Optimal Trade Credit Policy for Supplier under Asymmetric Information in the Supply Chain

Most papers about trade credit in supply chain studied retailer's inventory policy based on information shared.Few papers paid attention to supplier's trade credit policy under asymmetric information.So this paper tries to propose supplier's optimal trade credit policy to reveal retailer's private information.The aim is achieved by developing an incentive model with revelation principle.The retailer's private information can be found out through this trade credit policy.This contract is more general than the wholesale price contract.For the retailer's private information,the order quantity and ratio of delay in payment are distorted.Sensitivity analysis shows that the contract is influenced by sales ability and discount rate.Finally,the indirect mechanism with the same effect is proposed to make it easy to be put into practice.

Determining threshold default risk criterion for trade credit granting

To solve the problem of setting threshold default risk criterion to select retailer eligible for trade credit granting, a novel method of solving simultaneous equations is proposed. This method is based on the bilevel programming modeling of trade credit decisions as an interaction between supplier and retailer. First, the bilevel programming is set up where the supplier decides on credit terms at the top level considering a retailer's default risk, and the retailer determines the order quantity at the lower level in response to the credit terms offered. By solving this bilevel programming, the relationship between the optimal terms and the corresponding default risk can be derived. Second, set the extreme scenario where the threshold default risk is approached as the point causing a zero marginal profit to the supplier. Another equation describing this particular scenario can also be derived. Thus, a system of two equations with two unknown variables can be obtained where the exact threshold default risk criterion can be found by solving them. A numerical example is presented as an illustration of the method proposed. It shows that the threshold criterion can be uniquely determined when the financial costs, inventory costs, and the marketing parameters of supplier and buyer are specified.

Identification of the Credit Guarantee Network of Steel Trade Enterprises in China

The risk points in the credit guarantee network of steel trade enterprises were identified by using the network analysis method in this paper. Firstly, the formation and operation mechanism of steel trade credit guarantee network was analyzed.Secondly,a guarantee network was established to analyze the related network structure indexes based on the mutual guarantee data of 83 enterprises in a steel trade market. These indexes included centrality,honest broker,and structural hole. The results suggest that network analysis method can be used to find out the risk points of the guarantee network. Additionally,some recommendations are brought forth to reduce or prevent future crises.

Decision-Making of a Single Supplier and Multiple Loss-Averse Retailers under Partial Trade Credit

Under partial trade credit,suppliers usually require retailers to pay a fraction of the purchase cost immediately when ordering and the remaining payment is deferred at the end of the sales period.Considering a supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and multiple loss-averse retailers,we develop models under partial trade credit.We analyze the optimal decisions of a supplier and retailers under decentralized decision-making.The study shows that there is a unique Nash equilibrium among the retailers,and the optimal total order quantity of retailers increases as the delayed payment ratio increases and as the degree of retailers'competition increases,but decreases with an increase in the loss aversion.Numerical studies are conducted to demonstrate the solution procedures and the effects of the parameters on decisions and profits.

Trade credit financing for supply chain coordination under financial challenges:a multi‑leader–follower game approach

This study is designed to solve supply chain inefficiencies caused by some members’financial problems,such as capital shortages and financing restrictions in a stochastic environment.To this end,we have established a supply chain finance framework by designing two novel coordinating contracts based on trade credit financing for different problem settings.These contracts are modeled in the form of multi-leader Stackelberg games that address horizontal and vertical competition in a supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and a financially constrained manufacturer.However,previous studies in the trade credit literature have addressed only simple vertical competition,that is,seller-buyer competition.To solve the proposed models,two algorithms were developed by combining population-based metaheuristics,the Nash-domination concept,and the Nikaido-Isoda function.The results demonstrate that the proposed supply chain finance framework can eliminate supply chain inefficiencies and make a large profit for suppliers,as well as the financially constrained manufacturer.Furthermore,the results of the contracts’analysis showed that if the manufacturer is required to settle its payments to suppliers before the end of the period,the trade credit contract cannot coordinate the supply chain because of a lack of incentive for suppliers.However,if the manufacturer is allowed to extend its payments to the end of the period,the proposed trade credit financing contract can coordinate the supply chain.Finally,the sensitivity analysis results indicate that the worse the financial status of the manufacturer,the more bargaining power suppliers have in determining the contract parameters for more profit.

