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家族企业推行"委托-代理"制的障碍分析 被引量:1
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作者 王珍 《商业研究》 北大核心 2004年第18期60-64,共5页
西方家族企业"委托-代理"制的成功运作,有效地化解了家族企业的管理缺陷,证明了家族企业存在的合理性及进一步发展的强大生命力。从分析家族企业管理模式的弊端入手,探究"委托-代理"制将是完善家族企业持续发展的... 西方家族企业"委托-代理"制的成功运作,有效地化解了家族企业的管理缺陷,证明了家族企业存在的合理性及进一步发展的强大生命力。从分析家族企业管理模式的弊端入手,探究"委托-代理"制将是完善家族企业持续发展的重要途径,使家族企业在激烈的竞争中更好的发展。 展开更多
关键词 家族企业 “委托—代理”制 障碍
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温州民营企业实行“委托—代理制”的障碍分析 被引量:5
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作者 顾文静 《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2002年第2期74-78,共5页
温州民营企业在向现代企业迈进的过程中,委托代理问题一直未得到有效解决,大部分企业仍固守家族管理模式,难以打破封闭性,可持续发展的潜力受到置疑。本文在对温州民营企业的委托代理现状进行广泛调查的基础上,深入分析了阻碍“委托—... 温州民营企业在向现代企业迈进的过程中,委托代理问题一直未得到有效解决,大部分企业仍固守家族管理模式,难以打破封闭性,可持续发展的潜力受到置疑。本文在对温州民营企业的委托代理现状进行广泛调查的基础上,深入分析了阻碍“委托—代理”制有效实施的根本原因,并提出了家族制企业推行“委托—代理”制的若干建议,指出“委托—代理”制将是完善家族企业并使之永续发展的有效途径。 展开更多
关键词 温州市 民营企业 家族管理模式 “委托—代理”制 企业管理 现代企业 约束机 激励机
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Incentive mechanism analysis of information security outsourcing based on principal-agent model
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作者 熊强 仲伟俊 梅姝娥 《Journal of Southeast University(English Edition)》 EI CAS 2014年第1期113-117,共5页
In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote clien... In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote client enterprises to complete outsourcing service actively. The incentive mechanism model of information security outsourcing is designed based on the principal-agent theory. Through analyzing the factors such as enterprise information assets value, invasion probability, information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree how to impact on the incentive mechanism, conclusions show that an enterprise information assets value and invasion probability have a positive influence on the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient; while information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree have a negative influence on the compensation coefficient. Therefore, the principal enterprises should reasonably design the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient to encourage information security outsourcing agency enterprises to the full extent. 展开更多
关键词 principal agent information security outsourcing incentive mechanism
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An Overview of the New Listing Rules and Corporate Governance Best Practice in Sri Lanka
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作者 Chitra Sriyani De Silva Loku Waduge 《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》 2012年第4期569-577,共9页
Corporate governance represents institutional structures and incentive mechanisms that are implemented in order to mitigate the principal-agent problem and to thus promote the long-term competitiveness of the firm. Th... Corporate governance represents institutional structures and incentive mechanisms that are implemented in order to mitigate the principal-agent problem and to thus promote the long-term competitiveness of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of corporate governance best practice and the new listing rules in Sri Lanka. The paper discusses the evolution of the corporate governance best practice giving special reference to the new listing rules in Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan stock market overview and the importance of best practice governance for the developing economy of Sri Lanka. Corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka has made a progress towards best practice, but, this paper argues, that substantial reforms need to be implemented to effectively promote and sustain the accountability and transparency. 展开更多
关键词 corporate governance best practice listing rules Sri Lanka
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