Revisiting the nexus between fiscal decentralization and CO_(2)emissions in South Africa:fresh policy insights

The argument over fiscal decentralization and carbon dioxide emission(CO_(2))reduction has received much attention.However,evidence to back this claim is limited.Economic theory predicts that fiscal decentralization affects environmental quality,but the specifics of this relationship are still up for debate.Some scholars noted that fiscal decentralization might lead to a race to the top,whereas others contended that it would result in a race to the bottom.In light of the current debates in environmental and development economics,this study aims to provide insight into how this relationship may function in South Africa from 1960 to 2020.In contrast to the existing research,the present study uses a novel dynamic autoregressive distributed lag simulation approach to assess the positive and negative changes in fiscal decentralization,scale effect,technique effect,technological innovation,foreign direct investment,energy consumption,industrial growth,and trade openness on CO_(2)emissions.The following are the main findings:(i)Fiscal decentralization had a CO_(2)emission reduction impact in the short and long run,highlighting the presence of the race to the top approach.(ii)Economic growth(as represented by the scale effect)eroded ecological integrity.However,its square(as expressed by technique effect)aided in strengthening ecological protection,validating the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis.(iii)CO_(2)emissions were driven by energy utilization,trade openness,industrial value-added,and foreign direct investment,whereas technological innovation boosted ecological integrity.Findings suggest that further fiscal decentralization should be undertaken through further devolution of power to local entities,particularly regarding environmental policy issues,to maintain South Africa’s ecological sustainability.South Africa should also establish policies to improve environmental sustainability by strengthening a lower layer of government and clarifying responsibilities at the national and local levels to fulfill the energy-saving functions of fiscal expenditures.

CHINA'S REGIONAL DISPARITY IN 1981-2000:OPENNESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NON-STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION

While China's economic growth has been impressive since 1978, regional disparity in terms of provincial per capita GDP has been increasing. On the other hand, this rapid but uneven growth was accompanied by China's deepening openness and structural reforms including the development of non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and fiscal decentralization. Based on quantitative analyses, this paper tries to explore the features of regional disparity in China and the relationships between regional growth and China's openness and economic structure reforms in the period from 1981 to 2000. The paper finds that the catching-up of the coastal region to the initially rich provinces, which are mainly located in inland areas, brought about a convergence of the growth pattern across provinces in the 1980s.The subsequent divergence in the provincial growth rates between the coast and the interior generated an enlarging regional disparity in China in the 1990s. The ever-faster growth in the coastal region was benefited by China's openness and the development of non-state-owned enterprises. The development of non-state-owned enterprises underlies the higher operational efficiency in the coastal region. Additionally, with the insignificant regression results, fiscal decentralization was observed to facilitate faster growth in the coast region. The findings justify the initiative of the 'West Region Development Strategy' and offer some policy implications for China.

County-Level Tax Sharing:A Statistical Basis for Measuring China's Fiscal Decentralization

Controversies exist in literature regarding what indicators should be employed to measure China's fiscal decentralization. This paper measures China's fiscal decentralization by the sharing ratios of county-level VAT and corporate income tax(CIT). This approach avoids such problems as homogeneous denominator, and reflects the intricate interactions between governments at different levels. Based on extensive sources including the National Fiscal Statistical Information at Prefecture and County Levels and China County(City) Socio-Economic Statistical Yearbook over the 1998-2007 period, our estimation and analysis led to the following findings:(1) Since 2002, counties have retained a falling share of revenues;(2) a multidimensional horizontal comparison reveals a pattern in the county-level tax sharing ratio, i.e. counties in central and eastern regions retain a higher share of tax revenues compared with those in western and northwestern regions.These findings explain the fiscal difficulties at the grassroots level, and can be used to conduct a quantitative analysis of the determinants and economic effects of China's fiscal decentralization."

Interprovincial Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Financial Decentralization in China

By motivating local governments to fight for financial resources,China's tax sharing reform has affected the structure of financial decentralization and inflated local financial systems,thus spawning regional financial risks.Based on theoretical analysis and empirical evidence,this paper has arrived at the following findings:due to different policy objectives,central and local governments exhibit different fiscal and financial behaviors;public finance and financial sector have become financing instruments with certain convertibility under local economic growth framework;fiscal decentralization inevitably affects financial decentralization and lays the foundation for provincial fiscal disparities,resulting in a certain spatial effect of interprovincial fiscal variable;financial explicit centralization/implicit decentralization and fiscal centralization have fueled local competition for financial resources and resulted in correlation between the spatial effects of provincial financial and fiscal variables,and moreover,their mismatch has also spawned fiscal and financial risks on various fronts.Hence,setting clear boundaries of financial centralization and decentralization and ensuring local government fiscal accountability is the key to the prevention and mitigation of fiscal and financial risks in China.

