Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no...Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.展开更多
In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of ...In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.展开更多
We study a spectrum sharing problem where multiple systems coexist and interfere with each other. First, an analysis is proposed for distributed spectrum sharing based on Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) in Cognitive Radio...We study a spectrum sharing problem where multiple systems coexist and interfere with each other. First, an analysis is proposed for distributed spectrum sharing based on Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) in Cognitive Radios (CRs). In one-shot game, selfish and rational CRs greedily full spread their own spectrum space in order to maximize their own rates, which leads to Nash Equilibrium (N.E.). But with long term interaction, i.e., Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), CRs can come to cooperate and acquire the social optimal point by using different evolutionary strategies such as Tit For Tat (TFT), Generous TFT (GTFT), etc. Also we compare the performances of the different evolutionary strategies in noise-free and noisy environments for two-player games. Finally, N-player IPD (N-IPD) is simulated to verify our conclusions that TFT is a good strategy for spectrum sharing in CRs.展开更多
In this work, we consider an evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a homogeneous random network with the richest-following strategy adoption rule. By constructing homogeneous random networks from a regular ring gra...In this work, we consider an evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a homogeneous random network with the richest-following strategy adoption rule. By constructing homogeneous random networks from a regular ring graph, we investigate the effects of topologicaJ randomness on cooperation. In contrast to the ordinary view that the presence of smaJ1 amount of shortcuts in ring graphs favors cooperation, we find the cooperation inhibition by weak topological randomness. The explanations on the observations are presented.展开更多
We investigate the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game in structured populations by introducing dimers, which are defined as that two players in each dimer always hold a same strategy. We find that influences of dim...We investigate the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game in structured populations by introducing dimers, which are defined as that two players in each dimer always hold a same strategy. We find that influences of dimets on cooperation depend on the type of dimers and the population structure. For those dimers in which players interact with each other, the cooperation level increases with the number of dimers though the cooperation improvement level depends on the type of network structures. On the other hand, the dimers, in which there are not mutual interactions, will not do any good to the cooperation level in a single community, but interestingly, will improve the cooperation level in a population with two communities. We explore the relationship between dimers and self-interactions and find that the effects of dimers are similar to that of self-interactions. Also, we find that the dimers, which are established over two communities in a multi-community network, act as one type of interaction through which information between communities is communicated by the requirement that two players in a dimer hold a same strategy.展开更多
As a basic study to prevent accidents or concealment caused by violation of rules or regulations （which are regarded as uncooperative behavior）, an attempt was made to clarify the condition necessary for promoting c...As a basic study to prevent accidents or concealment caused by violation of rules or regulations （which are regarded as uncooperative behavior）, an attempt was made to clarify the condition necessary for promoting cooperation when the tit-for-tat strategy is adopted in the finite and repeated prisoner＇s dilemma situations. A mathematical model, in which three different strategies （tit-for-tat, all defection （individualism）, and all cooperation （altruism）） exist, was constructed in order to demonstrate the condition that can promote cooperative behaviors. As a result of an agent-agent computer simulation, it was shown that the tit-for-tat strategy promoted more cooperation than other strategies when the number of agents adopting the tit-for-tat strategy was dominant in the population and the discount parameter was larger. Next, it was explored how the tit-for-tat strategy in the finite and repeated prisoner＇s dilemma promotes cooperation using a human-agent computer simulation. In other words, the condition under which cooperative behavior is encouraged was clarified. In the simulation experiment, the discount rate was controlled as an experimental variable. As well as the first experiment above, the dominant occupation of the tit-for-tat strategy was found to lead to the promoted cooperation. Concerning the effect of discount parameter on the cooperative behavior, the cooperation rate tended to increase with the increase of discount parameter only when the t-t-for-tat strategy is dominant. As a whole, the type of change of discount parameter did not affect the cooperation rate.展开更多
The aim of this paper is to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods. When players agree on the need to collaborate but are in c...The aim of this paper is to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods. When players agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, one player must always compromise. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has ever been believed that if an agreement is reached under such circumstances, the players do not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement. However, this study shows that this belief is not always true if the players were able to revise the outcome of their negotiations later. The wide-ranging fields use game theories for their analysis frameworks to analyze the success or failure of coordination. However, comparing with the possibility of betrayal illustrated as a well-known Prisoner Dilemma, it has been rare to discuss conflict regarding the specific method of coordination, although such situations are often observed in today＇s interdependent real world. The repeated Battle of the Sexes games presented in this study would be a useful framework to analyze conflict regarding the specific method of coordination.展开更多
文摘Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.
