This research uses a theoretical conceptual method based on Chantal Mouffe＇s Radical Democracy which blended with Derrida＇s deconstruction thesis about ＂democracy to come＂ to reach findings on the state of South A...This research uses a theoretical conceptual method based on Chantal Mouffe＇s Radical Democracy which blended with Derrida＇s deconstruction thesis about ＂democracy to come＂ to reach findings on the state of South Africa＇s media freedom landscape. The method is contained in the conceptual framework. The article provides the constitutional legal landscape--or the overarching laws of the land--and the co-regulatory framework within which journalists work. There are four research explications： the Protection of State Information Bill （dubbed the Secrecy Bill）, a painting of the president and Freedom of Expression, an arson attack on a community radio station and finally, the death of a photojournalist at the hands of police. The argument here is that the death, the arson attack, the Secrecy Bill, and the shut-down of dissent during the exhibition of the painting of the president all undermine democracy and signify significant closures for the media in the now 20-year-old post-apartheid South Africa. The analysis and reflections will be framed within theories of radical democracy, which argue for more fights and contestations and more voices from the margins in order to deepen democracy, rather than rational consensus which closes the spaces for greater plurality.展开更多
Citizens of liberal democracies hold that their theory of governance is the most just, the most consistent with freedom, and the most likely to promote human flourishing. Yet, Canada, one of the world＇s most liberal ...Citizens of liberal democracies hold that their theory of governance is the most just, the most consistent with freedom, and the most likely to promote human flourishing. Yet, Canada, one of the world＇s most liberal and progressive democracies, has consistently been unable to come to terms with the minority nations in its midst. Why would national minorities resist joining fully in a just liberal democratic state？ And in the face of this refusal, what sort of relationship should the majority establish with these national minorities？ I argue that their resistance stems from an axiom of mainstream liberalism, ＂the civic unity assumption,＂ which holds that, ideally, all citizens endorse a single, unified state. While seemingly innocuous, this assumption extinguishes First Nations and Qurbrcois＇ claims to sovereignty. I conclude that this assumption--that majority and minority nationals must all work within the boundaries of a single constitutional structure--is ultimately an assimilative one, demanding that minority nationals merge their political community into the civic project of the majority. Drawing from John Rawls＇ The Law of Peoples, I argue that minority nations are best characterized as ＂peoples＂--complete societies with their own unique moral, cultural, and political traditions. If we accept this claim, we will come to see the multinational state differently： not as a political project uniting all citizens, but as a pact between nations; equal sovereign peoples coming together in a spirit of reciprocity to work out fair terms of social and political cooperation.展开更多
Given that preaching is the primary mode of public theological discourse for most Christian ministers, an intellectual virtue of verbal restraint is required when practicing public theology and it is wise to address t...Given that preaching is the primary mode of public theological discourse for most Christian ministers, an intellectual virtue of verbal restraint is required when practicing public theology and it is wise to address the ways that homilies can shepherd public discourse practices. A theology of rhetoric includes the homilist＇s moral purpose. Homilies either enhance public discourse or pervert it. This essay sketches a pattern of sermon movement that respects the logic operative in public theology, given the social context of America. Homilies can help cultivate the pastoral care of public rhetoric by modeling discourse that nurtures the politics of accountability. While many call for a public ethos where divergent moral voices engage each other in highly contested arenas, a precondition to practicing effective public theology requires that one exercises discourse in a way that respects the social limits on the free exercise of religion. It is important that a public theology of rhetoric clarifies the original social agreement for acceptable religious discourse in the public arena. Homiletics, as a dimension of practical theology, can teach preachers methods of pastoral care for public discourse. The social agreement in liberal democracies to contain the combative nature of religious discourse assumes a logic that is circumscribed by commitments to （1） religious pluralism, （2） theological agnosticism, and （3） epistemological pragmatism. Here we propose that a sermon＇s form, which implicitly touches upon these commitments, can tap into the basic modes of persuasion in secular liberal societies. This respects the moral purposes previously agreed upon and expected of partisans during highly contestable times. This calls for incarnational humility on the part of the Christian public theologian and it guides her/his practice.展开更多
The authors＇ purpose is to illustrate that counter cultures follow changes in democracy. While allowing more political freedom for individuals, such freedom is expressed by overtaking those rules, taboos, and mores t...The authors＇ purpose is to illustrate that counter cultures follow changes in democracy. While allowing more political freedom for individuals, such freedom is expressed by overtaking those rules, taboos, and mores that previously were followed when the minorities lacked that freedom. Changes occur in such topics as sexual mores, aesthetic appreciation of music, and the media. Beginning in the 1950s, American culture has changed dramatically because of changes in polities and the media. While not suggesting that this is good or bad, the authors profess that it is inevitable.展开更多
