Electric vehicle(EV)is an ideal solution to resolve the carbon emission issue and the fossil fuels scarcity problem in the future.However,a large number of EVs will be concentrated on charging during the valley hours ...Electric vehicle(EV)is an ideal solution to resolve the carbon emission issue and the fossil fuels scarcity problem in the future.However,a large number of EVs will be concentrated on charging during the valley hours leading to new load peaks under the guidance of static time-of-use tariff.Therefore,this paper proposes a dynamic time-of-use tariff mechanism,which redefines the peak and valley time periods according to the predicted loads using the fuzzy C-mean(FCM)clustering algorithm,and then dynamically adjusts the peak and valley tariffs according to the actual load of each time period.Based on the proposed tariff mechanism,an EV charging optimization model with the lowest cost to the users and the lowest variance of the grid-side load as the objective function is established.Then,a weight selection principle with an equal loss rate of the two objectives is proposed to transform the multi-objective optimization problem into a single-objective optimization problem.Finally,the EV charging load optimization model under three tariff strategies is set up and solved with the mathematical solver GROUBI.The results show that the EV charging load optimization strategy based on the dynamic time-of-use tariff can better balance the benefits between charging stations and users under different numbers and proportions of EVs connected to the grid,and can effectively reduce the grid load variance and improve the grid load curve.展开更多
This paper considers the two-part tariff licensing by an innovating firm to its potential competitor in a differentiated mixed duopoly, in which one firm sets a quantity and the other firm charges a price. Based on th...This paper considers the two-part tariff licensing by an innovating firm to its potential competitor in a differentiated mixed duopoly, in which one firm sets a quantity and the other firm charges a price. Based on the development cost incurred by the rival, we derive the optimal behavior of the firms under full information case and partial information case respectively. Information difference on the equilibrium strategies is also investigated.展开更多
基金Key R&D Program of Tianjin,China(No.20YFYSGX00060).
文摘Electric vehicle(EV)is an ideal solution to resolve the carbon emission issue and the fossil fuels scarcity problem in the future.However,a large number of EVs will be concentrated on charging during the valley hours leading to new load peaks under the guidance of static time-of-use tariff.Therefore,this paper proposes a dynamic time-of-use tariff mechanism,which redefines the peak and valley time periods according to the predicted loads using the fuzzy C-mean(FCM)clustering algorithm,and then dynamically adjusts the peak and valley tariffs according to the actual load of each time period.Based on the proposed tariff mechanism,an EV charging optimization model with the lowest cost to the users and the lowest variance of the grid-side load as the objective function is established.Then,a weight selection principle with an equal loss rate of the two objectives is proposed to transform the multi-objective optimization problem into a single-objective optimization problem.Finally,the EV charging load optimization model under three tariff strategies is set up and solved with the mathematical solver GROUBI.The results show that the EV charging load optimization strategy based on the dynamic time-of-use tariff can better balance the benefits between charging stations and users under different numbers and proportions of EVs connected to the grid,and can effectively reduce the grid load variance and improve the grid load curve.
基金Supported by Students’Innovation and Entrepreneurship Training Program of Liaoning Province(201710165000243)Liaoning Normal University(cx20170342)
文摘This paper considers the two-part tariff licensing by an innovating firm to its potential competitor in a differentiated mixed duopoly, in which one firm sets a quantity and the other firm charges a price. Based on the development cost incurred by the rival, we derive the optimal behavior of the firms under full information case and partial information case respectively. Information difference on the equilibrium strategies is also investigated.