This paper develops a model where two lenders to subprime borrowers compete with the interest rates charged and the severity of loan covenants. The model has a stable equilibrium, which demonstrates how an increase in...This paper develops a model where two lenders to subprime borrowers compete with the interest rates charged and the severity of loan covenants. The model has a stable equilibrium, which demonstrates how an increase in the number of borrowers or an increase in the cost of meeting covenants will reduce the severity of the covenants required by lenders, and each of these changes will increase the difference in the severity of the loan covenant levels. An increase in the expected losses to the lender from relaxing covenants will increase the severity of loan covenants, and this will also make the levels of severity more dispersed. Additional analysis demonstrates how exogenous shifts affect the interest rates charged by the lenders and their profits展开更多
文摘This paper develops a model where two lenders to subprime borrowers compete with the interest rates charged and the severity of loan covenants. The model has a stable equilibrium, which demonstrates how an increase in the number of borrowers or an increase in the cost of meeting covenants will reduce the severity of the covenants required by lenders, and each of these changes will increase the difference in the severity of the loan covenant levels. An increase in the expected losses to the lender from relaxing covenants will increase the severity of loan covenants, and this will also make the levels of severity more dispersed. Additional analysis demonstrates how exogenous shifts affect the interest rates charged by the lenders and their profits