Setting out from the categories of totality and histori（ci）sm in Kosik＇s Dialectics of the Concrete, we look at the relationship between theory and praxis： empty, abstract totality versus concrete, reified and ali...Setting out from the categories of totality and histori（ci）sm in Kosik＇s Dialectics of the Concrete, we look at the relationship between theory and praxis： empty, abstract totality versus concrete, reified and alienated practice （Lukacs, Habermas, Honneth）; a bad totality, in which the real polydimensional subject is replaced by the one-dimensional, mythologized, fetishized, and economistically reduced ＂subject＂ of consummation （Marcuse, Baudrillard）. The dialectics of concrete totality implies a marxistic critique of the ethical and juristic universalism, in the context of the ＂positive＂ side of globalization and political unilateralism, as a concrete, militant, hegemonistic, post-colonial, and neo-imperial practice （Apel, Habermas, Chomsky, Zinoviev）; globalization as totali（tari）zation, the ＂last man,＂ the ＂end of history,＂ and the ＂end＂ of dialectics in its neo-liberal, eschatological, empty ideological ＂realization＂ （Hegel, Marx, Fukuyama, Arendt）; the totality of the （invariable） being as a pseudo-concrete and pseudo-dialectical ontologistic speculation （Heidegger）： A ＂return＂ to a concrete history and a return of the ＂positive＂ dialectics as a critical awareness, mind, and method in the discourse ＂game＂ of human＇s cognitive, creative, and practical powers. The assumption of Kosik＇s humanism is a synchrony of nature and history in the ＂absolute＂ totality of human＇s concrete existence （Lukacs, Goldmann, Adorno, Sartre, Kosik）.展开更多
The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the increasing intervention of the state in the private sphere-as is evidenced in labor laws, consumer rights, bioethics, and Internet crimes-is compatible with the liberal ...The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the increasing intervention of the state in the private sphere-as is evidenced in labor laws, consumer rights, bioethics, and Internet crimes-is compatible with the liberal ideal of neutrality, or, on the contrary, whether it can be seen as a turning point towards the position of communitarian or republican authors, for whom the state must endorse a substantive good. Such a turning point could lead to a reformulation of the public and private spheres, and of course, raise questions over which values justify which kinds of intervention. This paper will cover these debates in three parts： First, by presenting briefly the history of the liberal conception of rights, I will try to show that, from a starting point based mostly on individual protection, the liberal tradition has become more interventionist, which can be seen through the notion of ＂claim rights.＂ Departing from John Rawls＇s work, I will argue that this notion allows for some level of intervention, without betraying liberal neutrality. Subsequently, I will discuss the difference between this kind of intervention and the ones proclaimed by communitarians and republicans authors： The former will be illustrated by Michael Sandel＇s criticism of Rawls in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and the later by Richard Dagger＇s position in Civic Virtues, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. Finally, in the third part, we＇ll discuss whether liberal principles can be harmonized with the republican and communitarian focus on civic virtues and good life.展开更多
My principal objective in this paper is to examine what position liberal egalitarians should take regarding the issue of immigration. Given that liberal egalitarians grant central importance to individual autonomy and...My principal objective in this paper is to examine what position liberal egalitarians should take regarding the issue of immigration. Given that liberal egalitarians grant central importance to individual autonomy and the moral equality of all persons, their rejection of restrictive immigration policies appears to follow from these central normative commitments. Liberal egalitarians such as Joseph Carens and Phillip Cole have argued that those who are committed to individual autonomy and moral equality should advocate for an open borders position in immigration. I argue that it is a serious mistake for liberal egalitarians to advocate open national borders and that borders should instead be strategically regulated to reduce global economic inequalities through immigration policies systematically integrated into development programs for the poorest and most vulnerable countries. Open borders would create an open market for immigration slots to choice countries of destination, which out of practical necessity would have to delimit the number of new immigrants. It is well known in migration studies that those who are more educated, young, and have more resources are more likely to migrate than the very young, the elderly, the infirm, and the poorest individuals. Those left behind in developing countries suffer serious negative consequences from the emigration of the most highly educated, capable, and talented individuals in their society. I then argue that liberal egalitarians should grant particular moral consideration to the world＇s poorest and most vulnerable and that immigration policies strategically designed to prioritize their needs are actually more consistent with the dual commitments of individual autonomy and moral equality than an open borders position. I propose three principles of global justice that are consistent with liberal egalitarianism that should guide transnational moral obligations. I end the paper by arguing that two of these principles can be used to justify restricted immigration policies that would enable developed countries to partially discharge some of their moral obligations to developing countries while enhancing the autonomy of the world＇s most vulnerable people.展开更多
