In the current stage of Chinese forest ownership reform,the central and local governments as well as the forest farmers play different roles with variations in their expected returns.Managing these respective relation...In the current stage of Chinese forest ownership reform,the central and local governments as well as the forest farmers play different roles with variations in their expected returns.Managing these respective relationships between the forestry stakeholders to maximize their benefits while actively engaging each stakeholder in the collective forest ownership reform process has become an important issue.This study uses the game theory methodology to analyze the relationship between the different reform stakeholders and then builds on the forest farmers' participation in the reform model process at the reform movement micro-level.This model calculates the forest products equilibrium marketing sales and the government subsidies provided to the forest farmers,when the forest farmers willingly participate in the reform process.It will provide a reliable basis for formulation of government policies which positively impacts Chinese forestry reform.展开更多
The pursuit-evasion game models the strategic interaction among players, attracting attention in many realistic scenarios, such as missile guidance, unmanned aerial vehicles, and target defense. Existing studies mainl...The pursuit-evasion game models the strategic interaction among players, attracting attention in many realistic scenarios, such as missile guidance, unmanned aerial vehicles, and target defense. Existing studies mainly concentrate on the cooperative pursuit of multiple players in two-dimensional pursuit-evasion games. However, these approaches can hardly be applied to practical situations where players usually move in three-dimensional space with a three-degree-of-freedom control. In this paper,we make the first attempt to investigate the equilibrium strategy of the realistic pursuit-evasion game, in which the pursuer follows a three-degree-of-freedom control, and the evader moves freely. First, we describe the pursuer's three-degree-of-freedom control and the evader's relative coordinate. We then rigorously derive the equilibrium strategy by solving the retrogressive path equation according to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs(HJBI) method, which divides the pursuit-evasion process into the navigation and acceleration phases. Besides, we analyze the maximum allowable speed for the pursuer to capture the evader successfully and provide the strategy with which the evader can escape when the pursuer's speed exceeds the threshold. We further conduct comparison tests with various unilateral deviations to verify that the proposed strategy forms a Nash equilibrium.展开更多
To improve the anti-jamming and interference mitigation ability of the UAV-aided communication systems, this paper investigates the channel selection optimization problem in face of both internal mutual interference a...To improve the anti-jamming and interference mitigation ability of the UAV-aided communication systems, this paper investigates the channel selection optimization problem in face of both internal mutual interference and external malicious jamming. A cooperative anti-jamming and interference mitigation method based on local altruistic is proposed to optimize UAVs’ channel selection. Specifically, a Stackelberg game is modeled to formulate the confrontation relationship between UAVs and the jammer. A local altruistic game is modeled with each UAV considering the utilities of both itself and other UAVs. A distributed cooperative anti-jamming and interference mitigation algorithm is proposed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, the convergence of the proposed algorithm and the impact of the transmission power on the system loss value are analyzed, and the anti-jamming performance of the proposed algorithm can be improved by around 64% compared with the existing algorithms.展开更多
Benefiting from the development of Federated Learning(FL)and distributed communication systems,large-scale intelligent applications become possible.Distributed devices not only provide adequate training data,but also ...Benefiting from the development of Federated Learning(FL)and distributed communication systems,large-scale intelligent applications become possible.Distributed devices not only provide adequate training data,but also cause privacy leakage and energy consumption.How to optimize the energy consumption in distributed communication systems,while ensuring the privacy of users and model accuracy,has become an urgent challenge.In this paper,we define the FL as a 3-layer architecture including users,agents and server.In order to find a balance among model training accuracy,privacy-preserving effect,and energy consumption,we design the training process of FL as game models.We use an extensive game tree to analyze the key elements that influence the players’decisions in the single game,and then find the incentive mechanism that meet the social norms through the repeated game.The experimental results show that the Nash equilibrium we obtained satisfies the laws of reality,and the proposed incentive mechanism can also promote users to submit high-quality data in FL.Following the multiple rounds of play,the incentive mechanism can help all players find the optimal strategies for energy,privacy,and accuracy of FL in distributed communication systems.展开更多
Background: Waste generation and its disposal is an essential issue in the sustainability of the environment and the planet’s future. Waste management is essential across sectors, likewise the health sector. Therefor...Background: Waste generation and its disposal is an essential issue in the sustainability of the environment and the planet’s future. Waste management is essential across sectors, likewise the health sector. Therefore, there is a need to employ extra care and attention to handling waste generated from healthcare facilities to avoid the dangers of poor biomedical waste management. We carried out this study to examine the waste management practice in healthcare facilities in Lagos State. Methods: The study was a descriptive survey carried out in one-thousand two hundred and fifty-six (1256) healthcare facilities in Lagos State. Nine hundred sixty-nine (969) of these facilities are located in urban areas, while two hundred and eighty-seven (287) are rural. The facilities studied are government/public health facilities (15.45%), private-for-profit facilities (82.88%), NGOs, Mission/Faith-Based medical facilities (1.67%). The data collected were analyzed using descriptive statistics. Specifically, we utilized bar charts, frequency, and percentage. Result: The result shows that 98.4% (1236) of the studied facilities are registered with the Lagos State Waste Management Authority (LAWMA), while 1.6% (20) are not registered. 