This paper investigates the structure of the payment card market, with consumers and merchants basing their subscription decisions on different information sets. We find that the market structure depends crucially on ...This paper investigates the structure of the payment card market, with consumers and merchants basing their subscription decisions on different information sets. We find that the market structure depends crucially on the information set on which consumers and merchants base their subscription decisions. In the studied case, we observe that a market with few cards dominating only emerges when decisions are based on very limited information. Under the same conditions using a complete information set, all cards survive in the long run. The use of an agent-based model, focusing on the interactions between merchants and consumers, as a basis for subscription decisions allows us to investigate the dynamics of the market and the effect of the indirect network externalities rather than investigating only equilibrium outcomes.展开更多
In this study we use the experiences from the service industry and explore pre-requisites of the e-health market which will need to achieve to stimulate both sides of the market (vendors, healthcare organizations, gov...In this study we use the experiences from the service industry and explore pre-requisites of the e-health market which will need to achieve to stimulate both sides of the market (vendors, healthcare organizations, government, institutions, corporations and services organizations) to interact with each other and develop demand driven services and social innovations. The results presented in this paper may be of interest for decision makers, industries (e.g. software or technology designers), small and medium enterprises (SME) and entrepreneurs with an interest in becoming a part of the e-health market, and for consumers (e.g. healthcare personnel and patients) that are willing to influence the market through their choices. The outcomes of the study shown that the role of virtual brokers is essential to the further development of a sustainable e-health market globally because its role as catalyst for interaction between the two-sides of the markets, its effects on the reduction of competitive constrains, its effects on the accessibility to broader network of actors and its effects on the support of public-private exchanges of knowledge and experience.展开更多
We investigate the effects of consumer privacy concerns on the pricing and personal data collection strategy of an online platform.The online platform derives revenues from disclosing consumer information to firms.Fir...We investigate the effects of consumer privacy concerns on the pricing and personal data collection strategy of an online platform.The online platform derives revenues from disclosing consumer information to firms.Firms compete for the information in order to enable them to price discriminate and thus derive revenues from consumer purchases.A novel aspect of our research is that we allow the online platform to sell only a subset of consumer data.We develop analytical models where consumers can/cannot protect their privacy.Our analysis yields three main conclusions.First,in the monopoly case,we find that when the consumer privacy disclosure aversion cost is relatively low,it is optimal for the platform to sell all consumer information to the firm.Second,in the duopoly case,we illustrate that when the consumer privacy disclosure aversion cost is relatively low,the platform will sell all consumer information to only one firm;when the cost is moderate,the platform will choose to sell the information of only some consumers and to only one firm;when the cost is relatively high,the platform will select only some of the consumers and sell their information to both firms.Third,it will be better for the platform to provide the information protection service for free when the privacy cost is low.展开更多
文摘This paper investigates the structure of the payment card market, with consumers and merchants basing their subscription decisions on different information sets. We find that the market structure depends crucially on the information set on which consumers and merchants base their subscription decisions. In the studied case, we observe that a market with few cards dominating only emerges when decisions are based on very limited information. Under the same conditions using a complete information set, all cards survive in the long run. The use of an agent-based model, focusing on the interactions between merchants and consumers, as a basis for subscription decisions allows us to investigate the dynamics of the market and the effect of the indirect network externalities rather than investigating only equilibrium outcomes.
文摘In this study we use the experiences from the service industry and explore pre-requisites of the e-health market which will need to achieve to stimulate both sides of the market (vendors, healthcare organizations, government, institutions, corporations and services organizations) to interact with each other and develop demand driven services and social innovations. The results presented in this paper may be of interest for decision makers, industries (e.g. software or technology designers), small and medium enterprises (SME) and entrepreneurs with an interest in becoming a part of the e-health market, and for consumers (e.g. healthcare personnel and patients) that are willing to influence the market through their choices. The outcomes of the study shown that the role of virtual brokers is essential to the further development of a sustainable e-health market globally because its role as catalyst for interaction between the two-sides of the markets, its effects on the reduction of competitive constrains, its effects on the accessibility to broader network of actors and its effects on the support of public-private exchanges of knowledge and experience.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.71771179,72171176 and 72021002).
文摘We investigate the effects of consumer privacy concerns on the pricing and personal data collection strategy of an online platform.The online platform derives revenues from disclosing consumer information to firms.Firms compete for the information in order to enable them to price discriminate and thus derive revenues from consumer purchases.A novel aspect of our research is that we allow the online platform to sell only a subset of consumer data.We develop analytical models where consumers can/cannot protect their privacy.Our analysis yields three main conclusions.First,in the monopoly case,we find that when the consumer privacy disclosure aversion cost is relatively low,it is optimal for the platform to sell all consumer information to the firm.Second,in the duopoly case,we illustrate that when the consumer privacy disclosure aversion cost is relatively low,the platform will sell all consumer information to only one firm;when the cost is moderate,the platform will choose to sell the information of only some consumers and to only one firm;when the cost is relatively high,the platform will select only some of the consumers and sell their information to both firms.Third,it will be better for the platform to provide the information protection service for free when the privacy cost is low.
