从“弈秋教学”想到的——浅谈会计模块化教学的尝试

<孟子·告子上>有一段弈秋教学的著名寓言:让天底下最好的第一流棋手来教两个学生下棋,一个学生专心致志地学,另一个学生在学棋的过程中想到天外有鸿鹄飞来,要是拉开弓箭把它射下来,那该多好!结果后一个学生的学习成绩,就远远落在前一个学生的后面.从这个寓言中我们可以得出如下结论:学习必须全神贯注.古人云:"有志者,事竞成."有志事成,还有一个前提,就是学习打基础时,最好心元二用,才能达到成功的彼岸.同时,我们还可想到这个问题:第一流棋手是否能胜任老师这一角色呢?如果他本人能将如何下棋讲得很引人入胜,扣人心弦,那么,会出现第二个学生思想开小差吗?如果当老师的在学生思想不专心时能及时加以制止,那么这两个学生的成绩差异会那么悬殊吗?

“弈坛春秋”田棋数字频道开播

2005年3月16日，北京北广传媒集团有限公司、北京美嘉传媒有限公司在北京举行了“弈坛春秋”围棋数字频道开播仪式。此举不仅会为中国数字电视的多样化发展提供一个更加广阔的平台，也将为中国棋坛带来勃勃生机。

Live-streaming selling strategies for competitive firms

The booming live-streaming commerce has significantly changed the traditional e-commerce model,thus attracting much attention from both industry and academia.In recent years,an increasing number of scholars have applied analytical models to explore live-streaming strategies for firms in different scenarios.However,the previous literature mainly considers monopolists,while in the real world,competition is not rare.To fill this gap between the literature and practical observations,this paper applies a game theoretical model to study live-streaming adoption and pricing strategy for firms under competitive environments.The results show that,for competitive firms,the equilibrium strategy depends on the relation between the commission rate and the intensity of the market expansion effect.Additionally,compared to the case in which no firm adopts live-streaming,competitive firms do not always benefit from the adoption of live-streaming selling.The paper also shows that competition plays a negative role in inducing a firm to adopt live-streaming.

Zero-determinant strategies in iterated multi-strategy games

Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.

EVOLUTIONARY GAME OF DYNAMIC KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGING IN KNOWLEDGE INTERACTION

Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies （ESSs） of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.

Supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information with retailer cost disruptions

A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymmetric information） are proposed by employing game theory in two scenarios： coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in a regular scenario （without disruption）; and coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in an irregular scenario （ with retailer cost disruptions）. It is optimal for the supply chain to maintain the original production plan and to guarantee a steadily running system if variations of retailer costs are sufficiently low and do not exceed an upper bound. This shows that the original production plan has certain robustness under disruptions. Decisions must be re-made if a retailer＇ s cost change is greater and exceeds an upper bound. Impacts of retailer cost disruptions on the order quantity, the retail price, the wholesale price and each party＇ s as well as the system＇ s expected profits are investigated through numerical analyses.

MANUFACTURING SYSTEM SCHEDULING BASED ON MULTI-AGENT COOPERATION GAME

Aiming at the flexible manufacturing system with multi-machining and multi-assembly equipment, a new scheduling algorithm is proposed to decompose the assembly structure of the products, thus obtaining simple scheduling problems and forming the cOrrespOnding agents. Then, the importance and the restriction of each agent are cOnsidered, to obtain an order of simple scheduling problems based on the cooperation game theory. With this order, the scheduling of sub-questions is implemented in term of rules, and the almost optimal scheduling results for meeting the restriction can be obtained. Experimental results verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheduling algorithm.

AUCTIONING METHOD FOR AIRSPACE CONGESTING RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integrating TFM initiatives and allocate the limited airspace resources to these airlines equitably and efficiently is still a problem.The air traffic management（ATM）authority aims to minimizing the systemic costs of congested airspaces.And the airlines are self-interested and profit-oriented.Being incorporated into the collaborative decision making（CDM）process,the airlines can influence the rescheduling decisions to profit themselves.The airlines maybe hide the flight information that is disadvantageous to them,but is necessary to the optimal system decision.To realize the coincidence goal between the ATM authority and airlines for the efficient,and equitable allocation of airspace resources,this paper provides an auction-based market method to solve the congestion airspace problem under the pre-tactic and tactic stage of air traffic flow management.Through a simulation experiment,the rationing results show that the auction method can decrease the total delay costs of flights in the congested airspace compared with both the first schedule first service（FSFS）tactic and the ration by schedule（RBS）tactic.Finally,the analysis results indicate that if reallocate the charges from the auction to the airlines according to the proportion of their disrupted flights,the auction mechanism can allocate the airspace resource in economy equitably and decrease the delay losses of the airlines compared with the results of the FSFS tactic.