98.5% (191) of the 194 government-owned facilities, 98.5% (1025) of the 1041 private-for-profit facilities, and 98.2% (20) of the 21 NGOs/faith-based health facilities are registered with Lagos State Waste Management Authority. The result also shows that 94% of the healthcare facilities studied in Lagos State use color-coded waste bags to segregate waste at the point of origin. 58.7% of the facilities use red-colored bags, 33.3% use yellow-colored bags, 10.7% use black-colored bags, and 1.3% use brown biohazard bags for segregating Infectious waste. Also, 34.2% of the health facilities in Lagos state use red-colored bags, 36.9% use yellow-colored bags, 11% use black-colored bags, and 4.1% use brown-colored bags to segregate their hazardous waste. Conclusion: Some healthcare facilities in Lagos State do not follow the recommended guidelines for medical waste segregation. Waste generated is not appropriately segregated at the point of origin into the recommended colored bags/bins in some facilities. Thus, a policy and procedure regulating healthcare waste are mandatory. It is important to regularly train healthcare workers on proper waste management practices and encourage staff to read and apply WHO rules in managing healthcare waste. Healthcare personnel should realize that hazardous material is a potential cause of a public disaster.展开更多
Malicious attacks against data are unavoidable in the interconnected,open and shared Energy Internet(EI),Intrusion tolerant techniques are critical to the data security of EI.Existing intrusion tolerant techniques suf...Malicious attacks against data are unavoidable in the interconnected,open and shared Energy Internet(EI),Intrusion tolerant techniques are critical to the data security of EI.Existing intrusion tolerant techniques suffered from problems such as low adaptability,policy lag,and difficulty in determining the degree of tolerance.To address these issues,we propose a novel adaptive intrusion tolerance model based on game theory that enjoys two-fold ideas:(1)it constructs an improved replica of the intrusion tolerance model of the dynamic equation evolution game to induce incentive weights;and (2)it combines a tournament competition model with incentive weights to obtain optimal strategies for each stage of the game process.Extensive experiments are conducted in the IEEE 39-bus system,whose results demonstrate the feasibility of the incentive weights,confirm the proposed strategy strengthens the system’s ability to tolerate aggression,and improves the dynamic adaptability and response efficiency of the aggression-tolerant system in the case of limited resources.展开更多
Public-private partnerships(PPPs)have been used by governments around the world to procure and construct infrastructural amenities.It relies on private sector expertise and funding to achieve this lofty objective.Howe...Public-private partnerships(PPPs)have been used by governments around the world to procure and construct infrastructural amenities.It relies on private sector expertise and funding to achieve this lofty objective.However,given the uncertainties of project management,transparency,accountability,and expropriation,this phenomenon has gained tremendous attention in recent years due to the important role it plays in curbing infrastructural deficits globally.Interestingly,the reasonable benefit distribution scheme in a PPP project is related to the behavior decisionmaking of the government and social capital,aswell as the performance of the project.In this paper,the government and social capital which are the key stakeholders of PPP projects were selected as the research objects.Based on the fuzzy expected value model and game theory,a hybrid method was adopted in this research taking into account the different risk preferences of both public entities and private parties under the fuzzy demand environment.To alleviate the problem of insufficient utilization of social capital in a PPP project,this paper seeks to grasp the relationship that exists between the benefit distribution of stakeholders,their behavioral decision-making,and project performance,given that they impact the performance of both public entities and private parties,as well as assist in maximizing the overall utility of the project.Furthermore,four game models were constructed in this study,while the expected value and opportunity-constrained programming model for optimal decision-making were derived using alternate perspectives of both centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making.Afterward,the optimal behavioral decision-making of public entities and private parties in four scenarios was discussed and thereafter compared,which led to an ensuing discussion on the benefit distribution system under centralized decision-making.Lastly,based on an example case,the influence of different confidence levels,price,and fuzzy uncertainties of PPP projects on the equilibrium strategy results of both parties were discussed,giving credence to the effectiveness of the hybrid method.The results indicate that adjusting different confidence levels yields different equilibriumpoints,and therefore signposts that social capital has a fair perception of opportunities,as well as identifies reciprocal preferences.Nevertheless,we find that an increase in the cost coefficient of the government and social capital does not inhibit the effort of both parties.Our results also indicate that a reasonable benefit distribution of PPP projects can assist them in realizing optimum Pareto improvements over time.The results provide us with very useful strategies and recommendations to improve the overall performance of PPP projects in China.展开更多
Community residents play an important role in the development of rural tourism. Taking the interest demands of stakeholders and non-cooperative game process as main line,the conflict of interest between community resi...Community residents play an important role in the development of rural tourism. Taking the interest demands of stakeholders and non-cooperative game process as main line,the conflict of interest between community residents and tourists and between community residents themselves as guidance,it built an interest relation model for community participating in rural tourism. Besides,it elaborated non-cooperative relation and their interest pattern for stakeholders of rural tourism,and discussed behavior interaction process and results of core stakeholders of rural tourism. Finally,it came up with pertinent recommendations for harmonious and healthy development of rural tourism.展开更多
1.Introduction In August 2024,over 4400 Paralympic athletes will gather in Paris for the Paralympic Summer Games—the pinnacle of every Paralympian’s(Para athletes competing at the Paralympic Games)career to showcase...1.Introduction In August 2024,over 4400 Paralympic athletes will gather in Paris for the Paralympic Summer Games—the pinnacle of every Paralympian’s(Para athletes competing at the Paralympic Games)career to showcase their ability and skills.Their training,preparation,and effort in the years leading up to the Games are unparalleled.To achieve success,Paralympians specifically rely on a medical support team to achieve their goals.So,what is required of the medical support team to prepare Paralympians to get ready,set,and go to Paris 2024?展开更多
