Characteristics and risk of violation behavior of non-motorists at signalized intersections

Aiming at prevalent violations of non-motorists at urban intersections in China, this paper intends to clarify the characteristics and risks of non-motorist violations at signalized intersections through questionnaires and video recordings, which may serve as a basis for non-motorized vehicle management. It can help improve the traffic order and enhance the degree of safety at signalized intersections. To obtain the perception information, a questionaire survey on the Internet was conducted and 972 valid questionnaires were returned. It is found that academic degree contributes little to non-motorist violations, while electrical bicyclists have a relatively higher frequency of violations compared with bicyclists. The video data of 18 228 non-motorist behaviors indicate that the violation rate of all non-motorists is 26.5%; the number of conflicts reaches 1 938, among which violation conflicts account for 66.8%. The study shows that the violation rates and the violation behavior at three types of surveyed intersections are markedly different. It is also concluded that the conflict rates and the violation rates are positively correlated. Furthermore, signal violation, traveling in the wrong direction, and overspeeding to cross the intersection are the most dangerous among traffic violation behaviors.

Study on Game Model of Information Disclosure and Supervision

In recent years, the infringements of information disclosure are conspicuous in listed companies in China, which has seriously impeded the healthy development of the capital market. In this paper, the results of regulations of the infringements by means of the game theory and our findings suggest that we should witness less cases of violations when we intensify own efforts to check up and punish those violations, and lower the return of the infringement. At the same time, we would increase the effect of supervising violated behavior when we strengthen the deterrence.

Are academic independent directors punished more severely when they engage in violations?

We use a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013 to explore the reputation damage and overflow effect of academic independent directors who have received supervisory punishment. We find that when companies violate information disclosure rules, the market punishes academic independent directors more severely than nonacademic independent directors for these violations. Furthermore, companies employing punished academic directors face greater declines in their stock price than companies employing punished nonacademic independent directors during a relatively short window before or after the punishment is announced. The punishment of academic independent directors influences the employment of other scholars in the same field and results in a negative overflow effect. This study provides evidence of the market's differential reactions to independent directors with different backgrounds; the findings reflect the double-edged sword of one individual's reputation on organizations.