文摘In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.
基金Supported by the "863" Program (No.2009AA01Z241)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.60772062)+2 种基金Key Scientific Research Project of Office of Education in Jiangsu Province (No.06KJA51001)Scientific Research Project of Office of Education in Jiangsu Province (No.8KJB510015)Startup Funding (No.NY208048)
文摘We study a spectrum sharing problem where multiple systems coexist and interfere with each other. First, an analysis is proposed for distributed spectrum sharing based on Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) in Cognitive Radios (CRs). In one-shot game, selfish and rational CRs greedily full spread their own spectrum space in order to maximize their own rates, which leads to Nash Equilibrium (N.E.). But with long term interaction, i.e., Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), CRs can come to cooperate and acquire the social optimal point by using different evolutionary strategies such as Tit For Tat (TFT), Generous TFT (GTFT), etc. Also we compare the performances of the different evolutionary strategies in noise-free and noisy environments for two-player games. Finally, N-player IPD (N-IPD) is simulated to verify our conclusions that TFT is a good strategy for spectrum sharing in CRs.
基金Supported by the Project of NECT-07-0112 the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 10775022 and 90921015
文摘In this work, we consider an evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a homogeneous random network with the richest-following strategy adoption rule. By constructing homogeneous random networks from a regular ring graph, we investigate the effects of topologicaJ randomness on cooperation. In contrast to the ordinary view that the presence of smaJ1 amount of shortcuts in ring graphs favors cooperation, we find the cooperation inhibition by weak topological randomness. The explanations on the observations are presented.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 10775022, 90921015the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
文摘We investigate the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game in structured populations by introducing dimers, which are defined as that two players in each dimer always hold a same strategy. We find that influences of dimets on cooperation depend on the type of dimers and the population structure. For those dimers in which players interact with each other, the cooperation level increases with the number of dimers though the cooperation improvement level depends on the type of network structures. On the other hand, the dimers, in which there are not mutual interactions, will not do any good to the cooperation level in a single community, but interestingly, will improve the cooperation level in a population with two communities. We explore the relationship between dimers and self-interactions and find that the effects of dimers are similar to that of self-interactions. Also, we find that the dimers, which are established over two communities in a multi-community network, act as one type of interaction through which information between communities is communicated by the requirement that two players in a dimer hold a same strategy.
文摘As a basic study to prevent accidents or concealment caused by violation of rules or regulations （which are regarded as uncooperative behavior）, an attempt was made to clarify the condition necessary for promoting cooperation when the tit-for-tat strategy is adopted in the finite and repeated prisoner＇s dilemma situations. A mathematical model, in which three different strategies （tit-for-tat, all defection （individualism）, and all cooperation （altruism）） exist, was constructed in order to demonstrate the condition that can promote cooperative behaviors. As a result of an agent-agent computer simulation, it was shown that the tit-for-tat strategy promoted more cooperation than other strategies when the number of agents adopting the tit-for-tat strategy was dominant in the population and the discount parameter was larger. Next, it was explored how the tit-for-tat strategy in the finite and repeated prisoner＇s dilemma promotes cooperation using a human-agent computer simulation. In other words, the condition under which cooperative behavior is encouraged was clarified. In the simulation experiment, the discount rate was controlled as an experimental variable. As well as the first experiment above, the dominant occupation of the tit-for-tat strategy was found to lead to the promoted cooperation. Concerning the effect of discount parameter on the cooperative behavior, the cooperation rate tended to increase with the increase of discount parameter only when the t-t-for-tat strategy is dominant. As a whole, the type of change of discount parameter did not affect the cooperation rate.
文摘The aim of this paper is to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods. When players agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, one player must always compromise. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has ever been believed that if an agreement is reached under such circumstances, the players do not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement. However, this study shows that this belief is not always true if the players were able to revise the outcome of their negotiations later. The wide-ranging fields use game theories for their analysis frameworks to analyze the success or failure of coordination. However, comparing with the possibility of betrayal illustrated as a well-known Prisoner Dilemma, it has been rare to discuss conflict regarding the specific method of coordination, although such situations are often observed in today＇s interdependent real world. The repeated Battle of the Sexes games presented in this study would be a useful framework to analyze conflict regarding the specific method of coordination.