Objective: To study the problematic use of video games among secondary school students in the city of Parakou in 2023. Methods: Descriptive cross-sectional study conducted in the commune of Parakou from December 2022 ...Objective: To study the problematic use of video games among secondary school students in the city of Parakou in 2023. Methods: Descriptive cross-sectional study conducted in the commune of Parakou from December 2022 to July 2023. The study population consisted of students regularly enrolled in public and private secondary schools in the city of Parakou for the 2022-2023 academic year. A two-stage non-proportional stratified sampling technique combined with simple random sampling was adopted. The Problem Video Game Playing (PVP) scale was used to assess problem gambling in the study population, while anxiety and depression were assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). Results: A total of 1030 students were included. The mean age of the pupils surveyed was 15.06 ± 2.68 years, with extremes of 10 and 28 years. The [13 - 18] age group was the most represented, with a proportion of 59.6% (614) in the general population. Females predominated, at 52.8% (544), with a sex ratio of 0.89. The prevalence of problematic video game use was 24.9%, measured using the Video Game Playing scale. Associated factors were male gender (p = 0.005), pocket money under 10,000 cfa (p = 0.001) and between 20,000 - 90,000 cfa (p = 0.030), addictive family behavior (p < 0.001), monogamous family (p = 0.023), good relationship with father (p = 0.020), organization of video game competitions (p = 0.001) and definite anxiety (p Conclusion: Substance-free addiction is struggling to attract the attention it deserves, as it did in its infancy everywhere else. This study complements existing data and serves as a reminder of the need to focus on this group of addictions, whose problematic use of video games remains the most frequent due to its accessibility and social tolerance. Preventive action combined with curative measures remains the most effective means of combating the problem at national level.展开更多
Given a graph g=( V,A ) , we define a space of subgraphs M with the binary operation of union and the unique decomposition property into blocks. This space allows us to discuss a notion of minimal subgraphs (minimal c...Given a graph g=( V,A ) , we define a space of subgraphs M with the binary operation of union and the unique decomposition property into blocks. This space allows us to discuss a notion of minimal subgraphs (minimal coalitions) that are of interest for the game. Additionally, a partition of the game is defined in terms of the gain of each block, and subsequently, a solution to the game is defined based on distributing to each player (node and edge) present in each block a payment proportional to their contribution to the coalition.展开更多
Mining globally contributes to the growth of many economies of the world. Since its inception, the Zambian mining industry has contributed largely to the country’s economy. The various developments both in technology...Mining globally contributes to the growth of many economies of the world. Since its inception, the Zambian mining industry has contributed largely to the country’s economy. The various developments both in technology and knowledge have contributed to the scale at which mining is being done. Challenges in such a setting arise due to the socio-economic and environmental impacts of mining, which create multidimensional problems. The study investigated the importance of engaging stakeholders in progressive rehabilitation programs for large-scale open pit mines, using a case study of the Lumwana Mine and its host community, Manyama. A qualitative approach was used, and data was collected through one-on-one interviews. A combination of convenient and quota sampling was used to engage with host community leaders, professionals and academicians from various fields and institutions. Results showed that most participants had agreed that stakeholder engagement is important for progressive rehabilitation, but the challenge was that the host community and municipal council representatives were not aware of any progressive rehabilitation efforts at Lumwana Mine. This was attributed to a lack of stakeholder engagement and communication of mitigation progress activities by the Lumwana Mine. Results also revealed that the lack of environmental impact assessment regulations to compel companies to involve stakeholders throughout the entire life of the mine other than just at the pre-mining stage led to a lack of compliance and accountability in rehabilitation.展开更多
The malicious mining pool can sacrifice part of its revenue to employ the computing power of blockchain network.The employed computing power carries out the pool mining attacks on the attacked mining pool.To realize t...The malicious mining pool can sacrifice part of its revenue to employ the computing power of blockchain network.The employed computing power carries out the pool mining attacks on the attacked mining pool.To realize the win-win game between the malicious mining pool and the employee,the paper proposes an Employment Attack Pricing Algorithm(EAPA)of mining pools in blockchain based on game theory.In the EAPA,the paper uses mathematical formulas to express the revenue of malicious mining pools under the employment attack,the revenue increment of malicious mining pools,and the revenue of the employee.It establishes a game model between the malicious mining pool and the employee under the employment attack.Then,the paper proposes an optimal computing power price selection strategy of employment attack based on model derivation.In the strategy,the malicious mining pool analyzes the conditions for the employment attack,and uses the derivative method to find the optimal utilization value of computing power,employees analyze the conditions for accepting employment,and use the derivative method to find the optimal reward value of computing power.Finally,the strategy finds the optimal employment computing power price to realize Nash equilibrium between the malicious mining pool and the employee under the current computing power allocation.The simulation results show that the EAPA could find the employment computing power price that realizes the win-win game between the malicious mining pool and the employee.The EAPA also maximizes the unit computing power revenue of employment and the unit computing power revenue of honest mining in malicious mining pool at the same time.The EAPA outperforms the state-of-the-art methods such as SPSUCP,DPSACP,and FPSUCP.展开更多
