论自然规律与社会规律的“可通约性”

自然规律与社会规律的"可通约性"是指哲学家在研究自然规律与社会规律时,尽管研究的对象不同,运用的词汇不同,研究方法也不一样,但他们最终的目的是相同的,都是为了发现规律、认识规律、运用规律。我们把这种殊途同归的研究过程叫做自然规律与社会规律的"可通约性"。并把它作为自然规律与社会规律之间联系的一个方面来进行讨论。

Interpreting Kuhn＇s Incommensurability-Thesis： Its Different Meanings and Epistemological Consequences

Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis is crucial for consequences for the pursuit of epistemology. A interpreting his views on the development of science and their commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the publication of the original version of Kuhn＇s epoch-making book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （henceforth： SSR） should thus provide a thorough reflection on this thesis. However, this thesis is not easy to interpret. It is not only complex in itself but has also undergone a historical development--in Kuhn＇s own hands and in those of his interpreters. In this article, I sort out the different interpretations of it, in particular, in Part A. In Part B, I demonstrate their epistemological consequences. Under closer scrutiny, Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis contains several sub-theses Different senses of ＂incommensurability＂ thus need to be distinguished. However, the way in which those distinctions are drawn in Kuhn-scholarship differs. In paragraph I of Part A, I provide an overview of the reception of the incommensurability-thesis in Kuhn-scholarship. In Paragraph II, I trace its development in Kuhn＇s later writings： given its importance and contested nature, Kuhn later clarifies his original thesis. Those later clarifications＇ main function consists in domesticating the most radically relativistic aspects his original incommensurability-thesis had, at least, in the eyes of his interpreters. The upshot of Part A （Paragraphs I and II） is to provide a coherent interpretation of Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis. To that end, I distinguish in line with much of Kuhn-scholarship a semantic from a methodological sense of incommensurability. In part B, the question is raised： What sort of epistemological consequences follow from both senses of incommensurability？ In particular, what consequences follow for the issues of reference, subjectivity （objectivity）, pluralism, and realism？ The underlying question is to what extent Kuhnian incommensurability caters to a relativistic understanding of those issues. This question is answered in Paragraph Ill with the help of the analyses of a currently leading Kuhn-scholar, C. H. Sankey. His answers are taken as a vantage point for my concluding evaluation of the consequences of Kuhnian incommensurability in Paragraph IV.

Political Reasoning and the Typology of Arguments in the Context of Political Philosophy

The main purpose of this article is to present the initial phase of the project in the field of argumentation theory and political philosophy. Project concerns studies of different types of rationality in the context of the argumentation. Background consideration is the problem of incommensurability and incompatibility types of rationality in political and ideological disputes. The first step is the establishment of a category of argumentative potential as a criterion for the typology of argument, which will build a map of argumentation, which will provide a starting point for a discussion. Apart from demonstrating the disproportion of discourses, the conclusion of the argument is to prove the local character of rationality.

Kuhn and Taxonomies of History

This paper introduces the idea that if theories of history generate different taxonomies of history they too are incommensurable. I argue this is unavoidable for Kuhn given what he says about incommensurability and 1 investigate the consequences in relation to reflexivity, justification, and paradox for Kuhn＇s account of science. I want to do this on two levels, firstly looking at different possibilities for characterising individual paradigms. I will look at some examples from ancient and early modem astronomy as here it is clearest that paradigms can be characterised in different ways and that this has important consequences. I will argue in particular that Kuhn＇s characterisation of the paradigm for astronomy which emerges from antiquity （geocentrism） is favourable to his general account of the history of science, but that there is a very plausible and extremely damaging alternative. I argue that these differing characterisations generate differing, incommensurable taxonomies of the history of astronomy, with attendant ＂local holism,＂ untranslatability of key terms and issues of theory choice. If so, Kuhn then has problems with generating an adequate decision making protocol for choosing between the two paradigm characterisations. That is problematic in itself, but I also argue this problem is systemic and affects the evidence needed for Kuhn to justify his general account of the history of science. I also want to investigate the implications of differing taxonomies of the history of science at a more abstract level. Kuhn＇s general theory of the history of science generates a taxonomy of the history of science, as do other theories such as those of Popper and of gradualism. If so, the incommensurability involved here, again with attendant ＂local holism,＂ untranslatability of key terms and issues of theory choice, leads to issues of paradox and justification for Kuhn＇s general account of the history of science. With this broader understanding of taxonomic issues, some important Kuhn statements about scientific theories become self-referential, again generating problems of paradox and justification.

Irrationality in Scientific Development？

The paper discusses several wide-spread misunderstandings of Kuhn＇s theory of scientific development, most prominently the ascription that he conceives of scientific development as irrational. The core of this ascription is an assessment of incommensurability as implying the lack of any rational possibility of theory comparison. This is supposed to be due to Gestalt switches and a quasi-religious element of conversion in theory change. Accordingly, scientific revolutions cannot be a serious matter for philosophical analysis; they furthermore foreclose any scientific progress. It is shown that such images of Kuhn＇s theory rest on deep misunderstandings that are partly due to Kuhn＇s writing style.

Incommensurability in Second Language Acquisition Approaches

Researchers in the field of Second Language Acquisition （SLA） have been taking different routes. Some researchers make linguistic-cognitive issues their inquire object and pursue objectivity with quantitative research methods. Other researchers regard the social context of activity as an essential characteristic of learning and teaching. These groups of researchers make use of qualitative research methods like case study, grounded theory, narrative inquiry, and ethnography. There are many other routes that SLA researchers have taken, but the two just mentioned are perhaps the most predominant ones and the ones that are most easily contrasted. The present paper explores the disparity between the different research paths from the perspective of philosophy of science echoing the notion of incommensurability. In this paper the author argues that the differences between different SLA perspectives are not only commensurable but wholesome for the development of SLA.

Kuhnian Understanding of Incommensurability and Implications of Paradigmatic Conception of Knowledge in International Relations

In international relations theory （maybe more than in any other discipline of social sciences）, the paradigmatic construction of Thomas Kuhn and his model of incommensurability might be applied to the theoretical interpretation of phenomena; and it is one of the cornerstones of the methodological toolkit for the interpretation in this field. The paper explores the reason why Kuhn＇s understanding of incommensurability seems to be necessary for the conception of knowledge in international relations： the concept of incommensurability can be considered typical as it is meant to indicate a conflict, of one form or another, between theories. And the discipline of international relations is more than a perfect ground for considering this concept when one is having in mind the high degree of polarized debate among rivalry theoretical schools （for interpreting and describing the identical phenomena） that is present from the very beginning of the discipline. Recalling the Kuhnian conception of science in paradigmatic view with an aim for understanding--international relations theory, the paper analyzes furthermore his rejection of the traditional dichotomy between “objectivisn”and ＂subjectivism.＂