Democratic private schools in Israel are a part of the neo-liberal discourse. They champion the dialogic philosophy associated with its most prominent advocates--Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas---together with Paulo Fr...Democratic private schools in Israel are a part of the neo-liberal discourse. They champion the dialogic philosophy associated with its most prominent advocates--Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas---together with Paulo Freire＇s critical pedagogy, the humanistic psychology propounded by Carl Rogers, Nel Noddings＇s pedagogy of care and concern, and even Gadamer＇s integrative hermeneutic perspective. Democratic schools form one of the greatest challenges to State education and most vocal and active critique of the focus conservative education places on exams and achievement. This article describes the dual discourse connected to the schools. The first is the inner dialogical, which is devoted to student freedom and progress, the child being placed at the center. The second is the exterior discourse, which represents the school as a place of counter-education that provides personal and group development and comprises a site of liberty and choice. The schools in Israel are described as test case and indicating the existence of a sophisticated form of deception via the use of alluring terminology. The democratic private schools should be recognized for what they really are--agents of commodification that undermine democracy rather than enhance it.展开更多
This paper argues that there is no real nationalism in the Middle East and if is, then it is an instrumental. The historical process of the region which relates to nationalism has had three stages： （1） the European...This paper argues that there is no real nationalism in the Middle East and if is, then it is an instrumental. The historical process of the region which relates to nationalism has had three stages： （1） the European conquest that forced the indigenous people to battle both for freedom and confront a secular idea such as nationalism; （2） arbitrarily marked borders by the West disregarding ethnic religious and tribal lines and affinity; （3） the creation of Arab nation states with no solid infrastructure of shared national values. This perspective can help understand current political developments in light of the Arab spring upheavals, in Iraq, Syria and Libya.展开更多
In the last three decades, the rise of a populist challenge to the liberal political mainstream exposed how shallow the supposed victory of global liberalism was, even in its heartlands in Europe and North America. Ex...In the last three decades, the rise of a populist challenge to the liberal political mainstream exposed how shallow the supposed victory of global liberalism was, even in its heartlands in Europe and North America. Exclusive nationalism and nativism, identity politics, critiques of globaiisation and internationalism, and calls for democratic re-empowerment of the demos have converged politically on a new locus of inflated territorial, indeed ＇border＇ sovereignty, aligning the caU of ＇taking back control＇ on behalf of a radically re-defined community （＇we＇） with a defensive re-territorialisation of power along existing fault lines of nation-statism. In this paper, I argue that the very same call has become the new common political denominator for all populist platforms and parties across Europe. I argue that populists across the conventional left-fight divide have deployed a rigidly territo- rialised concept of popular sovereignty in order to bestow intellectual coherence and communicative power to the otherwise disparate strands of their anti-utopian cri- tiques of globalisation. In spite of significant ideological differences between so- called fight- and left-wing populism, in the short-term the two populist projects have sought to stage their performances of sovereigntism on, behind or inside the borders of the existing nation-states.展开更多
文摘This research uses a theoretical conceptual method based on Chantal Mouffe＇s Radical Democracy which blended with Derrida＇s deconstruction thesis about ＂democracy to come＂ to reach findings on the state of South Africa＇s media freedom landscape. The method is contained in the conceptual framework. The article provides the constitutional legal landscape--or the overarching laws of the land--and the co-regulatory framework within which journalists work. There are four research explications： the Protection of State Information Bill （dubbed the Secrecy Bill）, a painting of the president and Freedom of Expression, an arson attack on a community radio station and finally, the death of a photojournalist at the hands of police. The argument here is that the death, the arson attack, the Secrecy Bill, and the shut-down of dissent during the exhibition of the painting of the president all undermine democracy and signify significant closures for the media in the now 20-year-old post-apartheid South Africa. The analysis and reflections will be framed within theories of radical democracy, which argue for more fights and contestations and more voices from the margins in order to deepen democracy, rather than rational consensus which closes the spaces for greater plurality.