In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individualcooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the g...In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individualcooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the generation ofcostly penalties and rewards has been a complex problem in promoting the development of cooperation. In real society,specialized institutions exist to punish evil people or reward good people by collecting taxes. We propose a strong altruisticpunishment or reward strategy in the public goods game through this phenomenon. Through theoretical analysis and numericalcalculation, we can get that tax-based strong altruistic punishment (reward) has more evolutionary advantages thantraditional strong altruistic punishment (reward) in maintaining cooperation and tax-based strong altruistic reward leads toa higher level of cooperation than tax-based strong altruistic punishment.展开更多
As the current global environment is deteriorating,distributed renewable energy is gradually becoming an important member of the energy internet.Blockchain,as a decentralized distributed ledger with decentralization,t...As the current global environment is deteriorating,distributed renewable energy is gradually becoming an important member of the energy internet.Blockchain,as a decentralized distributed ledger with decentralization,traceability and tamper-proof features,is an importantway to achieve efficient consumption andmulti-party supply of new energy.In this article,we establish a blockchain-based mathematical model of multiple microgrids and microgrid aggregators’revenue,consider the degree of microgrid users’preference for electricity thus increasing users’reliance on the blockchainmarket,and apply the one-master-multiple-slave Stackelberg game theory to solve the energy dispatching strategy when each market entity pursues the maximum revenue.The simulation results show that the blockchain-based dynamic game of the multi-microgrid market can effectively increase the revenue of both microgrids and aggregators and improve the utilization of renewable energy.展开更多
In evolutionary games,most studies on finite populations have focused on a single updating mechanism.However,given the differences in individual cognition,individuals may change their strategies according to different...In evolutionary games,most studies on finite populations have focused on a single updating mechanism.However,given the differences in individual cognition,individuals may change their strategies according to different updating mechanisms.For this reason,we consider two different aspiration-driven updating mechanisms in structured populations:satisfied-stay unsatisfied shift(SSUS)and satisfied-cooperate unsatisfied defect(SCUD).To simulate the game player’s learning process,this paper improves the particle swarm optimization algorithm,which will be used to simulate the game player’s strategy selection,i.e.,population particle swarm optimization(PPSO)algorithms.We find that in the prisoner’s dilemma,the conditions that SSUS facilitates the evolution of cooperation do not enable cooperation to emerge.In contrast,SCUD conditions that promote the evolution of cooperation enable cooperation to emerge.In addition,the invasion of SCUD individuals helps promote cooperation among SSUS individuals.Simulated by the PPSO algorithm,the theoretical approximation results are found to be consistent with the trend of change in the simulation results.展开更多
In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers in...In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.展开更多
This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,coo...This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.展开更多
China has implemented both quantitative and policy incentives for renewable energy development since 2019 and is currently in the policy transition stage.The implementation of renewable portfolio standards(RPSs)is dif...China has implemented both quantitative and policy incentives for renewable energy development since 2019 and is currently in the policy transition stage.The implementation of renewable portfolio standards(RPSs)is difficult due to the interests of multiple stakeholders,including power generation enterprises,power grid companies,power users,local governments,and the central government.Based on China’s RPS policy and power system reform documents,this research sorted out the core game decision problems of China’s renewable energy industry and established a conceptual game decision model of the renewable energy industry from the perspective of local governments,power generation enterprises and power grid companies.The results reveal that for local governments,the probability of meeting the earnings quota or punishments for not reaching quota completion are the major determinants for active participation in quota supervision.For power grid firms,the willingness to accept renewable electricity quotas depends on the additional cost of receiving renewable electricity and governmental incentives.It is reasonable,from the theoretical perspective,to implement the RPS policy on the power generation side.Electricity reform will help clarify the electricity price system and increase the transparency of the quota implementation process.Policy implications are suggested to achieve sustainable development of the renewable energy industry from price incentives and quantity delivery.展开更多
Solid waste management is one of the major concerns of the authorities in the town of Koudougou. The town’s dynamic is reflected in relative demographic growth and consumption patterns that are conducive to the forma...Solid waste management is one of the major concerns of the authorities in the town of Koudougou. The town’s dynamic is reflected in relative demographic growth and consumption patterns that are conducive to the formation of landfill sites. These landfills are the source of numerous environmental consequences and risk factors for local residents. The aim of this article is to analyze the dysfunctions in the solid waste sector caused by the interplay of actors. It draws on secondary data from the state of the art on the subject and primary data collected from 305 households and 89 actors in the sector between September 2022 and March 2023, as part of an ongoing thesis. These data show that the interplay of actors contributes to the malfunctioning of pre-collection and secondary collection, and remains a factor in the proliferation of illegal dumpsites.展开更多
文摘In the current stage of Chinese forest ownership reform,the central and local governments as well as the forest farmers play different roles with variations in their expected returns.Managing these respective relationships between the forestry stakeholders to maximize their benefits while actively engaging each stakeholder in the collective forest ownership reform process has become an important issue.This study uses the game theory methodology to analyze the relationship between the different reform stakeholders and then builds on the forest farmers' participation in the reform model process at the reform movement micro-level.This model calculates the forest products equilibrium marketing sales and the government subsidies provided to the forest farmers,when the forest farmers willingly participate in the reform process.It will provide a reliable basis for formulation of government policies which positively impacts Chinese forestry reform.
