Research on telecommunication resale service supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contract

The competition and cooperation between traditional telecom operators and resale operators in the supply chain are discussed, when the telecom industry developed telecommunication resale service. Supply chain contract is an effective way to coordinate the supply chain. This paper analyzes the revenue-sharing contract between telecom operators and resale operators. The study shows that by setting up a rational revenue-sharing ratio and wholesale price, a revenue-sharing contract can coordinate this supply chain, and telecom operators and resale operators can achieve a 'win-win' solution.

Revenue-sharing contract to coordinate independent participants within the supply chain

To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS IN TWO-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND NONLINEAR DEMAND

The challenge for supply chain management is to create appropriate supply chain contracts so as to optimize the system performance. To examine the role of asymmetric information in a two-echelon supply chain system and derive supply chain contracts to deal with existing asymmetric information, a two level supply chain model including one Supplier and one retailer under the demand of price elasticity is developed. By using the principalagent principle and the optimal control theory, three types of supply chain contract, i. e. , a wholesale pricing contract, a two-parameter linear and a two-parameter nonlinear contracts are obtained. In these contracts, the Supplier has asymmetric information about the retailer cost structure. Simulation results show that the two-parameter contracts are more effective strategies to achieve supply chain coordination.

Supply chain coordination mechanisms under flexible contracts

In supply chain management,an important research direction is to coordinate the supply chain through introducing flexible contracts.A supply chain contract is flexible if it can satisfy two conditions at the same time：the supply chain is coordinated,and the total profit of the supply chain can be arbitrarily divided between the supply chain members.This paper puts out two contracts,a flexible return contract and a flexible wholesale price discount contract.In contrast to many of literature,the supply chain contracts with an endogenous wholesale price is specifically considered,and a detailed sensitivity analysis of the contract parameters is given.The paper also discusses the application of the contract in vendor-managed inventory（VMI） mode.The results show that the supply chain＇s performance is improved after introducing above contracts.All the findings are illustrated by numerical examples.

Pareto Optimal Solution for Supply Contracts with Multiple Suppliers

This paper analyzes an electronic procurement （e-procurement） process between a manufacturer and N-supplier in the e-market. We proof that using the general contract based on auction theory, i. e. the wholesale price contract, would not achieve the coordination of channel composed of the manufacturer and the winning supplier. The paper designs a contract mechanism, i.e. the side payment price-restricted contract based on auction theory, which not only ensures Pareto optimal solutions for both, but also coordinates the supply chain. A numerical experiment is provided to compare the performance of different auction mechanisms and to reinforce key managerial insights generated through analysis.

Comparison on global supply chain purchasing strategies based on supply contracts

In the global supply chain in a setting characterized by exchange rate uncertainties,it is quite necessary to focus on comparative research trying to find out which kind of purchasing strategy is better in different situations.The two common global purchasing strategies,risk sharing(RS)and quantity flexibility(QF),are selected to be compared.Using a real-options approach,the valuation models of RS and QF purchasing contracts are established.By means of binomial lattice technique,numerical simulation and sensitivity analysis of two stochastic dynamic programs are presented.The effects on expected discounted value by changing relative parameters are described clearly.Based on comparative analysis,it is concluded that the QF purchasing strategy is better than that of the RS especially where great volatility exists for exchange rate processes in the global supply chain.

Supply chain coordination with participators' risk bias under buy-back contract

Considering participators' risk bias,which is measured by the method of value at risk,the risk constraints in a two-echelon supply chain coordination under buy-back contract is equal to giving the order of an upper bound.With a risk-averse dominant enterprise(M)and a risk-neutral non-dominant one(R),the coordination which optimizes the supply chain under the risk constraints is achieved by a penalty mechanism L to reduce R's order.With risk-neutral M and risk-averse R,M can motivate R to increase his order by providing a risk subsidy K,and two cases are discussed.If the risk constraints of R cannot satisfy M's participation constraint to offer K,M will prefer to accept R's order to obtain a sub-optimization solution of the supply chain.Or else,with M's K,R's optimal order just coordinates the supply chain,which is equal to the case without risk bias,and in this situation R's risk bias only affects the profit distribution between the participators.

Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Revenue Sharing Contract under Demand Disruptions

Contract is a common and effective mechanism for supply chain coordination,which has been studied extensively in recent years.For a supply chain network model,contracts can be used to coordinate it because it is too ideal to obtain the network equilibrium state in practical market competition.In order to achieve equilibrium,we introduce revenue sharing contract into a supply chain network equilibrium model with random demand in this paper.Then,we investigate the influence on this network equilibrium state from demand disruptions caused by unexpected emergencies.When demand disruptions happen,the supply chain network equilibrium state will be broken and change to a new one,so the decision makers need to adjust the contract parameters to achieve the new coordinated state through bargaining.Finally,a numerical example with a sudden demand increase as a result of emergent event is provided for illustrative purposes.

