库恩的“不可通约性”理论对历史比较研究的启示

在历史和文化的研究中比较无所不在。这种比较的存在 ,使事物的特征和价值得以确认。文化比较和历史比较的目的并非是只是判明优劣 ,它真正的目的是要克服缺陷 ,让人类明智。本组的六篇文章或探讨比较的理念 ,或分析中西传统思想中的底蕴 ,或评价中西方学者比较观念和方法的异同 ,或探讨异质文化共性的神奇折射 ,或评论当代科学哲学家库恩的理论对于历史比较的启示 ,或分析、评价当今美国关于中国唐、宋史学术研究前沿问题的方法和理论 ,都能从不同的角度触及到了历史文化比较的本质和方法问题。在这里 ,尽管各位作者具有自己的独特视野和个人的审美意图 ,但责任心和科学精神 ,以及无私的学术态度 ,始终是共同的衡量各种历史文化研究的客观标准。同样 ,尽管人们都认为比较只是一种方法 ,但下列文章却向我们表明 :它同样也是一种更为深远的思想感情 ,一种探讨各种价值、制度、事件内在合理性的理念与利器。正因为这样 ,对比较进行讨论是很有必要的 ,借此能够帮助我们确立公正的历史评判标准 ,能够提升事物原有的美。从这个意义上说 ,比较也是一种价值学说 ,一种智慧 ,一种积极的、客观的价值体系 ,一种开放精神 ,一种帮助当今的人们在世界的范围内做到资源共享 ,形成文化互动的桥梁。这些 。

“不可通约性”视阈下的新闻传播方式变革研究

在新闻传播学领域,“不可通约性”是一个探讨信息与意义如何在不同文化或解释框架中保持其特有性和独立性的理论。本文通过探讨“不可通约性”的理论框架,分析其在新闻传播领域的应用,并详细考察了新闻传播方式从传统媒体到数字化媒介的演变过程,最终聚焦于“不可通约性”视阈下多元化传播渠道的出现、用户生成内容的兴起以及个性化和定制化新闻服务的发展,从而揭示这些变革如何重新塑造我们理解和消费新闻的方式。

Political Reasoning and the Typology of Arguments in the Context of Political Philosophy

The main purpose of this article is to present the initial phase of the project in the field of argumentation theory and political philosophy. Project concerns studies of different types of rationality in the context of the argumentation. Background consideration is the problem of incommensurability and incompatibility types of rationality in political and ideological disputes. The first step is the establishment of a category of argumentative potential as a criterion for the typology of argument, which will build a map of argumentation, which will provide a starting point for a discussion. Apart from demonstrating the disproportion of discourses, the conclusion of the argument is to prove the local character of rationality.

Interpreting Kuhn＇s Incommensurability-Thesis： Its Different Meanings and Epistemological Consequences

Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis is crucial for consequences for the pursuit of epistemology. A interpreting his views on the development of science and their commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the publication of the original version of Kuhn＇s epoch-making book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （henceforth： SSR） should thus provide a thorough reflection on this thesis. However, this thesis is not easy to interpret. It is not only complex in itself but has also undergone a historical development--in Kuhn＇s own hands and in those of his interpreters. In this article, I sort out the different interpretations of it, in particular, in Part A. In Part B, I demonstrate their epistemological consequences. Under closer scrutiny, Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis contains several sub-theses Different senses of ＂incommensurability＂ thus need to be distinguished. However, the way in which those distinctions are drawn in Kuhn-scholarship differs. In paragraph I of Part A, I provide an overview of the reception of the incommensurability-thesis in Kuhn-scholarship. In Paragraph II, I trace its development in Kuhn＇s later writings： given its importance and contested nature, Kuhn later clarifies his original thesis. Those later clarifications＇ main function consists in domesticating the most radically relativistic aspects his original incommensurability-thesis had, at least, in the eyes of his interpreters. The upshot of Part A （Paragraphs I and II） is to provide a coherent interpretation of Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis. To that end, I distinguish in line with much of Kuhn-scholarship a semantic from a methodological sense of incommensurability. In part B, the question is raised： What sort of epistemological consequences follow from both senses of incommensurability？ In particular, what consequences follow for the issues of reference, subjectivity （objectivity）, pluralism, and realism？ The underlying question is to what extent Kuhnian incommensurability caters to a relativistic understanding of those issues. This question is answered in Paragraph Ill with the help of the analyses of a currently leading Kuhn-scholar, C. H. Sankey. His answers are taken as a vantage point for my concluding evaluation of the consequences of Kuhnian incommensurability in Paragraph IV.

