A certain constrained dynamic game is shown to be equivalent to a pair of symmetric dual variational problems which have more general formulation than those already existing in the literature. Various duality results ...A certain constrained dynamic game is shown to be equivalent to a pair of symmetric dual variational problems which have more general formulation than those already existing in the literature. Various duality results are proved under convexity and generalized convexity assumptions on the appropriate functionals. The dynamic game is also viewed as equivalent to a pair of dual variational problems without the condition of fixed points. It is also indicated that the equivalent formulation of a pair of symmetric dual variational problems as dynamic generalization of those had been already studied in the literature. In essence, the purpose of the research is to establish that the solution of variational problems yields the solution of the dynamic game.展开更多
Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no...Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.展开更多
In this paper,a criterion for the partially symmetric game(PSG)is derived by using the semitensor product approach.The dimension and the basis of the linear subspace composed of all the PSGs with respect to a given se...In this paper,a criterion for the partially symmetric game(PSG)is derived by using the semitensor product approach.The dimension and the basis of the linear subspace composed of all the PSGs with respect to a given set of partial players are calculated.The testing equations with the minimum number are concretely determined,and the computational complexity is analysed.Finally,two examples are displayed to show the theoretical results.展开更多
文摘A certain constrained dynamic game is shown to be equivalent to a pair of symmetric dual variational problems which have more general formulation than those already existing in the literature. Various duality results are proved under convexity and generalized convexity assumptions on the appropriate functionals. The dynamic game is also viewed as equivalent to a pair of dual variational problems without the condition of fixed points. It is also indicated that the equivalent formulation of a pair of symmetric dual variational problems as dynamic generalization of those had been already studied in the literature. In essence, the purpose of the research is to establish that the solution of variational problems yields the solution of the dynamic game.
文摘Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 61673012 and 11971240,respectively。
文摘In this paper,a criterion for the partially symmetric game(PSG)is derived by using the semitensor product approach.The dimension and the basis of the linear subspace composed of all the PSGs with respect to a given set of partial players are calculated.The testing equations with the minimum number are concretely determined,and the computational complexity is analysed.Finally,two examples are displayed to show the theoretical results.
