Given a graph g=( V,A ) , we define a space of subgraphs M with the binary operation of union and the unique decomposition property into blocks. This space allows us to discuss a notion of minimal subgraphs (minimal c...Given a graph g=( V,A ) , we define a space of subgraphs M with the binary operation of union and the unique decomposition property into blocks. This space allows us to discuss a notion of minimal subgraphs (minimal coalitions) that are of interest for the game. Additionally, a partition of the game is defined in terms of the gain of each block, and subsequently, a solution to the game is defined based on distributing to each player (node and edge) present in each block a payment proportional to their contribution to the coalition.展开更多
We consider a distribution system with one supplier and two retailers. For the two retailers, they face different demand and are both risk averse. We study a single period model which the supplier has ample goods and ...We consider a distribution system with one supplier and two retailers. For the two retailers, they face different demand and are both risk averse. We study a single period model which the supplier has ample goods and the retailers order goods separately. Market search is measured as the fraction of customers who unsatisfied with their ＂local＂ retailer due to stock-out, and search for the goods at the other retailer before leaving the system. We investigate how the retailers game for order quantity in a Conditional Value-at-Risk framework and study how risk averse degree, market search level, holding cost and backorder cost influence the optimal order strategies. Furthermore, we use uniform distribution to illustrate these results and obtain Nash equilibrium of order strategies.展开更多
Purpose:The collaboration relationships between innovation actors at a geographic level may be considered as grouping two separate layers,the domestic and the foreign.At the level of each layer,the relationships and t...Purpose:The collaboration relationships between innovation actors at a geographic level may be considered as grouping two separate layers,the domestic and the foreign.At the level of each layer,the relationships and the actors involved constitute a Triple Helix game.The paper distinguished three levels of analysis:the global grouping together all actors,the domestic grouping together domestic actors,and the foreign related to only actors from partner countries.Design/methodology/approach:Bibliographic records data from the Web of Science for South Korea and West Africa breakdown per innovation actors and distinguishing domestic and international collaboration are analyzed with game theory.The core,the Shapley value,and the nucleolus are computed at the three levels to measure the synergy between actors.Findings:The synergy operates more in South Korea than in West Africa;the government is more present in West Africa than in South Korea;domestic actors create more synergy in South Korea,but foreign more in West Africa;South Korea can consume all the foreign synergy,which is not the case of West Africa.Research limitations:Research data are limited to publication records;techniques and methods used may be extended to other research outputs.Practical implications:West African governments should increase their investment in science,technology,and innovation to benefit more from the synergy their innovation actors contributed at the foreign level.However,the results of the current study may not be sufficient to prove that greater investment will yield benefits from foreign synergies.Originality/value:This paper uses game theory to assess innovation systems by computing the contribution of foreign actors to knowledge production at an area level.It proposes an indicator to this end.展开更多
An iterative method based on Shapley Value Cooperative Game Theory is proposed for the calculation of local marginal price (LMP) for each Distributed Generator (DG) bus on a network. The LMP value is determined for ea...An iterative method based on Shapley Value Cooperative Game Theory is proposed for the calculation of local marginal price (LMP) for each Distributed Generator (DG) bus on a network. The LMP value is determined for each DG on the basis of its contribution to reduce loss and emission reduction, which is assessed using the Shapley Value approach. The proposed approach enables the Distribution Company (DISCO) decision-maker to operate the network optimally in terms of loss and emission. The proposed method is implemented in the Taiwan Power Company distribution network 7 warnings consisting of 84 buses and 11 feeders in the MATLAB environment. The results show that the proposed approach allows DISCO to operate the network on the basis of its priority between the reduction of active power loss and emission in the network.展开更多
We propose a game-theoretic model for a first-price sealed-bid auction （FPSB auction） of standing timber. A FPSB auction means that bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any ot...We propose a game-theoretic model for a first-price sealed-bid auction （FPSB auction） of standing timber. A FPSB auction means that bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the submitted price. The mathematical model has been elaborated considering only two bidders. Each bidder is supposed to know only the probability distribution of the bid of the other bidder. Using ap- propriate distributions, the adversity and propensity of a bidder to risk can be described. From the view point of a bidder, the conservative solution is calculated for both types of the other bidder. If a standing timber belongs to a public owner, the market has to follow a public evidence procedure, including public auctions. The function obtained is illustrated with a numerical example of a typical standing timber auction from a forest located in central Italy. Considering average costs and prices of the local chestnut timber market, winning bids and expected gains are estimated. Their amounts are com- parable with the currently average stumpage price registered in this market.展开更多
