Women on Boards of Directors

This research aims to measure the current gender representation in membership of boards of directors,and to study the factors affecting the presence of women on boards.The results of the study will support the decision makers and policy makers at all levels by providing knowledge that contributes to bridging the current gap in participation of women boards.The methodology used in this research is the descriptive analytical approach,which relies on quantitative methods in the process of collecting and analyzing data.This study represents the boards of directors in the three sectors(public,private,and non-profit)in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,The study sample contained 350 targets,where a random sample of 150 people in the public sector,100 people in the private sector,and 100 people in the non-profit sector were selected.The research result found that the majority of the responses believe that the lack of experience and training,and social factors,are the most impact areas of explaining the reasons for the existence of a gap in women’s membership in boards of directors in the three sectors.And the most important reasons for the existence of a gender gap in board membership are:there is no statutory minimum percentage for women’s representation on boards of directors,and scarcity of female competencies in general,and the lack of women occupying leadership positions.

The Effect of the Board of Directors and Audit Quality on Disclosure of Internal Control Practices: Evidence from European Companies

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the board of directors,namely board size,board independence,and CEO duality,as well as audit quality on the disclosure of internal control information.The sample consists of 164 European companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600.Based on positive agency theory,the authors posit that board of directors and audit quality influence corporate internal control disclosure practice.The content analysis and the design of the evaluation criterion were used to calculate the disclosure index of internal control.Thus,multiple regression analysis is utilized to analyze the results of this paper.The average internal control information disclosure index was 0.285,indicating that most of the companies in our sample do not disclose enough information about the internal control.This low level of forward-looking information disclosure makes it very difficult for corporate stakeholders to determine the future performance of the company.Multivariate results indicate that internal control disclosure is positively and significantly associated with board independence,CEO duality,and audit quality.This study contributes to the literature on the various governance characteristics and disclosure by showing that the disclosure of internal control information in European countries is positively and significantly associated with board independence,separation of duties,and audit quality.Our study was based on a sample of European companies including countries regulating IC disclosure as well as unregulated settings.As noted by Bedard and Graham(2014),regulatory differences in countries can contribute insights on the costs and benefits of disclosure.Findings also have policy implications for investors,managers,and regulators.

A Study of the Role of the Board of Directors in Corporate Governance Based on UK Listed Companies

Companies are directed and controlled by corporate governance.It acts on the company internally and externally.The board of directors is responsible for the governance of the company;that is to say,the board of directors is the brain of the company,while corporate governance is the blood distributed throughout the company,which not only supplies blood to the whole,but also reflects the situation.Therefore,with regard to the role of the board of directors in corporate governance,this paper objectively analyzes the importance of the board of directors in corporate governance from theory to practice and from the internal composition of the board of directors to the impact of the board’s actions on the enterprise as a whole based on United Kingdom(UK)listed companies.

The Empirical Study of Board Structure and Firm Performance-Innovative Small Enterprises in China

This study took small enterprises listed from 2010 to 2015 as the empirical object.The board size,CEO duality,and ratio of independent directors were independent variables.The return on total assets,return on shareholders’equity and earnings per share were taken as the dependent variables,and three hypotheses were tested with SPSS.It is found that the board size was positively correlated with firm performance,but was not significant.There was no significant correlation between the ratio of independent directors and CEO duality on firm performance.This study suggests that optimizing the leadership structure of the board of directors can help improve the firm performance of enterprises.

Effects of Pilot Programs for China's Central SOE Board of Directors

Since June 2004, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission(SASAC) has launched pilot programs for a board of directors(BoD) for central SOEs to establish and improve their governance structure and standardize their exercise of shareholder rights over state-owned listed companies. Based on this quasinatural experiment, this paper examines the BoD's effects on the agency cost of state-owned listed companies and their economic consequences. Using data of central SOE-controlled companies listed at Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2002-2015, this paper finds that the pilot programs significantly reduced the two types of agency costs for the companies, and such effects primarily existed for listed companies with smaller central SOE shareholding ratios. Further test uncovers that, compared with central SOEs that did not carry out the pilot programs, those that did reported higher economic value-added and stock returns. Our conclusions offer a new interpretation of the BoD's governance effects from a controlling shareholder's perspective, and provide empirical evidence for the positive effects of the pilot programs for central SOE boards of directors. These findings have important policy implications for deepening SOE governance reforms.

Experts and Enterprises Contribute to the Revision of Standardization Law

Representatives and experts from government,enterprises,universities and research institutes gathered together in the two workshops on the revision draft of Standardization Law of China,held by the State Council of China,in Beijing in April,2016.Zhang Jianhua,Director of Business and Communication Depar tment,Legislative Aff airs Offi ce of the State Council,and SAC Vice-Administrator Yu Xinli attended the workshops.At the meetings。

Editorial Board of CDC

Dr. Gerardino D’Errico Associate professor in Physical Chemistry University of Naples “Federico II”, Italy .

Tracing back to the source: Understanding the corporate governance of boards of directors in Chinese SOEs

Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs),this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governance effect of SOE boards.We find that the governance effect of SOE boards is driven by the dual characteristics of SOEs:state involvement in ownership and market incentives.With the state involved in ownership,SOEs adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China(CPC),which results in an enhanced governance effect.Under market incentives,SOEs tend to have an optimal board structure that helps mitigate both the shareholder–management agency problem(Type I agency problem)and the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder agency problem(Type II agency problem).In terms of the governance effect of boards,directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders are effective in alleviating Type I and Type II agency problems,and this highlights the importance of mixed-ownership reforms in SOEs.Independent directors,especially those with a professional background,also play a role in improving corporate governance.However,independent directors in SOEs have relatively weak incentives to monitor,which limits their governance effect.This paper shows positive implications for promoting mixed-ownership reforms and improving board governance in SOEs.