This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management through real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation across 7 Asia countries. The study proposes arguments that in economies with high investor ...This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management through real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation across 7 Asia countries. The study proposes arguments that in economies with high investor protection, managers prefer to manage earnings through real activity manipulation rather than through accrual manipulation because accrual manipulation is more likely to draw auditors or regulators scrutiny than real decisions about pricing and production. The study findings are consistent with prediction. Despite being in economies with high investor protection, managers still have bigger discretion in managing earnings through real activities rather than accrual manipulation.展开更多
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of accounting standards and investor protection on value relevance of earnings and book value of equity among European Union countries during the years 1999-2007. T...The objective of this study is to examine the effect of accounting standards and investor protection on value relevance of earnings and book value of equity among European Union countries during the years 1999-2007. The results indicate that the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards [IFRS] leads to improvement in value relevance, particularly on earnings. We also examine the impact of investor protection and the deviation of local accounting standards from IFRS on the effectiveness of the IFRS adoption. The results show supporting evidence for investor protection but inconclusive evidence for accounting standard deviation. However, additional analysis indicates that the countries which apparently benefit from adopting IFRS are those with high deviation of local accounting standards from IFRS and high investor protection. The findings imply that adopting IFRS alone cannot improve value relevance of accounting information, but standard setters and regulators need to strengthen their investor protection mechanisms in order to improve the quality of accounting information.展开更多
Tunneling is to describe transfer resource out of the firm for benefit of their controlling shareholders. Better legal protection and stronger social norms improve minority shareholders＇ protection from expropriation...Tunneling is to describe transfer resource out of the firm for benefit of their controlling shareholders. Better legal protection and stronger social norms improve minority shareholders＇ protection from expropriation. They consequently reduce the private benefits of controlling shareholders （La Porta, 1999）. This study aims to investigate tunneling in the context merger and acquisition （M＆A） and to examine whether tunneling occurs only in emerging markets with poor law enforcement or whether it also occurs in developed countries. This study documents that managers are more likely to overpay target in merger and acquisition with high overlapped owner which have stakes in bidder and target firm. That overpayment, a transfer of wealth from owners of bidder＇s firm to overlapping owners, is a type of tunneling. This study concludes that tunneling occurs in nations not only with low investor protection, but also with high investor protection.展开更多
文摘This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management through real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation across 7 Asia countries. The study proposes arguments that in economies with high investor protection, managers prefer to manage earnings through real activity manipulation rather than through accrual manipulation because accrual manipulation is more likely to draw auditors or regulators scrutiny than real decisions about pricing and production. The study findings are consistent with prediction. Despite being in economies with high investor protection, managers still have bigger discretion in managing earnings through real activities rather than accrual manipulation.
文摘The objective of this study is to examine the effect of accounting standards and investor protection on value relevance of earnings and book value of equity among European Union countries during the years 1999-2007. The results indicate that the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards [IFRS] leads to improvement in value relevance, particularly on earnings. We also examine the impact of investor protection and the deviation of local accounting standards from IFRS on the effectiveness of the IFRS adoption. The results show supporting evidence for investor protection but inconclusive evidence for accounting standard deviation. However, additional analysis indicates that the countries which apparently benefit from adopting IFRS are those with high deviation of local accounting standards from IFRS and high investor protection. The findings imply that adopting IFRS alone cannot improve value relevance of accounting information, but standard setters and regulators need to strengthen their investor protection mechanisms in order to improve the quality of accounting information.
文摘Tunneling is to describe transfer resource out of the firm for benefit of their controlling shareholders. Better legal protection and stronger social norms improve minority shareholders＇ protection from expropriation. They consequently reduce the private benefits of controlling shareholders （La Porta, 1999）. This study aims to investigate tunneling in the context merger and acquisition （M＆A） and to examine whether tunneling occurs only in emerging markets with poor law enforcement or whether it also occurs in developed countries. This study documents that managers are more likely to overpay target in merger and acquisition with high overlapped owner which have stakes in bidder and target firm. That overpayment, a transfer of wealth from owners of bidder＇s firm to overlapping owners, is a type of tunneling. This study concludes that tunneling occurs in nations not only with low investor protection, but also with high investor protection.