Kuhn and Taxonomies of History

This paper introduces the idea that if theories of history generate different taxonomies of history they too are incommensurable. I argue this is unavoidable for Kuhn given what he says about incommensurability and 1 investigate the consequences in relation to reflexivity, justification, and paradox for Kuhn＇s account of science. I want to do this on two levels, firstly looking at different possibilities for characterising individual paradigms. I will look at some examples from ancient and early modem astronomy as here it is clearest that paradigms can be characterised in different ways and that this has important consequences. I will argue in particular that Kuhn＇s characterisation of the paradigm for astronomy which emerges from antiquity （geocentrism） is favourable to his general account of the history of science, but that there is a very plausible and extremely damaging alternative. I argue that these differing characterisations generate differing, incommensurable taxonomies of the history of astronomy, with attendant ＂local holism,＂ untranslatability of key terms and issues of theory choice. If so, Kuhn then has problems with generating an adequate decision making protocol for choosing between the two paradigm characterisations. That is problematic in itself, but I also argue this problem is systemic and affects the evidence needed for Kuhn to justify his general account of the history of science. I also want to investigate the implications of differing taxonomies of the history of science at a more abstract level. Kuhn＇s general theory of the history of science generates a taxonomy of the history of science, as do other theories such as those of Popper and of gradualism. If so, the incommensurability involved here, again with attendant ＂local holism,＂ untranslatability of key terms and issues of theory choice, leads to issues of paradox and justification for Kuhn＇s general account of the history of science. With this broader understanding of taxonomic issues, some important Kuhn statements about scientific theories become self-referential, again generating problems of paradox and justification.

Irrationality in Scientific Development？

The paper discusses several wide-spread misunderstandings of Kuhn＇s theory of scientific development, most prominently the ascription that he conceives of scientific development as irrational. The core of this ascription is an assessment of incommensurability as implying the lack of any rational possibility of theory comparison. This is supposed to be due to Gestalt switches and a quasi-religious element of conversion in theory change. Accordingly, scientific revolutions cannot be a serious matter for philosophical analysis; they furthermore foreclose any scientific progress. It is shown that such images of Kuhn＇s theory rest on deep misunderstandings that are partly due to Kuhn＇s writing style.

Incommensurability in Second Language Acquisition Approaches

Researchers in the field of Second Language Acquisition （SLA） have been taking different routes. Some researchers make linguistic-cognitive issues their inquire object and pursue objectivity with quantitative research methods. Other researchers regard the social context of activity as an essential characteristic of learning and teaching. These groups of researchers make use of qualitative research methods like case study, grounded theory, narrative inquiry, and ethnography. There are many other routes that SLA researchers have taken, but the two just mentioned are perhaps the most predominant ones and the ones that are most easily contrasted. The present paper explores the disparity between the different research paths from the perspective of philosophy of science echoing the notion of incommensurability. In this paper the author argues that the differences between different SLA perspectives are not only commensurable but wholesome for the development of SLA.

Kuhnian Understanding of Incommensurability and Implications of Paradigmatic Conception of Knowledge in International Relations

In international relations theory （maybe more than in any other discipline of social sciences）, the paradigmatic construction of Thomas Kuhn and his model of incommensurability might be applied to the theoretical interpretation of phenomena; and it is one of the cornerstones of the methodological toolkit for the interpretation in this field. The paper explores the reason why Kuhn＇s understanding of incommensurability seems to be necessary for the conception of knowledge in international relations： the concept of incommensurability can be considered typical as it is meant to indicate a conflict, of one form or another, between theories. And the discipline of international relations is more than a perfect ground for considering this concept when one is having in mind the high degree of polarized debate among rivalry theoretical schools （for interpreting and describing the identical phenomena） that is present from the very beginning of the discipline. Recalling the Kuhnian conception of science in paradigmatic view with an aim for understanding--international relations theory, the paper analyzes furthermore his rejection of the traditional dichotomy between “objectivisn”and ＂subjectivism.＂

论历史主义科学哲学的发生及其概念运动的动力

库恩哲学概念的特殊性来自于其思想的历史主义倾向。本文通过讨论库恩历史主义科学哲学的发生来揭示理解库恩哲学概念的维度,同时认为历史主义的"困境"是一种内部矛盾,也正是推动库恩哲学概念如"不可通约性"延展其丰富性的动力所在。