基金supported in part by the Strategic Priority Research Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences(XDA27030100)National Natural Science Foundation of China(72293575, 11832001)。
文摘The pursuit-evasion game models the strategic interaction among players, attracting attention in many realistic scenarios, such as missile guidance, unmanned aerial vehicles, and target defense. Existing studies mainly concentrate on the cooperative pursuit of multiple players in two-dimensional pursuit-evasion games. However, these approaches can hardly be applied to practical situations where players usually move in three-dimensional space with a three-degree-of-freedom control. In this paper,we make the first attempt to investigate the equilibrium strategy of the realistic pursuit-evasion game, in which the pursuer follows a three-degree-of-freedom control, and the evader moves freely. First, we describe the pursuer's three-degree-of-freedom control and the evader's relative coordinate. We then rigorously derive the equilibrium strategy by solving the retrogressive path equation according to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs(HJBI) method, which divides the pursuit-evasion process into the navigation and acceleration phases. Besides, we analyze the maximum allowable speed for the pursuer to capture the evader successfully and provide the strategy with which the evader can escape when the pursuer's speed exceeds the threshold. We further conduct comparison tests with various unilateral deviations to verify that the proposed strategy forms a Nash equilibrium.
基金supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.62271253,61901523,62001381)Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No.NS2023018)+2 种基金the National Aerospace Science Foundation of China under Grant 2023Z021052002the open research fund of National Mobile Communications Research Laboratory,Southeast University (No.2023D09)Postgraduate Research & Practice Innovation Program of NUAA (No.xcxjh20220402)。
文摘To improve the anti-jamming and interference mitigation ability of the UAV-aided communication systems, this paper investigates the channel selection optimization problem in face of both internal mutual interference and external malicious jamming. A cooperative anti-jamming and interference mitigation method based on local altruistic is proposed to optimize UAVs’ channel selection. Specifically, a Stackelberg game is modeled to formulate the confrontation relationship between UAVs and the jammer. A local altruistic game is modeled with each UAV considering the utilities of both itself and other UAVs. A distributed cooperative anti-jamming and interference mitigation algorithm is proposed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, the convergence of the proposed algorithm and the impact of the transmission power on the system loss value are analyzed, and the anti-jamming performance of the proposed algorithm can be improved by around 64% compared with the existing algorithms.
基金sponsored by the National Key R&D Program of China(No.2018YFB2100400)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.62002077,61872100)+4 种基金the Major Research Plan of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(92167203)the Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation(No.2020A1515110385)the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(No.2022M710860)the Zhejiang Lab(No.2020NF0AB01)Guangzhou Science and Technology Plan Project(202102010440).
文摘Benefiting from the development of Federated Learning(FL)and distributed communication systems,large-scale intelligent applications become possible.Distributed devices not only provide adequate training data,but also cause privacy leakage and energy consumption.How to optimize the energy consumption in distributed communication systems,while ensuring the privacy of users and model accuracy,has become an urgent challenge.In this paper,we define the FL as a 3-layer architecture including users,agents and server.In order to find a balance among model training accuracy,privacy-preserving effect,and energy consumption,we design the training process of FL as game models.We use an extensive game tree to analyze the key elements that influence the players’decisions in the single game,and then find the incentive mechanism that meet the social norms through the repeated game.The experimental results show that the Nash equilibrium we obtained satisfies the laws of reality,and the proposed incentive mechanism can also promote users to submit high-quality data in FL.Following the multiple rounds of play,the incentive mechanism can help all players find the optimal strategies for energy,privacy,and accuracy of FL in distributed communication systems.