文摘Citizens of liberal democracies hold that their theory of governance is the most just, the most consistent with freedom, and the most likely to promote human flourishing. Yet, Canada, one of the world＇s most liberal and progressive democracies, has consistently been unable to come to terms with the minority nations in its midst. Why would national minorities resist joining fully in a just liberal democratic state？ And in the face of this refusal, what sort of relationship should the majority establish with these national minorities？ I argue that their resistance stems from an axiom of mainstream liberalism, ＂the civic unity assumption,＂ which holds that, ideally, all citizens endorse a single, unified state. While seemingly innocuous, this assumption extinguishes First Nations and Qurbrcois＇ claims to sovereignty. I conclude that this assumption--that majority and minority nationals must all work within the boundaries of a single constitutional structure--is ultimately an assimilative one, demanding that minority nationals merge their political community into the civic project of the majority. Drawing from John Rawls＇ The Law of Peoples, I argue that minority nations are best characterized as ＂peoples＂--complete societies with their own unique moral, cultural, and political traditions. If we accept this claim, we will come to see the multinational state differently： not as a political project uniting all citizens, but as a pact between nations; equal sovereign peoples coming together in a spirit of reciprocity to work out fair terms of social and political cooperation.
文摘Given that preaching is the primary mode of public theological discourse for most Christian ministers, an intellectual virtue of verbal restraint is required when practicing public theology and it is wise to address the ways that homilies can shepherd public discourse practices. A theology of rhetoric includes the homilist＇s moral purpose. Homilies either enhance public discourse or pervert it. This essay sketches a pattern of sermon movement that respects the logic operative in public theology, given the social context of America. Homilies can help cultivate the pastoral care of public rhetoric by modeling discourse that nurtures the politics of accountability. While many call for a public ethos where divergent moral voices engage each other in highly contested arenas, a precondition to practicing effective public theology requires that one exercises discourse in a way that respects the social limits on the free exercise of religion. It is important that a public theology of rhetoric clarifies the original social agreement for acceptable religious discourse in the public arena. Homiletics, as a dimension of practical theology, can teach preachers methods of pastoral care for public discourse. The social agreement in liberal democracies to contain the combative nature of religious discourse assumes a logic that is circumscribed by commitments to （1） religious pluralism, （2） theological agnosticism, and （3） epistemological pragmatism. Here we propose that a sermon＇s form, which implicitly touches upon these commitments, can tap into the basic modes of persuasion in secular liberal societies. This respects the moral purposes previously agreed upon and expected of partisans during highly contestable times. This calls for incarnational humility on the part of the Christian public theologian and it guides her/his practice.
文摘The authors＇ purpose is to illustrate that counter cultures follow changes in democracy. While allowing more political freedom for individuals, such freedom is expressed by overtaking those rules, taboos, and mores that previously were followed when the minorities lacked that freedom. Changes occur in such topics as sexual mores, aesthetic appreciation of music, and the media. Beginning in the 1950s, American culture has changed dramatically because of changes in polities and the media. While not suggesting that this is good or bad, the authors profess that it is inevitable.
文摘Setting out from the categories of totality and histori（ci）sm in Kosik＇s Dialectics of the Concrete, we look at the relationship between theory and praxis： empty, abstract totality versus concrete, reified and alienated practice （Lukacs, Habermas, Honneth）; a bad totality, in which the real polydimensional subject is replaced by the one-dimensional, mythologized, fetishized, and economistically reduced ＂subject＂ of consummation （Marcuse, Baudrillard）. The dialectics of concrete totality implies a marxistic critique of the ethical and juristic universalism, in the context of the ＂positive＂ side of globalization and political unilateralism, as a concrete, militant, hegemonistic, post-colonial, and neo-imperial practice （Apel, Habermas, Chomsky, Zinoviev）; globalization as totali（tari）zation, the ＂last man,＂ the ＂end of history,＂ and the ＂end＂ of dialectics in its neo-liberal, eschatological, empty ideological ＂realization＂ （Hegel, Marx, Fukuyama, Arendt）; the totality of the （invariable） being as a pseudo-concrete and pseudo-dialectical ontologistic speculation （Heidegger）： A ＂return＂ to a concrete history and a return of the ＂positive＂ dialectics as a critical awareness, mind, and method in the discourse ＂game＂ of human＇s cognitive, creative, and practical powers. The assumption of Kosik＇s humanism is a synchrony of nature and history in the ＂absolute＂ totality of human＇s concrete existence （Lukacs, Goldmann, Adorno, Sartre, Kosik）.