In the framework of games with coalition structure, we introduce probabilistic Owen value which is an extension of the Owen value and probabilistic Shapley value by considering the situation that not all priori unions...In the framework of games with coalition structure, we introduce probabilistic Owen value which is an extension of the Owen value and probabilistic Shapley value by considering the situation that not all priori unions are able to cooperate with others. Then we use five axioms of probabilistic efficiency, symmetric within coalitions, symmetric across coalitions applying to unanimity games, strong monotone property and linearity to axiomatize the value.展开更多
文摘Given a graph g=( V,A ) , we define a space of subgraphs M with the binary operation of union and the unique decomposition property into blocks. This space allows us to discuss a notion of minimal subgraphs (minimal coalitions) that are of interest for the game. Additionally, a partition of the game is defined in terms of the gain of each block, and subsequently, a solution to the game is defined based on distributing to each player (node and edge) present in each block a payment proportional to their contribution to the coalition.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70471034, A0324666)
文摘We consider a distribution system with one supplier and two retailers. For the two retailers, they face different demand and are both risk averse. We study a single period model which the supplier has ample goods and the retailers order goods separately. Market search is measured as the fraction of customers who unsatisfied with their ＂local＂ retailer due to stock-out, and search for the goods at the other retailer before leaving the system. We investigate how the retailers game for order quantity in a Conditional Value-at-Risk framework and study how risk averse degree, market search level, holding cost and backorder cost influence the optimal order strategies. Furthermore, we use uniform distribution to illustrate these results and obtain Nash equilibrium of order strategies.
文摘Purpose:The collaboration relationships between innovation actors at a geographic level may be considered as grouping two separate layers,the domestic and the foreign.At the level of each layer,the relationships and the actors involved constitute a Triple Helix game.The paper distinguished three levels of analysis:the global grouping together all actors,the domestic grouping together domestic actors,and the foreign related to only actors from partner countries.Design/methodology/approach:Bibliographic records data from the Web of Science for South Korea and West Africa breakdown per innovation actors and distinguishing domestic and international collaboration are analyzed with game theory.The core,the Shapley value,and the nucleolus are computed at the three levels to measure the synergy between actors.Findings:The synergy operates more in South Korea than in West Africa;the government is more present in West Africa than in South Korea;domestic actors create more synergy in South Korea,but foreign more in West Africa;South Korea can consume all the foreign synergy,which is not the case of West Africa.Research limitations:Research data are limited to publication records;techniques and methods used may be extended to other research outputs.Practical implications:West African governments should increase their investment in science,technology,and innovation to benefit more from the synergy their innovation actors contributed at the foreign level.However,the results of the current study may not be sufficient to prove that greater investment will yield benefits from foreign synergies.Originality/value:This paper uses game theory to assess innovation systems by computing the contribution of foreign actors to knowledge production at an area level.It proposes an indicator to this end.
文摘An iterative method based on Shapley Value Cooperative Game Theory is proposed for the calculation of local marginal price (LMP) for each Distributed Generator (DG) bus on a network. The LMP value is determined for each DG on the basis of its contribution to reduce loss and emission reduction, which is assessed using the Shapley Value approach. The proposed approach enables the Distribution Company (DISCO) decision-maker to operate the network optimally in terms of loss and emission. The proposed method is implemented in the Taiwan Power Company distribution network 7 warnings consisting of 84 buses and 11 feeders in the MATLAB environment. The results show that the proposed approach allows DISCO to operate the network on the basis of its priority between the reduction of active power loss and emission in the network.
文摘We propose a game-theoretic model for a first-price sealed-bid auction （FPSB auction） of standing timber. A FPSB auction means that bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the submitted price. The mathematical model has been elaborated considering only two bidders. Each bidder is supposed to know only the probability distribution of the bid of the other bidder. Using ap- propriate distributions, the adversity and propensity of a bidder to risk can be described. From the view point of a bidder, the conservative solution is calculated for both types of the other bidder. If a standing timber belongs to a public owner, the market has to follow a public evidence procedure, including public auctions. The function obtained is illustrated with a numerical example of a typical standing timber auction from a forest located in central Italy. Considering average costs and prices of the local chestnut timber market, winning bids and expected gains are estimated. Their amounts are com- parable with the currently average stumpage price registered in this market.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.70771010,71071018)Innovation Ability Promotion of Beijing Municipal Commission of Education(TJSHS201310011004)
文摘In the framework of games with coalition structure, we introduce probabilistic Owen value which is an extension of the Owen value and probabilistic Shapley value by considering the situation that not all priori unions are able to cooperate with others. Then we use five axioms of probabilistic efficiency, symmetric within coalitions, symmetric across coalitions applying to unanimity games, strong monotone property and linearity to axiomatize the value.