Effects of cooperative mechanisms in mobile commerce value chain

In order to analyze the effects of different cooperative mechanisms between a mobile device manufacturer and a mobile network operator （ MNO ）, a Stackelberg structure is constructed. The manufacturer acts as a leader, while the MNO acts as a follower, i. e., a traditional retailer. Three cooperative mechanisms are considered： the manufacturer does not invest in developing the propriety function and software to support the infrastructure capacity of the MNO; the manufacturer invests in the development; the MNO offers a subsidy to encourage the manufacturer to invest in development. The results reveal that investing in the development can increase the profits of both the manufacturer and the MNO. Furthermore, if the MNO shares certain investment costs with the manufacturer, the MNO may charge higher prices of mobile connection services and mobile value-added services, and the profits of the two players may be enhanced.

MULTI-OBJECTIVE SHAPE DESIGN IN AERODYNAMICS USING GAME STRATEGY

Multi-objective optimization for the optimum shape design is introduced in aerodynamics using the Game theory. Based on the control theory, the employed optimizer and the negative feedback are used to implement the constraints. All the constraints are satisfied implicitly and automatically in the design. Furthermore,the above methodology is combined with a formulation derived from the Game theory to treat multi-point airfoil optimization. Airfoil shapes are optimized according to various aerodynamics criteria. In the symmetric Nash game, each “player” is responsible for one criterion, and the Nash equilibrium provides a solution to the multipoint optimization. Design results confirm the efficiency of the method.

MULTIOBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION OF EIGHT-DOF VEHICLE SUSPENSION BASED ON GAME THEORY

A systematic and effective optimization is proposed for the design of a three-dimensional （3-D） vehicle suspension model with eight degrees of freedom （DOF）, including vertical seat motion, vehicle suspension, pitching and rolling motions, and vertical wheel motions using the evolutionary game theory. A new design of the passive suspension is aided by game theory to attain the best compromise between ride quality and suspension deflections. Extensive simulations are performed on three type road surface models A, B, C pavement grades based on the guidelines provided by ISO-2631 with the Matlab/Simulink environment. The preliminary results show that, when the passive suspension is optimized via the proposed approach, a substantial improvement in the vertical ride quality is obtained while keeping the suspension deflections within their allowable clearance when the vehicle moves at a constant velocity v=20 m/s, and the comfort performance of a suspension seat can be enhanced by 20%-30%.

GAMES ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE PRICING UNDER CONSIDERING MORAL HAZARD

This paper first gives an explanation of moral hazard in the insurance field,and then offers a game theory model about insurance pricing according to the non zero sum game analysis between the insurer and the insured when moral hazard exists.On the basis of the game analysis,this paper also presents a lowest pricing formula and studies the cost of moral hazard simultaneously.

Imperfect targeted advertising with two-period competition

A two-period model is developed to investigate the competitive effects of targeted advertising with imperfect targeting in a duopolistic market. In the first period, two firms compete in price in order to recognize customers. In the second period, targeted advertising plays an informative role and acts as a price discrimination device. The firms＇ optimal advertising and pricing strategies under imperfect targeting are compared with those under perfect targeting. Equilibrium decisions show that, under imperfect targeting, when the advertising cost is low enough, both firms will choose to target ads at the rivals＇ old segments. This equilibrium, which could not exist under perfect targeting, results in two opposite results. When cost is high, the effect of mis-targeting will soften price competition and increase profits; on the contrary, when cost is low enough, it will lead to aggressive price competition and profit loss with the increase of imperfect targeting, so firms may have incentives to reduce the mis- targeting degree.