Research on two-part revenue-sharing contract under demand disruption

Assuming that the realized demand is determined by the inventory level,a two-part revenue sharing contract of one supplier and one retailer is analyzed under the circumstance of demand disruption(the disruption cost occurs at the supplier).Based on the centralized optimization,the profits of the two members are maximized in sequential optimization though a two-part revenue-sharing contract.The result shows that when the demand disruption occurs,if the degree of disruption is within some range,the ordering and manufacturing plans need not be changed,while only the revenue sharing fraction for the retailer should be diminished;if not,both the plan and the revenue sharing fraction should be changed for the possible coordination of the supply chain.Finally,numerical illustrations of the contract for various scenarios are given.

E-Supply Chain Incentive and Coordination Based on Revenue Sharing Contract

This paper took the buyer-biased electronic market as an example, where multiple suppliers selling short-life-cycle products are bidding for an order from a powerful buyer with stochastic customer demand. It used a single period newsvendor model to analyze the decision of supplied and buyers to do or not do business online. The results suggest that lack of Incentive is the key factor of B2B electronic markets failure. At the same time, it designed a revenue sharing contract to coordinate the E-supply chain in order to prevent failure of E-market.

Supply Chain Commitment Contract Model Based on Uncertainty Theory under Uncertain Market Information

Based on the uncertainty theory, market demand information updating as the background, we study the coordination and optimization problem of three-stage supply chain in this paper. In half a asymmetric market information, participants are risk neutral;under the situation of the manufacturers and wholesalers having twice pre-season decision-making opportunity, wholesalers can be replenished in the season;manufacturers join the lowest supply contract of commitment: manufacturers for exchanging the information that they cannot get directly from the market will promise wholesalers to have a season lowest supply in pre-season. According to this contract, we establish optimization models of manufacturers and wholesalers respectively, and get the optimal strategy of supply chain members by analyzing the supply chain system. Finally, by giving a numerical example and comparing the results with that under random circumstances, the result is reasonable.

Linear-contract Mechanisms Based on the Risk Preference of an Agent in a Supply Chain

With respect to different risk preference of an agent in a supply chain, linear-contract models are designed according to the principal-agent theory. The study shows that the risk preference of an agent directly correlates with the incentive compensation coefficient of principal, order quantity of principal and production capability level of the agent. The principal should offer an appropriate incentive contract according to the risk preference of the agent, or choose an agent holding a different risk preference to establish the supply chain.

A supply chain model with two competitive buyers under a hybrid greening cost and revenue-sharing contract

This article considers a vendor-buyer supply chain model where a single vendor produces a single product and markets it through two competitive buyers to a group of customers.The customer demand for the product depends on the selling price,green level and warranty period of the product.Successive deliveries from the vendor are scheduled at a fixed time interval wherein the subsequent shipments appear when each of the buyer’s inventories from the former delivery has just been cleared out.A hybrid greening cost and revenue sharing(HGRS)contract is introduced,which provides more profit to individual members than their decentralised profits.The numerical study reveals that,under the HGRS contract,customers are influenced to buy a more reliable product at a reasonable price with a higher green level.A sensitivity analysis is also carried out to examine the impact of key model parameters on the optimal results.

Digitalization for supply chain resilience and robustness: The roles of collaboration and formal contracts

Black swan events such as the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak cause substantial supply chain disruption risks to modern companies. In today’s turbulent and complex business environment, supply chain resilience and robustness as two critical capabilities for firms to cope with disruptions have won substantial attention from both the academia and industry. Accordingly, this study intends to explore how digitalization helps build supply chain resilience and robustness. Adopting organizational information processing theory, it proposes the mediating effect of supply chain collaboration and the moderating effect of formal contracts. Using survey data of Chinese manufacturing firms, the study applied structural equation modelling to test the research model. Results show that digitalization has a direct effect on supply chain resilience, and supply chain collaboration can directly facilitate both resilience and robustness. Our study also indicates a complementary mediating effect of supply chain collaboration on the relationship between digitalization and supply chain resilience and an indirect-only mediation effect on the relationship between digitalization and supply chain robustness. Findings reveal the differential roles of digitalization as a technical factor and supply chain collaboration as an organizational factor in managing supply chain disruptions. Paradoxically, formal contracts enhance the relationship between digitalization and supply chain resilience but weaken the relationship between supply chain collaboration and supply chain resilience. The validation of moderating effects determines the boundary conditions of digitalization and supply chain collaboration and provides insights into governing supply chain partners’ behavior. Overall, this study enhances the understanding on how to build a resilient and robust supply chain.