Foreign direct investment and environmental pollution:A fiscal decentralization perspective

Based on the panel data of 272 prefecture-level cities in China from 2003 to 2017,this study used the comprehensive index of environmental pollution to measure local environmental pollution,and employed the panel simultaneous equation to analyze the relationship between fiscal decentralization,foreign direct investment,and environmental pollution.The results showed that environmental pollution has the characteristics of time inertia and positive spatial spillover;fiscal decentralization and local government competition have a significant“race to bottom”effect on environmental pollution;and with the increase of fiscal decentralization,environmental quality will deteriorate.In the interaction between foreign direct investment and environmental pollution under the system of fiscal decentralization,foreign direct investment aggravates environmental pollution.Meanwhile,if the environmental pollution in a given region is serious,the willingness of foreign investors to invest therein is lessened to a certain extent.Based on the conditions in China,certain policy suggestions are put forward to increase environmental quality,such as building a comprehensive performance assessment mechanism that includes environmental quality,optimizing the decentralization system,and raising the threshold of foreign investment access.

Fiscal Decentralization,Financial Decentralization and Macroeconomic Governance

Improvement of the macroeconomic governance system as an important part of the national governance system is a key initiative to address major economic problems in the new era.The coordination and economic regulatory effects of fiscal and monetary policies are subject to the arrangements of fiscal and financial decentralization systems.Analysis revealed a mismatch between China’s fiscal income decentralization and fiscal spending decentralization,as manifested in the clear decentralization of fiscal revenue and vague decentralization of fiscal spending;in pursuing local economic stability,local governments seek other sources of revenue and compete for financial resources,as manifested in apparent financial centralization and implicit financial decentralization,causing financial decentralization to be inconsistent between various levels of government and between government and the market.The above-mentioned problems are reflected in mutual conversion between public finance and financial intermediation as two financial allocation methods and mutual transmission between fiscal and financial risks,making the case for enhancing coordination between fiscal and monetary policies.In creating a scientific macroeconomic governance system,therefore,we must establish clear local government responsibilities,reduce the proportion of local fiscal spending,clarify the orientations and relief boundary of fiscal and monetary policies,moderately decentralize financial powers,and give better play to the role of local governments in improving the quality of economic development and controlling major risks.

Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China: A Meta-Regression Analysis

In order to test whether the major empirical results on the "relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China" are affected by study characteristics, this paper conducts a meta-analysis of the major existing empirical literature. Our analysis indicates that some empirical results on how China's fiscal decentralization affects economic growth are subject to different study characteristics. In particular, empirical results that fiscal decentralization has "significant positive effect" on economic growth are subject to such study characteristics as "region, labor and capital growth rate, other reforms and intra-budget capital." Through the funnel plot asymmetry test, the problem of publication bias is found to exist in the sampled literature and is concentrated in spending decentralization.

A Study of the Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on the Efficiency of Public Health Expenditure

In this present-day global pandemic that has not been completely resolved,health is a major concern among people,and correspondingly,people are demanding higher standards for public health products and services provided by the government.In this paper,we measure the technical efficiency of public health expenditure in each province by using the data envelopment analysis(DEA)model,and examine the impact of decentralization on the efficiency of public health expenditure under the fiscal decentralization system using the panel data from 31 provinces from 2012-2019 in a panel model subject to fixed effects.

Local Government Behavior behind China's Excessive Investment under Decentralization——Theoretical and Empirical Analysis Based on Manufacturing Sector

This paper investigates the effect of local government intervention on capital deepening of manufacturing sector by using interprovincial panel data sets of 28 Chinese provinces,municipalities and autonomous regions between 1994 and 2011.Theoretical research indicates that as a transitional economy,China's local government intervention in corporate investment behaviors will cause excessive investment,thus bringing about a long-term and sustained tendency of capital deepening in manufacturing sector.Empirical test further discovers that in a certain range,the phenomenon of capital deepening in manufacturing sector is not an inevitable result endogenous to economic development and technology progress,and that investment behaviors of manufacturing sector are largely subject to the external institutional environment.Fiscal decentralization has indeed promoted capital deepening of manufacturing sector.Financial credit expansion and interventions in SOEs are major instruments for local governments to intervene in the capital deepening of manufacturing sector and such an influence is particularly significant for China's central,western and northeast regions.Therefore,clarifying government functions and improving local government performance review mechanism are of great significance to the healthy development of China's manufacturing sector.