文摘Background: Waste generation and its disposal is an essential issue in the sustainability of the environment and the planet’s future. Waste management is essential across sectors, likewise the health sector. Therefore, there is a need to employ extra care and attention to handling waste generated from healthcare facilities to avoid the dangers of poor biomedical waste management. We carried out this study to examine the waste management practice in healthcare facilities in Lagos State. Methods: The study was a descriptive survey carried out in one-thousand two hundred and fifty-six (1256) healthcare facilities in Lagos State. Nine hundred sixty-nine (969) of these facilities are located in urban areas, while two hundred and eighty-seven (287) are rural. The facilities studied are government/public health facilities (15.45%), private-for-profit facilities (82.88%), NGOs, Mission/Faith-Based medical facilities (1.67%). The data collected were analyzed using descriptive statistics. Specifically, we utilized bar charts, frequency, and percentage. Result: The result shows that 98.4% (1236) of the studied facilities are registered with the Lagos State Waste Management Authority (LAWMA), while 1.6% (20) are not registered. 98.5% (191) of the 194 government-owned facilities, 98.5% (1025) of the 1041 private-for-profit facilities, and 98.2% (20) of the 21 NGOs/faith-based health facilities are registered with Lagos State Waste Management Authority. The result also shows that 94% of the healthcare facilities studied in Lagos State use color-coded waste bags to segregate waste at the point of origin. 58.7% of the facilities use red-colored bags, 33.3% use yellow-colored bags, 10.7% use black-colored bags, and 1.3% use brown biohazard bags for segregating Infectious waste. Also, 34.2% of the health facilities in Lagos state use red-colored bags, 36.9% use yellow-colored bags, 11% use black-colored bags, and 4.1% use brown-colored bags to segregate their hazardous waste. Conclusion: Some healthcare facilities in Lagos State do not follow the recommended guidelines for medical waste segregation. Waste generated is not appropriately segregated at the point of origin into the recommended colored bags/bins in some facilities. Thus, a policy and procedure regulating healthcare waste are mandatory. It is important to regularly train healthcare workers on proper waste management practices and encourage staff to read and apply WHO rules in managing healthcare waste. Healthcare personnel should realize that hazardous material is a potential cause of a public disaster.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.51977113,62293500,62293501 and 62293505).
文摘Malicious attacks against data are unavoidable in the interconnected,open and shared Energy Internet(EI),Intrusion tolerant techniques are critical to the data security of EI.Existing intrusion tolerant techniques suffered from problems such as low adaptability,policy lag,and difficulty in determining the degree of tolerance.To address these issues,we propose a novel adaptive intrusion tolerance model based on game theory that enjoys two-fold ideas:(1)it constructs an improved replica of the intrusion tolerance model of the dynamic equation evolution game to induce incentive weights;and (2)it combines a tournament competition model with incentive weights to obtain optimal strategies for each stage of the game process.Extensive experiments are conducted in the IEEE 39-bus system,whose results demonstrate the feasibility of the incentive weights,confirm the proposed strategy strengthens the system’s ability to tolerate aggression,and improves the dynamic adaptability and response efficiency of the aggression-tolerant system in the case of limited resources.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.62141302)the Humanities Social Science Programming Project of the Ministry of Education of China(No.20YJA630059)+2 种基金the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangxi Province of China(No.20212BAB201011)the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(No.2019M662265)the Research Project of Economic and Social Development in Liaoning Province of China(No.2022lslybkt-053).
文摘Public-private partnerships(PPPs)have been used by governments around the world to procure and construct infrastructural amenities.It relies on private sector expertise and funding to achieve this lofty objective.However,given the uncertainties of project management,transparency,accountability,and expropriation,this phenomenon has gained tremendous attention in recent years due to the important role it plays in curbing infrastructural deficits globally.Interestingly,the reasonable benefit distribution scheme in a PPP project is related to the behavior decisionmaking of the government and social capital,aswell as the performance of the project.In this paper,the government and social capital which are the key stakeholders of PPP projects were selected as the research objects.Based on the fuzzy expected value model and game theory,a hybrid method was adopted in this research taking into account the different risk preferences of both public entities and private parties under the fuzzy demand environment.To alleviate the problem of insufficient utilization of social capital in a PPP project,this paper seeks to grasp the relationship that exists between the benefit distribution of stakeholders,their behavioral decision-making,and project performance,given that they impact the performance of both public entities and private parties,as well as assist in maximizing the overall utility of the project.Furthermore,four game models were constructed in this study,while the expected value and opportunity-constrained programming model for optimal decision-making were derived using alternate perspectives of both centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making.Afterward,the optimal behavioral decision-making of public entities and private parties in four scenarios was discussed and thereafter compared,which led to an ensuing discussion on the benefit distribution system under centralized decision-making.Lastly,based on an example case,the influence of different confidence levels,price,and fuzzy uncertainties of PPP projects on the equilibrium strategy results of both parties were discussed,giving credence to the effectiveness of the hybrid method.The results indicate that adjusting different confidence levels yields different equilibriumpoints,and therefore signposts that social capital has a fair perception of opportunities,as well as identifies reciprocal preferences.Nevertheless,we find that an increase in the cost coefficient of the government and social capital does not inhibit the effort of both parties.Our results also indicate that a reasonable benefit distribution of PPP projects can assist them in realizing optimum Pareto improvements over time.The results provide us with very useful strategies and recommendations to improve the overall performance of PPP projects in China.
文摘Community residents play an important role in the development of rural tourism. Taking the interest demands of stakeholders and non-cooperative game process as main line,the conflict of interest between community residents and tourists and between community residents themselves as guidance,it built an interest relation model for community participating in rural tourism. Besides,it elaborated non-cooperative relation and their interest pattern for stakeholders of rural tourism,and discussed behavior interaction process and results of core stakeholders of rural tourism. Finally,it came up with pertinent recommendations for harmonious and healthy development of rural tourism.
