In this paper I examine the following claims by William Eaton in his monograph Boyle on Fire： （i） that Boyle＇s religious convictions led him to believe that the world was not completely explicable, and this shows ...In this paper I examine the following claims by William Eaton in his monograph Boyle on Fire： （i） that Boyle＇s religious convictions led him to believe that the world was not completely explicable, and this shows that there is a shortcoming in the power of mechanical explanations; （ii） that mechanical explanations offer only sufficient, not necessary explanations, and this too was taken by Boyle to be a limit in the explanatory power of mechanical explanations; （iii） that the mature Boyle thought that there could be more intelligible explanatory models than mechanism; and （iv） that what Boyle says at any point in his career is incompatible with the statement of Maria Boas-Hall, i.e., that the mechanical hypothesis can explicate all natural phenomena. Since all four of these claims are part of Eaton＇s developmental argument, my rejection of them will not only show how the particular developmental story Eaton diagnoses is inaccurate, but will also explain what limits there actually are in Boyle＇s account of the intelligibility of mechanical explanations. My account will also show why important philosophers like Locke and Leibniz should be interested in Boyle＇s philosophical work.展开更多
Recent critical approaches on human rights have exalted the potentiality of this category for seeking progressive agendas （Santos 2007） insofar as they are enacted within counter-hegemonic cognitive frames （Rajagop...Recent critical approaches on human rights have exalted the potentiality of this category for seeking progressive agendas （Santos 2007） insofar as they are enacted within counter-hegemonic cognitive frames （Rajagopal 2006） towards the construction of ＂subaltern human rights＂ （Onazi 2009）. Others,. however, have pointed out that the human rights institutional and political hegemony makes other valuable emancipatory strategies less available, and that this foregrounds problems of participation and procedure at the expense of distribution （Kennedy 2005）. Finally, others have explained how the abstractedness of the category entails a de-politicization （Rancière 2004; Zizek 2005; Douzinas 2007） or an emptiness that, of course, can be filled by progressive activism, but whose substance is easily reappropriated by those in power （Miéville 2005）. By engaging with the above-mentioned perspectives, and following the decolonial approach （Mignolo 2009; 2011）, I suggest that the category human rights can be decolonized and being used for progressive agendas only after a comprehensive critique of liberal legality （that entails a critique of liberal abstract rationality, political economy, and modernity/coloniality） has been performed.展开更多
文摘In this paper I examine the following claims by William Eaton in his monograph Boyle on Fire： （i） that Boyle＇s religious convictions led him to believe that the world was not completely explicable, and this shows that there is a shortcoming in the power of mechanical explanations; （ii） that mechanical explanations offer only sufficient, not necessary explanations, and this too was taken by Boyle to be a limit in the explanatory power of mechanical explanations; （iii） that the mature Boyle thought that there could be more intelligible explanatory models than mechanism; and （iv） that what Boyle says at any point in his career is incompatible with the statement of Maria Boas-Hall, i.e., that the mechanical hypothesis can explicate all natural phenomena. Since all four of these claims are part of Eaton＇s developmental argument, my rejection of them will not only show how the particular developmental story Eaton diagnoses is inaccurate, but will also explain what limits there actually are in Boyle＇s account of the intelligibility of mechanical explanations. My account will also show why important philosophers like Locke and Leibniz should be interested in Boyle＇s philosophical work.
文摘Recent critical approaches on human rights have exalted the potentiality of this category for seeking progressive agendas （Santos 2007） insofar as they are enacted within counter-hegemonic cognitive frames （Rajagopal 2006） towards the construction of ＂subaltern human rights＂ （Onazi 2009）. Others,. however, have pointed out that the human rights institutional and political hegemony makes other valuable emancipatory strategies less available, and that this foregrounds problems of participation and procedure at the expense of distribution （Kennedy 2005）. Finally, others have explained how the abstractedness of the category entails a de-politicization （Rancière 2004; Zizek 2005; Douzinas 2007） or an emptiness that, of course, can be filled by progressive activism, but whose substance is easily reappropriated by those in power （Miéville 2005）. By engaging with the above-mentioned perspectives, and following the decolonial approach （Mignolo 2009; 2011）, I suggest that the category human rights can be decolonized and being used for progressive agendas only after a comprehensive critique of liberal legality （that entails a critique of liberal abstract rationality, political economy, and modernity/coloniality） has been performed.