Optimal Policy for EOQ Model with Two Level of Trade Credits in One Replenishment Cycle

In general, a supplier/retailer frequently offer trade credit to stimulate their respective sales. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal supplier/retailer’s replenishment decisions under two levels of trade credit policy within the economic order quantity (EOQ) framework. This paper deals with the supplier/retailer’s inventory replenishment problem under two levels of trade credit in one replenishment cycle. A different approach of two levels of trade credit is used, which give more freedom to the supplier/retailer in business. In addition, the easy-to-use procedure is developed to efficiently find the optimal cycle time for the retailer under minimizing annual total relevant cost. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate these results.

Trade Credit in the Crisis： Selling or Financing？

The work investigates the use of trade credit in Italy for reasons of a financial nature. The analysis considers Italian small and medium-sized enterprises （SMEs） and investigates, over the years of 2009-2011： the existence of functional relationships between the incidence of trade receivables and payables and corporate profitability; the existence of interdependencies between trade credit policy and trade debt policy; and the coexistence of interchangeable and complementary conditions between trade debts and bank loans and other sources of funding. To verify the research hypotheses, linear regression models on a yearly basis are used and these models are put under observation over the years of 2009-2011. We can conclude that there are interdependencies between trade credit policy and trade debt policy and that trade credit is a source of flexible way of financing, also available in periods of crisis, which has a positive effect on the profitability of SMEs and can be utilized as a complementary and substitute source of financing to bank loans.

Construction of BDS Spatiotemporal Information Agricultural Product Digital Credit System

Spatiotemporal information,positioning and navigation services have become important elements of new type infrastructure.The rapid development of global digital trade provides a large-scale application scenario for the use of Beidou Navigation Satellite System(BDS)spatiotemporal information to support the certification of origin of agricultural products.The BDS spatiotemporal information agricultural product digital credit system uses such modules as BDS,spatiotemporal information collection,spatiotemporal coding,and spatiotemporal blockchain.It incorporates multi-level joint supervision mechanisms such as government,associations,and users.Starting from the initial production link of agricultural products,it realizes the correspondence and locking of online and offline products,effectively improves the integrity and credibility of information in the production process,finished product quality and circulation process of products,effectively manages the green production and anti-channel conflicts of producers,and provides credible information for consumers,thus realizing the digital credit certification of products.The successful practice of characteristic agricultural products in Yunnan Province has verified the application ability of the BDS spatiotemporal information agricultural product digital credit system.This system has played a significant role in promoting the online and offline locking,credible information,effective supervision and high quality and high price of characteristic agricultural products from the field.The BDS provides services for global digital trade and contributes to the further enhancement of the global application scale of GNSS.

西北汉简中的“贳卖”与“贳买”

西北汉简中有一类“戍卒贳卖名籍”,内容是记录内地戍卒将其携带衣财物在边地贳卖的名单。贳卖即赊卖,西北汉简中记载的贳卖是一种有特定含义的贸易活动。贳卖地点包括吏所和民所两类,分别对应“卒居署贳卖名籍”和“卒行道贳卖名籍”。贳卖民所标识信息详细,包括籍贯、人名,且有任者,并标注身份或居住地;贳卖吏所记录则相对简单,只标注隧长、隧名。偶有作为知情人、见证人的“旁人”,但并不涉及经济关系。其原因在于军政系统中的候官对军吏约束力强。贳卖对象相对集中,故而当为中介机构而非个人。官府禁止戍卒私贳卖衣财物。边地官府掌控着贳卖活动,军政系统由部—候官—都尉府层层控制,通过帮助收债、干预贳卖价格、调查交易中的不法行为来实现。贳卖方来源于内地戍卒,贳买方主要为边地的底层官吏和百姓。内地戍卒的贳卖活动有专门贸易的倾向,可以满足对现钱的需求,是丝路贸易的一种形式。边地军政机构也能通过贳卖名籍掌握士卒的衣物装备,从而保证戍卒基本屯戍衣装需要。国家对边地贳卖活动的管理显示出其为巩固边疆所做出的努力。

