The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the increasing intervention of the state in the private sphere-as is evidenced in labor laws, consumer rights, bioethics, and Internet crimes-is compatible with the liberal ...The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the increasing intervention of the state in the private sphere-as is evidenced in labor laws, consumer rights, bioethics, and Internet crimes-is compatible with the liberal ideal of neutrality, or, on the contrary, whether it can be seen as a turning point towards the position of communitarian or republican authors, for whom the state must endorse a substantive good. Such a turning point could lead to a reformulation of the public and private spheres, and of course, raise questions over which values justify which kinds of intervention. This paper will cover these debates in three parts： First, by presenting briefly the history of the liberal conception of rights, I will try to show that, from a starting point based mostly on individual protection, the liberal tradition has become more interventionist, which can be seen through the notion of ＂claim rights.＂ Departing from John Rawls＇s work, I will argue that this notion allows for some level of intervention, without betraying liberal neutrality. Subsequently, I will discuss the difference between this kind of intervention and the ones proclaimed by communitarians and republicans authors： The former will be illustrated by Michael Sandel＇s criticism of Rawls in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and the later by Richard Dagger＇s position in Civic Virtues, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. Finally, in the third part, we＇ll discuss whether liberal principles can be harmonized with the republican and communitarian focus on civic virtues and good life.展开更多
文摘The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the increasing intervention of the state in the private sphere-as is evidenced in labor laws, consumer rights, bioethics, and Internet crimes-is compatible with the liberal ideal of neutrality, or, on the contrary, whether it can be seen as a turning point towards the position of communitarian or republican authors, for whom the state must endorse a substantive good. Such a turning point could lead to a reformulation of the public and private spheres, and of course, raise questions over which values justify which kinds of intervention. This paper will cover these debates in three parts： First, by presenting briefly the history of the liberal conception of rights, I will try to show that, from a starting point based mostly on individual protection, the liberal tradition has become more interventionist, which can be seen through the notion of ＂claim rights.＂ Departing from John Rawls＇s work, I will argue that this notion allows for some level of intervention, without betraying liberal neutrality. Subsequently, I will discuss the difference between this kind of intervention and the ones proclaimed by communitarians and republicans authors： The former will be illustrated by Michael Sandel＇s criticism of Rawls in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and the later by Richard Dagger＇s position in Civic Virtues, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. Finally, in the third part, we＇ll discuss whether liberal principles can be harmonized with the republican and communitarian focus on civic virtues and good life.