文摘1.Introduction In August 2024,over 4400 Paralympic athletes will gather in Paris for the Paralympic Summer Games—the pinnacle of every Paralympian’s(Para athletes competing at the Paralympic Games)career to showcase their ability and skills.Their training,preparation,and effort in the years leading up to the Games are unparalleled.To achieve success,Paralympians specifically rely on a medical support team to achieve their goals.So,what is required of the medical support team to prepare Paralympians to get ready,set,and go to Paris 2024?
文摘Objective: To study the problematic use of video games among secondary school students in the city of Parakou in 2023. Methods: Descriptive cross-sectional study conducted in the commune of Parakou from December 2022 to July 2023. The study population consisted of students regularly enrolled in public and private secondary schools in the city of Parakou for the 2022-2023 academic year. A two-stage non-proportional stratified sampling technique combined with simple random sampling was adopted. The Problem Video Game Playing (PVP) scale was used to assess problem gambling in the study population, while anxiety and depression were assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). Results: A total of 1030 students were included. The mean age of the pupils surveyed was 15.06 ± 2.68 years, with extremes of 10 and 28 years. The [13 - 18] age group was the most represented, with a proportion of 59.6% (614) in the general population. Females predominated, at 52.8% (544), with a sex ratio of 0.89. The prevalence of problematic video game use was 24.9%, measured using the Video Game Playing scale. Associated factors were male gender (p = 0.005), pocket money under 10,000 cfa (p = 0.001) and between 20,000 - 90,000 cfa (p = 0.030), addictive family behavior (p < 0.001), monogamous family (p = 0.023), good relationship with father (p = 0.020), organization of video game competitions (p = 0.001) and definite anxiety (p Conclusion: Substance-free addiction is struggling to attract the attention it deserves, as it did in its infancy everywhere else. This study complements existing data and serves as a reminder of the need to focus on this group of addictions, whose problematic use of video games remains the most frequent due to its accessibility and social tolerance. Preventive action combined with curative measures remains the most effective means of combating the problem at national level.
文摘Given a graph g=( V,A ) , we define a space of subgraphs M with the binary operation of union and the unique decomposition property into blocks. This space allows us to discuss a notion of minimal subgraphs (minimal coalitions) that are of interest for the game. Additionally, a partition of the game is defined in terms of the gain of each block, and subsequently, a solution to the game is defined based on distributing to each player (node and edge) present in each block a payment proportional to their contribution to the coalition.
文摘Mining globally contributes to the growth of many economies of the world. Since its inception, the Zambian mining industry has contributed largely to the country’s economy. The various developments both in technology and knowledge have contributed to the scale at which mining is being done. Challenges in such a setting arise due to the socio-economic and environmental impacts of mining, which create multidimensional problems. The study investigated the importance of engaging stakeholders in progressive rehabilitation programs for large-scale open pit mines, using a case study of the Lumwana Mine and its host community, Manyama. A qualitative approach was used, and data was collected through one-on-one interviews. A combination of convenient and quota sampling was used to engage with host community leaders, professionals and academicians from various fields and institutions. Results showed that most participants had agreed that stakeholder engagement is important for progressive rehabilitation, but the challenge was that the host community and municipal council representatives were not aware of any progressive rehabilitation efforts at Lumwana Mine. This was attributed to a lack of stakeholder engagement and communication of mitigation progress activities by the Lumwana Mine. Results also revealed that the lack of environmental impact assessment regulations to compel companies to involve stakeholders throughout the entire life of the mine other than just at the pre-mining stage led to a lack of compliance and accountability in rehabilitation.
基金funded by the“Ling Yan”Research and Development Project of Science Technology Department of Zhejiang Province of China under Grants No.2022C03122Public Welfare Technology Application and Research Projects of Science Technology Department of Zhejiang Province of China under Grants No.LGF22F020006 and LGF21F010004.
文摘The malicious mining pool can sacrifice part of its revenue to employ the computing power of blockchain network.The employed computing power carries out the pool mining attacks on the attacked mining pool.To realize the win-win game between the malicious mining pool and the employee,the paper proposes an Employment Attack Pricing Algorithm(EAPA)of mining pools in blockchain based on game theory.In the EAPA,the paper uses mathematical formulas to express the revenue of malicious mining pools under the employment attack,the revenue increment of malicious mining pools,and the revenue of the employee.It establishes a game model between the malicious mining pool and the employee under the employment attack.Then,the paper proposes an optimal computing power price selection strategy of employment attack based on model derivation.In the strategy,the malicious mining pool analyzes the conditions for the employment attack,and uses the derivative method to find the optimal utilization value of computing power,employees analyze the conditions for accepting employment,and use the derivative method to find the optimal reward value of computing power.Finally,the strategy finds the optimal employment computing power price to realize Nash equilibrium between the malicious mining pool and the employee under the current computing power allocation.The simulation results show that the EAPA could find the employment computing power price that realizes the win-win game between the malicious mining pool and the employee.The EAPA also maximizes the unit computing power revenue of employment and the unit computing power revenue of honest mining in malicious mining pool at the same time.The EAPA outperforms the state-of-the-art methods such as SPSUCP,DPSACP,and FPSUCP.
基金the National Natural Science Foun-dation of China(Grant No.71961003).
