Anglo-American Special Relations： Atomic Diplomacy and the Canadian Dimension, 1942-1948

In recent years, we have entered a period of increasing impact of world affairs on national politics and international security. Notwithstanding, the present debate on national security and nuclear proliferation, Anglo-American ＂special relations＂ continue to be a subject of vigorous discussion influenced by the impact of new international emergencies as unstable countries acquire nuclear power and refuse ＂to reign＂ in their nuclear programmes （The Globe and Mail, 12 January 2012）. Along these lines the 71st anniversary of the Anglo-American Manhattan Project presents a unique opportunity to reappraise the Anglo-American wartime collaboration （or lack of） in atomic energy developments that resulted in the tragedy of nuclear weapons escalation. The Quebec Agreements of 1943-1944 were crafted to address the controlled flow of scientific information. But did this mean a trend toward more effective collaboration or toward greater American control of the atomic project？ This study explores the subject of nuclear politics from an unique vantage point of Anglo-Canadian and American-Canadian atomic diplomacy. In doing so, it will show that both the American and British atomic policy makers violated the Quebec Agreements. It seeks to demonstrate that （1） in the tangle of competition replacing cooperation, Canada was more important to the American atomic monopolists than the Anglo-AmcTican partnership, （2） the US-Canada Trade and Defence Agreements contributed to United States retaining exclusive control of the ＂absolute weapon＂, and that （3） their post-war nuclear energy agenda delayed Britain＇s atomic venture and isolated Britain from full participation in Arctic research. In practical terms, the emerging atomic policy in Washington boiled down to maintaining the American edge, come what may, and reducing British prestige in the post-war world. The article concludes by raising the question： did the United States, Britain, and Canada really work for atomic control？

The Pontecorvo Affaire Reappraised： Five Decades of Cold War Spy-Stories （1948-1998）

In August 1950, the nuclear physicist Bruno Pontecorvo suddenly left Rome for Stockholm and disappeared without leaving any trace. Pontecorvo had joined the British atomic bomb project. His abrupt disappearance quickly became an international affaire, causing much concern to the western intelligence services, who were worried about the escape of atomic secrets to the Soviet Union, especially after Fuchs＇ famous case. In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics （USSR）, Pontecorvo was welcomed with honour, but also isolated from the rest of the world for many decades. He always denied any direct involvement in the Soviet nuclear programme. According to him, he moved to Russia because of his socialist beliefs, working only on particle physics and peaceful applications of atomic energy. Who was really Bruno Pontecorvo？ A pacifist like Robert Oppenheimer or a communist agent like Klaus Fuchs？ Did he have access to any information about the Manhattan Project during the war, thanks to his friendship with Enrico Fermi？ Did he spy on the Anglo-Canadian programme like Igor Gouzenko, before moving to Russia？ Did he join Soviet military projects across more than 30 years in Dubna？ The author will discuss how the perception of Pontecorvo＇s case changed in the public opinion from the 1950s until the 1990s, as a mirror of the tensions between the two blocks. The whole affaire was object of harsh political confrontation in Italy for almost 50 years. Therefore, the author will also focus on the role played by the Italian communists in Pontecorvo＇s defection to the USSR as well as on such a local debate, which reflects the history of the post-war Italian Communist Party （PCI） until the end of the Cold War.