Descartes＇ metaphysical doubts in the Third and Fifth Meditations present a scenario like this： it is possible that I （the Meditator） am so imperfect as to be deceived by my author （i.e., an omnipotent God/Decei...Descartes＇ metaphysical doubts in the Third and Fifth Meditations present a scenario like this： it is possible that I （the Meditator） am so imperfect as to be deceived by my author （i.e., an omnipotent God/Deceiver） in the matters which I think I perceive clearly and distinctly. The metaphysical doubts attempt to cast doubt on beliefs based on present or recollected clear and distinct perceptions. This paper clarifies the intension of the metaphysical doubts by answering the question of how an omnipotent God/Deceiver might exercise a deceptive influence on clear and distinct perception. My analysis shows： （1） the memory interpretation and the retrospective interpretation to be implausible; （2） the incoherence interpretation to be ill-founded, though its conclusion is partly right, such that we should accept a weaker version of it; （3） the misrepresentation interpretation, the defective-origin interpretation, the truth-value variation interpretation and the radical interpretation to be plausible; （4） all of these credible interpretations to be compatible with each other as well.展开更多
In the history of philosophy, voluntarists-that is, philosophers committed to some version of the freedom of indifference-have worried about its metaphysical credentials, but only a few, at least to my knowledge, have...In the history of philosophy, voluntarists-that is, philosophers committed to some version of the freedom of indifference-have worried about its metaphysical credentials, but only a few, at least to my knowledge, have attempted to argue for more than its mere existence. Freedom of indifference is the option to choose between opposites in a given situation. In this paper, I present the ambitious attempt of the German pre-Kantian philosopher Christian August Crusius (1715-1775) to argue for the claim that we have freedom of indifference as a matter of hypothetical necessity. The point is that, in his view, there can be no actual world without freedom of indifference. This is not a logical but a metaphysical truth. I argue that a possible (motivational) reason for CrusiusJs choice to tread this slippery path is that he attempts to bestow some metaphysical dignity on the freedom of indifference. As a consequence, this metaphysical value of freedom of indifference shapes the relation between the divine and free, rational agents in a way that is completely different from a rationalist’s conception such as Leibniz’s. In this paper, I give a plausible interpretation of a metaphysical argument that has been neglected in the relevant literature.展开更多
文摘Descartes＇ metaphysical doubts in the Third and Fifth Meditations present a scenario like this： it is possible that I （the Meditator） am so imperfect as to be deceived by my author （i.e., an omnipotent God/Deceiver） in the matters which I think I perceive clearly and distinctly. The metaphysical doubts attempt to cast doubt on beliefs based on present or recollected clear and distinct perceptions. This paper clarifies the intension of the metaphysical doubts by answering the question of how an omnipotent God/Deceiver might exercise a deceptive influence on clear and distinct perception. My analysis shows： （1） the memory interpretation and the retrospective interpretation to be implausible; （2） the incoherence interpretation to be ill-founded, though its conclusion is partly right, such that we should accept a weaker version of it; （3） the misrepresentation interpretation, the defective-origin interpretation, the truth-value variation interpretation and the radical interpretation to be plausible; （4） all of these credible interpretations to be compatible with each other as well.
文摘In the history of philosophy, voluntarists-that is, philosophers committed to some version of the freedom of indifference-have worried about its metaphysical credentials, but only a few, at least to my knowledge, have attempted to argue for more than its mere existence. Freedom of indifference is the option to choose between opposites in a given situation. In this paper, I present the ambitious attempt of the German pre-Kantian philosopher Christian August Crusius (1715-1775) to argue for the claim that we have freedom of indifference as a matter of hypothetical necessity. The point is that, in his view, there can be no actual world without freedom of indifference. This is not a logical but a metaphysical truth. I argue that a possible (motivational) reason for CrusiusJs choice to tread this slippery path is that he attempts to bestow some metaphysical dignity on the freedom of indifference. As a consequence, this metaphysical value of freedom of indifference shapes the relation between the divine and free, rational agents in a way that is completely different from a rationalist’s conception such as Leibniz’s. In this paper, I give a plausible interpretation of a metaphysical argument that has been neglected in the relevant literature.