文摘In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individualcooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the generation ofcostly penalties and rewards has been a complex problem in promoting the development of cooperation. In real society,specialized institutions exist to punish evil people or reward good people by collecting taxes. We propose a strong altruisticpunishment or reward strategy in the public goods game through this phenomenon. Through theoretical analysis and numericalcalculation, we can get that tax-based strong altruistic punishment (reward) has more evolutionary advantages thantraditional strong altruistic punishment (reward) in maintaining cooperation and tax-based strong altruistic reward leads toa higher level of cooperation than tax-based strong altruistic punishment.
基金This research was funded by the NSFC under Grant No.61803279in part by the Qing Lan Project of Jiangsu,in part by the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant Nos.2020M671596 and 2021M692369+3 种基金in part by the Suzhou Science and Technology Development Plan Project(Key Industry Technology Innovation)under Grant No.SYG202114in part by the Open Project Funding from Anhui Province Key Laboratory of Intelligent Building and Building Energy Saving,Anhui Jianzhu University,under Grant No.IBES2021KF08in part by the Postgraduate Research&Practice Innovation Program of Jiangsu Province under Grant No.KYCX23_3320in part by the Postgraduate Research&Practice Innovation Program of Jiangsu Province under Grant No.SJCX22_1585.
文摘As the current global environment is deteriorating,distributed renewable energy is gradually becoming an important member of the energy internet.Blockchain,as a decentralized distributed ledger with decentralization,traceability and tamper-proof features,is an importantway to achieve efficient consumption andmulti-party supply of new energy.In this article,we establish a blockchain-based mathematical model of multiple microgrids and microgrid aggregators’revenue,consider the degree of microgrid users’preference for electricity thus increasing users’reliance on the blockchainmarket,and apply the one-master-multiple-slave Stackelberg game theory to solve the energy dispatching strategy when each market entity pursues the maximum revenue.The simulation results show that the blockchain-based dynamic game of the multi-microgrid market can effectively increase the revenue of both microgrids and aggregators and improve the utilization of renewable energy.
基金Project supported by the Doctoral Foundation Project of Guizhou University(Grant No.(2019)49)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71961003)the Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province(Grant No.7223)。
文摘In evolutionary games,most studies on finite populations have focused on a single updating mechanism.However,given the differences in individual cognition,individuals may change their strategies according to different updating mechanisms.For this reason,we consider two different aspiration-driven updating mechanisms in structured populations:satisfied-stay unsatisfied shift(SSUS)and satisfied-cooperate unsatisfied defect(SCUD).To simulate the game player’s learning process,this paper improves the particle swarm optimization algorithm,which will be used to simulate the game player’s strategy selection,i.e.,population particle swarm optimization(PPSO)algorithms.We find that in the prisoner’s dilemma,the conditions that SSUS facilitates the evolution of cooperation do not enable cooperation to emerge.In contrast,SCUD conditions that promote the evolution of cooperation enable cooperation to emerge.In addition,the invasion of SCUD individuals helps promote cooperation among SSUS individuals.Simulated by the PPSO algorithm,the theoretical approximation results are found to be consistent with the trend of change in the simulation results.
基金the Open Foundation of Key Lab-oratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan Province(Grant Nos.2020SE308 and 2020SE309).
文摘In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.
基金Project supported by the Open Foundation of Key Laboratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan Province(Grant Nos.2020SE308 and 2020SE309).
文摘This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.
基金financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71704178)Beijing Excellent Talent Program(No.2017000020124G133)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(Nos.2021YQNY07 and 2021YQNY01).
文摘China has implemented both quantitative and policy incentives for renewable energy development since 2019 and is currently in the policy transition stage.The implementation of renewable portfolio standards(RPSs)is difficult due to the interests of multiple stakeholders,including power generation enterprises,power grid companies,power users,local governments,and the central government.Based on China’s RPS policy and power system reform documents,this research sorted out the core game decision problems of China’s renewable energy industry and established a conceptual game decision model of the renewable energy industry from the perspective of local governments,power generation enterprises and power grid companies.The results reveal that for local governments,the probability of meeting the earnings quota or punishments for not reaching quota completion are the major determinants for active participation in quota supervision.For power grid firms,the willingness to accept renewable electricity quotas depends on the additional cost of receiving renewable electricity and governmental incentives.It is reasonable,from the theoretical perspective,to implement the RPS policy on the power generation side.Electricity reform will help clarify the electricity price system and increase the transparency of the quota implementation process.Policy implications are suggested to achieve sustainable development of the renewable energy industry from price incentives and quantity delivery.
文摘Solid waste management is one of the major concerns of the authorities in the town of Koudougou. The town’s dynamic is reflected in relative demographic growth and consumption patterns that are conducive to the formation of landfill sites. These landfills are the source of numerous environmental consequences and risk factors for local residents. The aim of this article is to analyze the dysfunctions in the solid waste sector caused by the interplay of actors. It draws on secondary data from the state of the art on the subject and primary data collected from 305 households and 89 actors in the sector between September 2022 and March 2023, as part of an ongoing thesis. These data show that the interplay of actors contributes to the malfunctioning of pre-collection and secondary collection, and remains a factor in the proliferation of illegal dumpsites.