文摘The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the increasing intervention of the state in the private sphere-as is evidenced in labor laws, consumer rights, bioethics, and Internet crimes-is compatible with the liberal ideal of neutrality, or, on the contrary, whether it can be seen as a turning point towards the position of communitarian or republican authors, for whom the state must endorse a substantive good. Such a turning point could lead to a reformulation of the public and private spheres, and of course, raise questions over which values justify which kinds of intervention. This paper will cover these debates in three parts： First, by presenting briefly the history of the liberal conception of rights, I will try to show that, from a starting point based mostly on individual protection, the liberal tradition has become more interventionist, which can be seen through the notion of ＂claim rights.＂ Departing from John Rawls＇s work, I will argue that this notion allows for some level of intervention, without betraying liberal neutrality. Subsequently, I will discuss the difference between this kind of intervention and the ones proclaimed by communitarians and republicans authors： The former will be illustrated by Michael Sandel＇s criticism of Rawls in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and the later by Richard Dagger＇s position in Civic Virtues, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. Finally, in the third part, we＇ll discuss whether liberal principles can be harmonized with the republican and communitarian focus on civic virtues and good life.
文摘My principal objective in this paper is to examine what position liberal egalitarians should take regarding the issue of immigration. Given that liberal egalitarians grant central importance to individual autonomy and the moral equality of all persons, their rejection of restrictive immigration policies appears to follow from these central normative commitments. Liberal egalitarians such as Joseph Carens and Phillip Cole have argued that those who are committed to individual autonomy and moral equality should advocate for an open borders position in immigration. I argue that it is a serious mistake for liberal egalitarians to advocate open national borders and that borders should instead be strategically regulated to reduce global economic inequalities through immigration policies systematically integrated into development programs for the poorest and most vulnerable countries. Open borders would create an open market for immigration slots to choice countries of destination, which out of practical necessity would have to delimit the number of new immigrants. It is well known in migration studies that those who are more educated, young, and have more resources are more likely to migrate than the very young, the elderly, the infirm, and the poorest individuals. Those left behind in developing countries suffer serious negative consequences from the emigration of the most highly educated, capable, and talented individuals in their society. I then argue that liberal egalitarians should grant particular moral consideration to the world＇s poorest and most vulnerable and that immigration policies strategically designed to prioritize their needs are actually more consistent with the dual commitments of individual autonomy and moral equality than an open borders position. I propose three principles of global justice that are consistent with liberal egalitarianism that should guide transnational moral obligations. I end the paper by arguing that two of these principles can be used to justify restricted immigration policies that would enable developed countries to partially discharge some of their moral obligations to developing countries while enhancing the autonomy of the world＇s most vulnerable people.
文摘Democratic private schools in Israel are a part of the neo-liberal discourse. They champion the dialogic philosophy associated with its most prominent advocates--Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas---together with Paulo Freire＇s critical pedagogy, the humanistic psychology propounded by Carl Rogers, Nel Noddings＇s pedagogy of care and concern, and even Gadamer＇s integrative hermeneutic perspective. Democratic schools form one of the greatest challenges to State education and most vocal and active critique of the focus conservative education places on exams and achievement. This article describes the dual discourse connected to the schools. The first is the inner dialogical, which is devoted to student freedom and progress, the child being placed at the center. The second is the exterior discourse, which represents the school as a place of counter-education that provides personal and group development and comprises a site of liberty and choice. The schools in Israel are described as test case and indicating the existence of a sophisticated form of deception via the use of alluring terminology. The democratic private schools should be recognized for what they really are--agents of commodification that undermine democracy rather than enhance it.
文摘This paper argues that there is no real nationalism in the Middle East and if is, then it is an instrumental. The historical process of the region which relates to nationalism has had three stages： （1） the European conquest that forced the indigenous people to battle both for freedom and confront a secular idea such as nationalism; （2） arbitrarily marked borders by the West disregarding ethnic religious and tribal lines and affinity; （3） the creation of Arab nation states with no solid infrastructure of shared national values. This perspective can help understand current political developments in light of the Arab spring upheavals, in Iraq, Syria and Libya.
文摘In the last three decades, the rise of a populist challenge to the liberal political mainstream exposed how shallow the supposed victory of global liberalism was, even in its heartlands in Europe and North America. Exclusive nationalism and nativism, identity politics, critiques of globaiisation and internationalism, and calls for democratic re-empowerment of the demos have converged politically on a new locus of inflated territorial, indeed ＇border＇ sovereignty, aligning the caU of ＇taking back control＇ on behalf of a radically re-defined community （＇we＇） with a defensive re-territorialisation of power along existing fault lines of nation-statism. In this paper, I argue that the very same call has become the new common political denominator for all populist platforms and parties across Europe. I argue that populists across the conventional left-fight divide have deployed a rigidly territo- rialised concept of popular sovereignty in order to bestow intellectual coherence and communicative power to the otherwise disparate strands of their anti-utopian cri- tiques of globalisation. In spite of significant ideological differences between so- called fight- and left-wing populism, in the short-term the two populist projects have sought to stage their performances of sovereigntism on, behind or inside the borders of the existing nation-states.
