Farmers’contract breach behavior is cited as one of the major stumbling blocks in the sustainable expansion of contract farming in many developing countries.This paper examines farmers’contract breach decisions from...Farmers’contract breach behavior is cited as one of the major stumbling blocks in the sustainable expansion of contract farming in many developing countries.This paper examines farmers’contract breach decisions from the perspective of time preferences.The empirical analysis is based on a household survey and economic field experiments of poultry households participating in contract farming conducted in Jiangsu Province,China.A discounted utility model and a maximum likelihood technique are applied to estimate farmers’time preferences and the effect of time preferences on contract breach in the production and sales phases are explored with a bivariate probit model.The results show that,on average,the poultry farmers in the sample are generally present biased and impatient regarding future utility.The regression results show that farmers with a higher preference for the present and a higher discount rate are more likely to breach contracts,and time preferences play a greater role in the production phase than in the sales phase.When considering heterogeneity,specific investments and transaction costs promote contract stability only for farmers with a low degree of impatience.Moreover,compared with large-scale farmers,small-scale farmers’contract breach decisions are more significantly affected by their time preferences.These results have implications for contract stability policies and other issues that are impacted by the linking of behavioral preferences to agricultural decisions.展开更多
The double moral hazard of "company + farmer" and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of "company + fa...The double moral hazard of "company + farmer" and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of "company + farmer" model was the existence of market risk, namely, the fluctuation of market price, and the stable market price in contracts was actualy a kind of interval, instead of a specific value. Furthermore, the effect of default penalty, market transaction cost and time prefer-ence cost on the stability of contract was studied. The results showed that default penalty, market transaction cost and time preference cost had positive influence on the price interval range of a contract.展开更多
In this study,I explore smoking behavior among pregnant U.S.women using the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.The key aspect of this study is the availability of smoking participation data befor...In this study,I explore smoking behavior among pregnant U.S.women using the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.The key aspect of this study is the availability of smoking participation data before and during pregnancy.I consider the probabilities of smoking cessation while pregnant as the outcome.I find that pregnant women who smoke are less responsive to price changes when they are more future-oriented.Women who are more present-oriented are more likely to smoke and consume more cigarettes given that they smoke more than those who are future-oriented.Moreover,those who discount the future more heavily are more sensitive to the money price of cigarettes than those who are more future-oriented.I focus on the role of time preference and the interaction between time preference and price in determining these outcomes.展开更多
There are few papers in the literature focusing on the issue of the optimal depletion of exhaustible resources in the framework of variable time preference. This paper attempts to analyze the pure consumption of exhau...There are few papers in the literature focusing on the issue of the optimal depletion of exhaustible resources in the framework of variable time preference. This paper attempts to analyze the pure consumption of exhaustible resource under hy- perbolic time preference, and to discuss the optimal depletion rate and the effect of the protection of the exhaustible resource under different commitment abilities. The results of model show that the case of the hyperbolic discount with the full commitment of the govemment is equivalent to the case of constant discount of the social planner problem. In that case, the optimal depletion rate and the initial consumption of exhaustible resource are the slowest. On the contrary, they are the highest and the myopic behaviors lead to excessive consumption of exhaustible resources inevitably without commitment. Otherwise, in the case of partial commit- ment, the results are between the cases of full commitment and of no commitment. Therefore, with the hyperbolic time preference, the optimal depletion rate of resource depends on the commitment ability. Higher commitment ability leads to lower effective rate of time preference, and consequently, lower depletion rate and lower initial depletion value. The improvement of commitment ability can decrease the impatience and myopia behaviors, and contribute to the protection of the exhaustible resources.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72003082 and 71573130)the Project of Philosophy and Social Science Research in Colleges and Universities in Jiangsu Province of China(2020SJA1015)+1 种基金the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions,China(PAPD)the China Center for Food Security Studies,Nanjing Agricultural University,China。
文摘Farmers’contract breach behavior is cited as one of the major stumbling blocks in the sustainable expansion of contract farming in many developing countries.This paper examines farmers’contract breach decisions from the perspective of time preferences.The empirical analysis is based on a household survey and economic field experiments of poultry households participating in contract farming conducted in Jiangsu Province,China.A discounted utility model and a maximum likelihood technique are applied to estimate farmers’time preferences and the effect of time preferences on contract breach in the production and sales phases are explored with a bivariate probit model.The results show that,on average,the poultry farmers in the sample are generally present biased and impatient regarding future utility.The regression results show that farmers with a higher preference for the present and a higher discount rate are more likely to breach contracts,and time preferences play a greater role in the production phase than in the sales phase.When considering heterogeneity,specific investments and transaction costs promote contract stability only for farmers with a low degree of impatience.Moreover,compared with large-scale farmers,small-scale farmers’contract breach decisions are more significantly affected by their time preferences.These results have implications for contract stability policies and other issues that are impacted by the linking of behavioral preferences to agricultural decisions.
基金Supported by Humanities and Social Sciences of Ministry of Education(12YJC630050)Soft Science Bidding Project of Ministry of Agriculture(20140203)+1 种基金Jiangxi Soft Science Fund(20141BBA10065)Jiangxi’s Jiangxi Provincial Education Department(GJJ13727)~~
文摘The double moral hazard of "company + farmer" and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of "company + farmer" model was the existence of market risk, namely, the fluctuation of market price, and the stable market price in contracts was actualy a kind of interval, instead of a specific value. Furthermore, the effect of default penalty, market transaction cost and time prefer-ence cost on the stability of contract was studied. The results showed that default penalty, market transaction cost and time preference cost had positive influence on the price interval range of a contract.
文摘In this study,I explore smoking behavior among pregnant U.S.women using the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.The key aspect of this study is the availability of smoking participation data before and during pregnancy.I consider the probabilities of smoking cessation while pregnant as the outcome.I find that pregnant women who smoke are less responsive to price changes when they are more future-oriented.Women who are more present-oriented are more likely to smoke and consume more cigarettes given that they smoke more than those who are future-oriented.Moreover,those who discount the future more heavily are more sensitive to the money price of cigarettes than those who are more future-oriented.I focus on the role of time preference and the interaction between time preference and price in determining these outcomes.
基金Funding of Humanities and Social Science Fundation of Education Ministry (Grant No.11YJC790308)
文摘There are few papers in the literature focusing on the issue of the optimal depletion of exhaustible resources in the framework of variable time preference. This paper attempts to analyze the pure consumption of exhaustible resource under hy- perbolic time preference, and to discuss the optimal depletion rate and the effect of the protection of the exhaustible resource under different commitment abilities. The results of model show that the case of the hyperbolic discount with the full commitment of the govemment is equivalent to the case of constant discount of the social planner problem. In that case, the optimal depletion rate and the initial consumption of exhaustible resource are the slowest. On the contrary, they are the highest and the myopic behaviors lead to excessive consumption of exhaustible resources inevitably without commitment. Otherwise, in the case of partial commit- ment, the results are between the cases of full commitment and of no commitment. Therefore, with the hyperbolic time preference, the optimal depletion rate of resource depends on the commitment ability. Higher commitment ability leads to lower effective rate of time preference, and consequently, lower depletion rate and lower initial depletion value. The improvement of commitment ability can decrease the impatience and myopia behaviors, and contribute to the protection of the exhaustible resources.