Supply chain coordination with CCPP for a short-life-cycle product

Supply chain coordination for short-life-cycle products with price-dependent demand is a focus in present operation management and management science fields. This paper considers the supply chain coordination problem for a single-cycle and two-selling-stage short-life-cycle product. Firstly, the inventory model of whole system is depicted with a stochastic dynamics programming. Then, a new combined contract CCPP （combined contract with pending prices） is developed to coordinate the decentralized system, and its validity for channel coordination is proved. Finally, the analysis on system performances is simulated with some examples.

A Study on Preconditions Setting of Long-Term Contract between Manufacturer and Component Supplier

To provide a risk-sharing mechanism that encourages a component supplier and a manufacturer to expand their production capacity of components and products, many researches on SCM suggested that it is better for the SC players to connect a long-term contract with flexible preconditions before doing the decision-making of production capacity. With considering of the uncertainty of demand and integrity problems between SC players, it is difficult to set reasonable preconditions. As a result, under-investment problems still occur frequently. In this paper, after we had discussed the decision-making of production capacity with the preconditions by analyzing the character of the players, we verified the under-investment problem of the supply chain. In order to clarify the optimum preconditions to alleviate the under-investment problem, we also analyzed the relations between preconditions and supply capacity of the whole supply chain. In the last part of this paper, we proposed a method of preconditions setting in such uncertain situations.

非理性偏好下动力电池再制造供应链最优决策与协调研究

考虑动力电池剩余容量不确定特征,构建由电池供应商和汽车制造商组成的再制造供应链,分别探讨决策双方完全理性、单向非理性偏好和双向非理性偏好等5种决策情形下的均衡解。研究发现:动力电池再制造容量起始点对回收量具有正向作用。在双向非理性偏好情形下,供应商的利他(公平)偏好程度增加导致制造商和系统总利润提高(降低),而自身利润总是降低;制造商的非理性偏好对供应链成员及系统利润的影响与供应商的非理性偏好程度有关。在单向非理性情形下,供应链成员的利他(公平)偏好程度增加导致自身利润下降(上升)而对方利润上升(下降)。两部定价契约和收益共享契约能够实现双向非理性偏好情形下再制造供应链的协调。

数字出版供应链下区块链投资与版权保护策略

区块链技术的可追溯性、安全性以及不可篡改性可以解决数字内容产品的盗版问题。以此为背景,构建由出版商、销售平台以及消费者构成的数字出版供应链,探讨在传统版权保护和区块链下的版权保护两种版权保护模式中的出版商最优定价和平台最优版权保护强度的决策问题,并比较了供应链绩效。研究发现,区块链下的版权保护模式中平台实施严格的版权保护强度,进而提高正版产品的吸引力,需求上升弥补了传统版权保护下出版商通过降价提高需求造成的利润损失。但是,平台只有在区块链投资成本较低时才愿意投资区块链,无法实现供应链的收益最大化。针对这一问题,通过设计契约提高了平台投资区块链的动机。最后,研究了平台投资区块链对购买正版产品消费者的消费者剩余以及社会福利,发现投资区块链可以提高社会福利,但在一定程度上会损害正版产品的消费者剩余。

融资道德风险下订单农业供应链成员信任决策研究

基于订单农业供应链中农户转移资金用途的道德风险问题,考虑农户受资金约束和农户互惠动机,构建公司与农户的序贯互惠信任博弈模型,通过农户完全理性、农户具有互惠动机但公司不提供担保融资、农户具有互惠动机且公司提供担保融资3种情形,分析订单价格、生产成本和融资利率对供应链成员信任的影响及信任决策问题.结果发现:当公司不提供担保融资时,无论农户是否具有互惠动机,双方都不能建立信任互惠关系;当公司提供担保融资且农户具有互惠动机时,则存在3种序贯互惠均衡,在互惠动机满足一定条件时可以实现双方互信;最后,通过算例分析订单价格、生产成本和融资利率对农户互惠敏感程度和守信用概率的影响,提出增强农户互惠动机,设置合理的利益共享和监督机制及丰富订单农业融资服务等建议.

基于区块链技术的生鲜农产品溯源系统设计

当前生鲜农产品供应链体系通常采用中心化管理模式,存在不同用户之间信息不对称、缺乏实时信息共享平台以及产品来源可追溯性差等问题。为了解决这些问题,采用区块链技术作为开发框架,提出一个基于区块链技术的生鲜农产品供应链的信息共享和可追溯模型,该模型系统具有信息共享、调度实时控制、溯源机制完善等特点。通过设计智能合约算法和新型的交易提案方式,实现自动化管理生鲜农产品供应链系统,以更好地可视化展现区块链网络交易流程。使用Caliper工具进行性能测试,实验结果表明,该方案可行性高,多节点环境下系统交易时延低,同时可以保证信息安全,具备完善的交易功能。最后,选取几个现有的农产品溯源应用系统做对比分析,该方案相较于现有的农产品溯源应用系统具有更强的溯源监管能力,更高的交易可靠性,以及更好的供应链各环节节点间的数据交互性等优势。