考虑碳交易和消费者偏好的纺织服装企业演化博弈

绿色信贷是实现绿色发展的重要推动力,能够有效调节资金配置。针对服装行业中小制造企业进行绿色生产时融资难的问题,建立消费者绿色偏好及碳交易驱动下的政府、银行、纺织服装中小企业及核心企业间的四方演化博弈模型,分析四方参与主体的相互影响机制及演化稳定策略。研究结果表明:当纺织服装中小企业进行绿色生产时的成本、碳交易的收益及间接名誉收益之和大于绿色生产所支付的成本时,企业才会选择绿色生产策略;政府监管力度和消费者绿色偏好的增加均能提升银行实施绿色信贷的意愿,降低纺织服装中小企业绿色生产的成本;碳交易价格的上涨能够加快纺织服装中小企业绿色生产的演进速度;相对较大的服装生产订单能够引导纺织服装中小企业主动进行绿色生产。

Trade credit contracting in a risk-averse supply chain under adverse selection and moral hazard

Trade credit,as an effective tool for integrating and coordinating material,information,and financial flows in supply chain management,is becoming increasingly widespread.We explore how a manufacturer can design optimal trade credit contracts when a risk-averse retailer hides its sales cost information(adverse selection)and selling effort level(moral hazard).We develop incentive models for a risk-averse supply chain when adverse selection and moral hazard coexist,which are then compared with the results under single information asymmetry(moral hazard).Moreover,we analyze the effects of private information and risk-aversion coefficient on contract parameters,selling effort level and the profit or utility of the supply chain.The study shows that when the degree of retailer’s risk aversion is within a certain range,reasonable trade credit contracts designed by the manufacturer can effectively induce the retailer to report its real sales cost and encourage it to exert appropriate effort.Furthermore,we find that the optimal trade credit period,optimal transfer payment,and retailer’s optimal sales effort level under dual information asymmetry are less than those under single information asymmetry.Numerical analysis are conducted to demonstrate the effects of the parameters on decisions and profits.

A Letter of Credit

In international trade, one of the major things is how to protect benefits and implement obligations of seller and buyer, more concerns are than domestic businesses. As a result, solutions for facilitate and ensure obligations are undeniable necessity. By the nature, Letter of credit balance risk for both seller and buyer sides, protect the benefits and ensure obligations. Letter of credit plays a very important role in international trade.

碳信息披露能提升企业商业信用融资吗?

“双碳”背景下,企业披露的碳信息日益成为利益相关者决策的重要依据。本文以2010—2022年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,采用文本分析法量化碳信息披露的可读性和信息增量特征,并探究其对商业信用融资金额与期限的影响。研究发现,企业碳信息披露可读性越好,所获的商业信用融资金额越高。而且,碳披露的信息增量越多,商业信用融资不仅额度越高且期限越长,表明相较于披露“形式”,供应商和客户更注重企业的“实质”表现。进一步的作用机制分析显示,良好的碳信息披露可读性和信息增量能够提升企业的信息透明度与市场地位,激发供应链上下游的善意信任与能力信任,进而对商业信用融资产生积极作用。异质性分析发现,在企业面临的媒体关注度越高以及所处地区环境规制越弱的情况下,碳信息披露的商业信用融资效应越显著。此外,经济后果检验表明,碳信息披露带来的商业信用融资能显著提升企业环境绩效与财务绩效,表现为促进绿色创新和提升企业价值。

金融支持碳普惠制发展研究:制约因素、实践经验和对策建议

金融支持碳普惠制发展能实现微观领域碳减排和提升绿色金融服务能力的双赢目标。本文基于我国碳普惠制试点实践,分析我国碳普惠制发展面临的制约因素,在借鉴国外有关碳普惠制实践经验基础上,探索建立以金融碳账户为核心的碳普惠发展机制,从搭建碳征信服务体系、量化碳减排核算标准、优化绿色金融管理机制、完善正向激励配套措施等方面提出相关对策建议,助力我国绿色低碳发展目标的实现。

贸易信用中账期对供应链上下游及供应链绩效的影响研究

贸易信用是供应链中上游企业允许下游企业延期支付的供应链内部融资方式。有观点认为供应链下游企业会通过延长账期挤占上游企业的利益,特别是一些处于优势地位的下游,他们不仅延长账期,同时还向上游提供供应链金融服务。针对这一观点,本文构建了含有一个供应商和一个零售商的供应链模型,对比分析了三种供应商资金模式下(自有资金充足、自有资金不足通过银行融资和自有资金不足通过零售商融资)账期对供应链上下游和供应链绩效的具体影响。研究发现:(1)对于供应商和供应链绩效,账期并非越短越好,对于零售商,账期并非越长越好;(2)当供应商资金不足时,相比银行融资,零售商融资会导致账期延长,但这有利于供应链各成员的利润;(3)账期和零售商融资并存有可能让供应链各成员获得更多利润,甚至会比供应商资金充足情况更优。本文的研究有助于厘清贸易信用中账期对供应链成员的收益以及供应链整体绩效的影响,从而有利于供应链金融业务的健康开展。