市场激励型环境规制与区域绿色创新效率——基于产业结构优化的中介作用和财政分权的调节作用

市场激励型环境规制是解决环境治理负外部性、推进区域绿色创新效率的重要途径。以2005~2020年省级面板数据为研究对象,采用系统广义矩模型(GMM)法检验市场激励型环境规制对区域绿色创新效率的影响效应及作用机理。结果表明:市场激励型环境规制能够显著促进区域绿色创新效率的提升;从影响机制来看,市场激励型环境规制可以通过促进产业结构合理化和产业结构高级化显著促进区域绿色创新效率的提升。此外,有效的财政分权环境能够正向调节市场激励型环境规制与区域绿色创新效率的关系。

财政分权、地方政府行为与经济绿色转型

依据2009—2019年省级面板数据,运用空间计量模型和中介效应模型,考量财政分权对经济绿色转型的影响。结果显示:财政分权促进本地经济绿色转型作用显著,但会阻碍相邻地区经济绿色转型进程。地方政府行为在二者之间发挥着中介作用,财政分权主要通过促进地方政府合理竞争、提高地方政府财政科技投入强度促进经济绿色转型,提高财政分权程度会强化地方保护主义行为,但地方保护主义行为对经济绿色转型的影响不显著。

财政分权对城市贸易经济韧性的影响及空间溢出效应研究

在中国经济迈入高质量发展的新阶段,面对复杂多变的外部环境,增强城市贸易经济韧性显得尤为重要。基于2006—2019年中国283个地级及以上城市面板数据,采用面板回归模型、中介效应检验方法及空间杜宾模型,探究财政分权对城市贸易经济韧性的影响及其内在机制。研究发现:财政分权能够显著增强城市贸易经济韧性,科技创新在其中起到了部分中介作用,上述结论经过稳健性检验后依然成立。空间杜宾效应分析表明,财政分权可通过空间溢出效应作用于邻近城市贸易经济韧性。进一步的异质性分析发现,财政分权对城市贸易经济韧性的促进作用存在区位和贸易经济韧性水平差异,在中西部地区及贸易经济韧性水平较低的城市中其作用效果越强。

财政分权的绿色技术创新效应研究

绿色技术创新是实现绿色低碳发展的核心驱动力,明确财政分权在绿色技术创新过程中发挥的作用具有十分重要的现实意义。本文基于中国省级面板数据,运用固定效应模型等多种数据分析方法,实证考察了财政分权对绿色技术创新的影响。研究发现,财政分权抑制了绿色技术创新。财政科学技术支出和环境规制是财政分权抑制绿色技术创新的主要渠道;在低收入地区,财政分权抑制了绿色技术创新,而在中高收入地区,财政分权促进了绿色技术创新。本文为深化我国财政分权体制改革,加快推进绿色技术创新提供了政策启示。

财政分权的碳排放效应:空间溢出与机制检验

立足于“双碳”目标实现的现实需求,在厘清财政分权影响区域碳排放的理论基础上,基于2007—2019年我国30省份面板数据,运用空间杜宾和中介效应模型,实证检验财政分权对区域碳排放的直接效应、空间效应与作用路径。全国层面检验发现,财政分权对本地、邻地碳排放均具有显著促进作用,且收入角度指标作用效果大于支出角度。分区域检验发现,中部地区直接效应显著为负、间接效应显著为正,西部地区影响特征与全国层面一致,而东部地区则与之相反。机制检验发现,财政分权在产业结构合理化、高级化两个维度均会阻碍产业结构升级,从而间接促进地区碳排放。据此提出强化中央碳排放治理事务的博弈力量、探索推进碳税征收、加强府际合作、优化产业结构等政策建议。

企业科学研究反哺存在最优财政支持模式吗?——基于财政科技支出集中度视角

基于2010—2020年我国省级区域的规上工业企业数据,探讨财政科技支出集中度对企业科学研究反哺的作用效应。结果表明:提升区域财政科技支出集中度,可抑制企业科学研究反哺强度和倾向。分区域角度分析,东部地区反哺强度受到激励,西部地区反哺倾向受到抑制,中部地区反哺倾向虽受到激励但反哺强度受到抑制。调节效应和门槛效应分析显示,提升财政科技支出强度或企业绩效可逆转财政科技支出集中度对反哺强度的抑制性,低企业绩效可加剧财政科技支出集中度对反哺倾向的抑制,而提升企业绩效可减弱上述抑制效应。

