This paper investigates company characteristics associated with the adoption and maintenance of executive stock option plan （ESOP） proxied with the proportion of stock options. In order to develop and inform public ...This paper investigates company characteristics associated with the adoption and maintenance of executive stock option plan （ESOP） proxied with the proportion of stock options. In order to develop and inform public policies of executive stock options, it is important to understand some of the factors that will drive a company＇s decision in order to adopt an ESOP. First, an analysis evaluates what kind of company＇s characteristics is associated with these plans. Second, an analysis examines the company characteristics that predict the adoption of such plans. This paper contributes to that stream of accounting research by identifying several factors to the adoption of ESOP. The study finds that intellectual capital （consisting of human capital efficiency （HCE）, structural capital efficiency （SCE）, and capital employed efficiency （CEE））, risk, and financial constraints （FC） affect the adoption and maintenance of stock option plans, these conditions will be increasingly supported in companies that experience relatively rapid growth. HCE, risk, and FC are significant predictors of the adoption and maintenance of ESOP. The companies who have some difficulties in observing human capital＇s behavior are more likely to adopt executive stock options, and based on our theoretical review, this is a rational course of action. Firms with higher levels of business risks are less likely to shift some of the risks to employees through stock-based compensation, whereas firms with higher variability in total shareholder returns are more likely to adopt executive stock options. Overall, our results suggest that higher monitoring costs prompt firms to adopt and maintain ESOP.展开更多
The relationship between options and agency costs in levered firms is studied by modeling the effect of executive stock options on the manager's investment strategy in levered firms. Stock options do not necessari...The relationship between options and agency costs in levered firms is studied by modeling the effect of executive stock options on the manager's investment strategy in levered firms. Stock options do not necessarily aggravate agency costs in levered firms. The corporate governance affects agency costs greatly. If debt-holders were entitled to design executive stock options together with stockholders, by allocating power properly between stockholders and debt-holders, firm value could be enhanced greatly. The following way of allocating power between the two parties is proposed: the exercise price should be the weighted average of the stockholders' and debt-holders' suggested exercise prices. The weight allocated to debt-holders is positively related to the amount of debts that debt-holders lend to stockholders.展开更多
文摘This paper investigates company characteristics associated with the adoption and maintenance of executive stock option plan （ESOP） proxied with the proportion of stock options. In order to develop and inform public policies of executive stock options, it is important to understand some of the factors that will drive a company＇s decision in order to adopt an ESOP. First, an analysis evaluates what kind of company＇s characteristics is associated with these plans. Second, an analysis examines the company characteristics that predict the adoption of such plans. This paper contributes to that stream of accounting research by identifying several factors to the adoption of ESOP. The study finds that intellectual capital （consisting of human capital efficiency （HCE）, structural capital efficiency （SCE）, and capital employed efficiency （CEE））, risk, and financial constraints （FC） affect the adoption and maintenance of stock option plans, these conditions will be increasingly supported in companies that experience relatively rapid growth. HCE, risk, and FC are significant predictors of the adoption and maintenance of ESOP. The companies who have some difficulties in observing human capital＇s behavior are more likely to adopt executive stock options, and based on our theoretical review, this is a rational course of action. Firms with higher levels of business risks are less likely to shift some of the risks to employees through stock-based compensation, whereas firms with higher variability in total shareholder returns are more likely to adopt executive stock options. Overall, our results suggest that higher monitoring costs prompt firms to adopt and maintain ESOP.
文摘The relationship between options and agency costs in levered firms is studied by modeling the effect of executive stock options on the manager's investment strategy in levered firms. Stock options do not necessarily aggravate agency costs in levered firms. The corporate governance affects agency costs greatly. If debt-holders were entitled to design executive stock options together with stockholders, by allocating power properly between stockholders and debt-holders, firm value could be enhanced greatly. The following way of allocating power between the two parties is proposed: the exercise price should be the weighted average of the stockholders' and debt-holders' suggested exercise prices. The weight allocated to debt-holders is positively related to the amount of debts that debt-holders lend to stockholders.