考虑信贷和投资约束下贸易政策不确定性对企业融资成本影响的研究

融资成本是影响企业融资行为的重要因素,贸易政策不确定性通过金融不确定性信贷约束和企业不确定性投资约束抑制企业融资。随着中美贸易摩擦延续,贸易政策不确定性对企业融资成本的影响成为了学者关注的重要研究内容。基于此,本文以1999年至2020年沪市A股上市企业的财务数据为样本,检验了中国贸易政策不确定性对企业融资成本的影响。实证结果显示,中国贸易政策不确定性上升会显著增加企业的融资成本,金融不确定性信贷约束和企业不确定性投资约束是贸易政策不确定性作用于企业融资成本的中介变量,且不同行业对贸易政策不确定性的敏感性存在差异。在中美贸易摩擦延续背景下,本文为审视贸易政策不确定性对企业融资成本的影响提供了新的视角和证据,丰富了贸易政策不确定性和企业行为相关文献的研究成果。

基于区块链的水权交易机制重构研究

为完善区块链技术下水权交易平台建设,建立统一用水权交易市场,激发水权交易活跃度,结合区块链技术对水权交易机制进行重构研究。将区块链技术与水权交易目前需求进行契合分析,结合微服务技术搭建了水权交易技术框架,初步设计了基于区块链的水权交易流程与奖惩机制,并利用python语言对信用奖惩机制进行仿真。结果表明,区块链技术特征与水权交易需求高度契合,奖惩机制能够保证在不同交易情景下对参与节点进行有效奖励,并对违约节点进行信用和资金处罚,从而激励交易主体积极履行合约,提高整体交易意愿。区块链技术应用在水权全交易流程能够实现水权交易信息的完整性存储、分布式共享和追踪溯源,研究成果可以为优化水权交易机制、提高水权交易活跃度提供参考。

应用型本科院校大学生诚信体系构建研究

大学生信用水平的提升对于优化国家社会信用结构,提升信用社会运行效率具有重要作用。应用型高校在不断加强学生的在校技能,提高学生解决实际业务的能力的同时还需要提高学生具备良好的信用。尤其是国际贸易专业的学生不仅要加强专业能力的提高,也要加强信用建设的发展。本文对通过信用的含义出发,分析应用型本科院校大学生信用体系建设存在的主要问题,从而提出了信用体系建设的初步框架,希望对高校的信用体系建设有一定的借鉴作用。

商业信用融资对企业高质量发展的影响研究——基于创新与效率视角

利用2010-2021年我国沪深A股上市公司数据,实证检验商业信用融资对企业高质量发展的影响,并从创新与效率视角进行中介效应检验。研究发现,商业信用融资与企业高质量发展显著正相关,研发投入、营运能力和代理成本在其中发挥了部分中介作用,即商业信用融资有助于增加企业研发投入、提高企业营运能力和降低企业代理成本进而推动企业高质量发展。

经济政策不确定性与商业信用融资--基于商业信用网络位置视角的分析

以2000—2022年沪深A股上市公司数据为样本,研究经济政策不确定性对商业信用融资的影响及商业信用网络位置的调节效应。研究发现,面对经济政策不确定性时,企业会选择提升商业信用融资,企业的商业信用网络中心位置能够帮助企业获得更多性商业信用融资。进一步研究表明,面对经济政策不确定性时,商业信用网络中心位置的企业是通过提升企业的议价能力与系统性风险地位进而提升商业信用融资的。面对经济政策不确定性提升,商业信用网络中心位置会缓解企业对银行信用的依赖,但当企业自身能够获得银行信用青睐时,商业信用网络中心位置会进一步提升企业的商业信用。因此建议企业在经济政策不确定高时充分融入商业信用网络,以商业信用资源弥补企业的银行信用不足,同时监管当局需要合理引导优化金融资源配置,避免商业信用与银行信用资源的过度倾斜。