财政分权与经济结构转型——一个产业结构变迁的视角

本文构建了一个包含中央政府和地方政府行为的产业结构变迁模型,理论研究发现,财政分权通过影响财政支出在中央政府和地方政府之间的配置来影响全要素生产率,并进一步影响产业结构变迁,促进产业升级。财政分权对产业结构变迁的影响与财政分权水平,以及非农业部门中央政府财政支出和地方政府财政支出的产出弹性有关,经济中可能存在最优的财政分权可以极小化农业部门的劳动力份额。本文通过省级面板数据模型考察财政分权对我国产业结构变迁的影响。在此基础上,我们运用省内县级政府的税收分权指标,以及双重差分方法做了稳健性检验。实证研究发现,财政分权程度越高,农业部门劳动力份额越低,这说明财政分权有利于我国产业结构升级,且这一结论是稳健的。

金融结构优化、财政分权与共同富裕

立足金融结构优化背景,借助我国省级面板数据考察金融结构优化对共同富裕的影响。研究发现:金融结构优化能够赋能共同富裕,且经过内生性与一系列稳健性检验后,该结论依然成立;门槛回归结果表明,财政分权可正向调节金融结构优化对共同富裕的影响。进一步研究得出,金融结构优化对共同富裕影响呈“边际效应递增”的非线性特征;金融结构优化积极效应在不同区域和不同金融发展水平地区存在显著差异。

财政分权对城乡融合发展的影响研究

合理的财政制度安排和财政引导对激发地方活力、推动城乡融合发展进程进而实现乡村振兴战略具有重要意义。研究基于2011—2021年我国省级面板数据,利用全局主成分分析法、建立计量模型,研究财政分权对我国城乡融合发展的影响,及其通过基础设施水平和市场化水平对我国城乡融合发展的中介效应。结果表明:近年来,我国城乡融合发展水平呈上升趋势,但增速缓慢且区域间差异较大;财政分权对城乡融合发展总体来看具有显著的负向影响,并且具有通过抑制基础设施水平提升、引致市场化程度降低从而对城乡融合发展产生不利影响的中介效应,这一结果通过稳健性检验;通过异质性检验发现,财政分权对城乡融合发展的负向效应主要集中在中部地区,对西部区域城乡融合发展表现为显著正向促进作用。深化财政体制改革、完善地方政府绩效考核体系、重视城乡基础设施空间布局、破解阻碍城乡融合发展的制度障碍是推动城乡融合发展的关键举措。

财政分权、人力资本与高质量就业

更加充分、更高质量的就业是实现经济高质量发展的应有之义。本文选取2005—2021年30个省级面板数据,基于固定效应模型和面板门槛模型,实证检验财政分权、人力资本与高质量就业之间的关系。研究发现,财政分权对就业质量具有显著的促进作用,在经过系列稳健性检验后结论仍然成立。地区异质性检验结果表明,财政分权对西部地区的促进作用比东、中部地区更加明显。传导机制分析发现,财政分权通过提高人力资本水平,进而促进高质量就业水平的提升。人力资本在财政分权对高质量就业作用的关系中存在显著的门槛效应。随着人力资本水平的提升,财政分权对就业质量的作用呈现边际效应递增的规律。因此,我国应当进一步完善财政分权制度,实行多元化的地方政府绩效考核体系,多渠道提升地区人力资本水平,从而推动实现更高质量的就业。

财政分权、粮食安全省长责任制与粮食生产

财政分权作为调控地方资源配置的重要制度安排和国家治理的重要手段,对治理成效的影响日益凸显,对地方粮食生产的作用不可忽视。在理论分析基础上,基于2004—2020年中国31个省份(不含港澳台地区)的面板数据,实证检验财政分权对粮食生产的影响,并分析粮食安全省长责任制对上述两者关系的调节作用。结果发现,财政分权显著削弱了粮食生产;粮食安全省长责任制对财政分权与粮食生产之间的调节关系存在区域异质性,有效抑制了财政分权对粮食主产区、中部和西部地区粮食生产的削弱,但加剧了财政分权对非主产区和东部地区粮食生产的削弱。为稳定各地粮食生产、保障国家粮食安全,提出三方面政策建议:一是优化财政分权制度,加强地方支粮财政支出;二是优化粮食安全省长责任制内容,提高地方粮食生产;三是加大地方考核中粮食安全权重,提高地方抓粮积极性。