Implementing VMI service pricing strategy for 3PL corporation considering recovery costs

The collector managed inventory(CMI)management idea is introduced based on the comparison of manufacturer and third-party logistics(3PL)implementing vendor managed inventory(VMI)services.Considering recovery costs,the service pricing strategies for 3PL corporations implementing VMI are studied to meet two conditions of participation constraints and incentive-compatibility constraints.The numerical simulation results indicate that the supply chain partners' profits change after considering recovery costs,and the 3PL corporation's profits and the total profits increase first,and then decrease.The retailers' and manufacturers' profits also increase.The total profits of the supply chain have a characteristic of increasing first and then decreasing with the increase of the callback ratio of unsold products.The concrete extremum point is codetermined by price flexibility,service pricing of the 3PL corporation,callback price and callback ratio.

On the development of modern service industry under mismatched Blotto game of knowledge flow

In order to highlight and analyze the influence of heterogeneous knowledge flows to enterprises in the modern service industry,based on a review of the Colonel Blotto game,some presumptions such as the game's utility function are modified,and a mechanism to change tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge is constructed to carry out an analysis of a two-player knowledge flow management.The characteristics of the players' optimal reactions of knowledge flow management are studied,and the results bear evidence of the facts that a gap always exists under the spillover effect.Meanwhile,tacit knowledge seems more important to the development of enterprises than explicit knowledge.So it implies that the foremost task for the development of the modern service industry is to strengthen the settings and institutions for the flux of tacit knowledge and enterprise knowledge management.

Price and retailer's service level decision in a supply chain under consumer returns

To investigate the optimal retail price and service level in a supply chain under consumer returns, a consumer returns model under the retailer＇s service provision is built. The optimal decision results and optimal profits are obtained in the vertical integration game and the manufacturer Stackelberg game, respectively. Through comparing the optimal profits with service provision with those of no service provision, the boundary conditions that the retailer＇s service should be provided are derived. The results show that in the manufacturer Stackelberg game, the optimal profit of the retailer and the manufacturer with service is always superior to that of a no service provision. However, in the vertical integration game, the supply chain can only benefit from the service under certain conditions. Finally, through numerical examples, the impacts of the cost for providing services and the consumer return rate on the optimal decisions are analyzed.

Competition Game Analysis Between Public Enterprises

Municipal public utilities reform is an important part of the economic system structural reform of cities. In this paper a kind of market competition mechanism for commercial municipal public enterprises is proposed; a price competition model of municipal public enterprises with similar products is founded; its static and dynamic game analysis is offered and a comparison between them is made. The results show that,for the business type of municipal public enterprise market competition mechanism can be introduced to mobilize the enterprise activity to raise the end of efficiency; the government may control the market price through the economic measures of regulating the amount of subsidy;that enterprises enter the market and select the price simultaneously is more advantageous than entering the market one after another in general, information among the municipal enterprises is symmetrical (the equilibrium is lower); "following enterprises" gets "second mover advantage";to raise the difference of the same product will increase the profit of enterprise.

Analysis on stability of strategic alliance: A game theory perspective

Strategic alliance has suffered much instabilities since its first implementation. Scholars have carried out many em- bedded, precise and comprehensive researches from both theory and empiricism. Here we try to find certain stable solutions by employing game theory, in an attempt to construct theoretical bases for strategic alliance, which people called “one of the most important organizational innovation in the end of the 20th century” (Shi, 2001), to exploit its advantages in the process of glob- alization. Finally, this article puts forward some advices for its success.

Evolution trend analysis of urban residents’ low-carbon travel development based on multidimensional game theory

In the travel process of urban residents,travelers will take a series of activities such as imitation and exclusion by observing other people’s travel modes,which affects their following trips.This process can be seen as a repeated game between members of the travelers.Based on the analysis of this game and its evolution trend,a multi-dimensional game model of low-carbon travel for residents is established.The two dimensional game strategies include whether to accept the low-carbon concept and whether to choose low-carbon travel.Combined with evolutionary game theory,the low-carbon travel choices of residents in different cities are simulated,and the evolutionary stability strategies are obtained.Finally,the influences of the main parameters of the model on the evolution process and stability strategies are discussed.The results show that travelers would develop towards two trends.Cities with more developed public traffic system have a higher proportion of receiving low-carbon concept and choosing low-carbon travel.Cities with underdeveloped public transport system could increase this proportion by some measures such as encouraging residents to choose slow transport and increasing the propaganda of low-carbon travel,but the positive effects of the measures like propaganda have a limited impact on the proportion.