This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings （IPOs）. Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange （SZSE...This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings （IPOs）. Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange （SZSE）, which was collected from the Guotaian Research Service Center （GTA-RSC） databases, this study uses two proxies to measure firm performance and three proxies to measure managerial entrenchment. The two proxies for firm performance are Tobins＇ Q and return on assets （ROA）, and the three proxies for managerial entrenchment are entrenchment 1, entrenchment 2, and entrenchment 3. These three entrenchment proxies are derived from the principal component analysis （PCA）. Though previous studies of managerial entrenchment and firm performance variables suffer from endogeneity, with respect to the corporate governance it is unclear as to which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. This study confirms that the data are linear and no endogeneity issue should be address in this study, but only heteroskedasticity, non-normality for Tobins＇ Q are a problem, therefore, the regression method employed for Tobins＇ Q is the generalised least square （GLS） and the ordinary least square （OLS） between estimators for ROA. The regression result for Tobins＇ Q reveals that managerial entrenchment is negatively impact on firm performance. The results are in contradiction to the stewardship theory for new firms whereas the managerial entrenchment for new firms is positive. Furthermore, only one entrenchment proxy yields a significant coefficient. In conclusion, the negative results of entrenchment proxies were caused by the different institutional structures and legal systems which are the Chinese corporations that are still largely owned and controlled by a state and hence the centralised state controlled was responsible for all managerial actions.展开更多
In recent years, managers＇ self-interest motivation has been attracting more and more attention from both the academia and practice.Therefore, the ways and depth of managers＇ self-interest motivation influencing lis...In recent years, managers＇ self-interest motivation has been attracting more and more attention from both the academia and practice.Therefore, the ways and depth of managers＇ self-interest motivation influencing listed companies＇ operating performance has become a hot research area with important theoretical and practical significance. Based on the samples of A-share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange during 2012-2014. we studied different effects of managers＇ self-interest motivation on listed company＇s business performance under different situations.The innovation of this paper mainly lies in the following two points： on the one hand, we did not adopt the previous research methods which does not distinguish different kinds of company＇s business performance. Therefore, we divided business performance into two types firstly, then we made empirical text of the influences of managers＇ self-interest motivation on business performance by virtue of Hausman Model and drew related conclusions under different situations of operating performance. On the other hand, the index measuring managers＇ self-interest is relatively new.展开更多
The data of warrants underlying stocks was selected for the sample period from August,2005 to December,2009.These data the authors collected did not include the announcement date of reform of non-tradable underlying s...The data of warrants underlying stocks was selected for the sample period from August,2005 to December,2009.These data the authors collected did not include the announcement date of reform of non-tradable underlying shares,and was available from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.The event study method is employed to test the magnitude effect based on the Wild bootstrap,which is performed on the abnormal return,the cumulative abnormal return,and the standardized cumulative abnormal return.Empirical results show no evidence of magnitude effect but sign effect after warrants introduction.The authors argue that this phenomenon is caused by the migration of radical agents from stock market to warrant market.展开更多
Leung Chun-ying（fifth right）,Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Chairman Chow Chung-kong（fourth left）jointly beat a gong to mark the inauguration of the...Leung Chun-ying（fifth right）,Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Chairman Chow Chung-kong（fourth left）jointly beat a gong to mark the inauguration of the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect in Hong Kong on December 5. Under the new scheme, mainland investors can trade shares on the stock exchange of Hong Kong through local brokers, and Hong Kong investors can buy and sell stocks on the tech-heavy Shenzhen bourse. The arrangement is the second link between mainland and Hong Kong capital markets, after the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect was launched in 2014.展开更多
文摘This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings （IPOs）. Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange （SZSE）, which was collected from the Guotaian Research Service Center （GTA-RSC） databases, this study uses two proxies to measure firm performance and three proxies to measure managerial entrenchment. The two proxies for firm performance are Tobins＇ Q and return on assets （ROA）, and the three proxies for managerial entrenchment are entrenchment 1, entrenchment 2, and entrenchment 3. These three entrenchment proxies are derived from the principal component analysis （PCA）. Though previous studies of managerial entrenchment and firm performance variables suffer from endogeneity, with respect to the corporate governance it is unclear as to which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. This study confirms that the data are linear and no endogeneity issue should be address in this study, but only heteroskedasticity, non-normality for Tobins＇ Q are a problem, therefore, the regression method employed for Tobins＇ Q is the generalised least square （GLS） and the ordinary least square （OLS） between estimators for ROA. The regression result for Tobins＇ Q reveals that managerial entrenchment is negatively impact on firm performance. The results are in contradiction to the stewardship theory for new firms whereas the managerial entrenchment for new firms is positive. Furthermore, only one entrenchment proxy yields a significant coefficient. In conclusion, the negative results of entrenchment proxies were caused by the different institutional structures and legal systems which are the Chinese corporations that are still largely owned and controlled by a state and hence the centralised state controlled was responsible for all managerial actions.
文摘In recent years, managers＇ self-interest motivation has been attracting more and more attention from both the academia and practice.Therefore, the ways and depth of managers＇ self-interest motivation influencing listed companies＇ operating performance has become a hot research area with important theoretical and practical significance. Based on the samples of A-share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange during 2012-2014. we studied different effects of managers＇ self-interest motivation on listed company＇s business performance under different situations.The innovation of this paper mainly lies in the following two points： on the one hand, we did not adopt the previous research methods which does not distinguish different kinds of company＇s business performance. Therefore, we divided business performance into two types firstly, then we made empirical text of the influences of managers＇ self-interest motivation on business performance by virtue of Hausman Model and drew related conclusions under different situations of operating performance. On the other hand, the index measuring managers＇ self-interest is relatively new.
基金supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China under Grant No.71101001the National Nature Science Foundation of Chinathe Research Grants Council of Hong Kong under Grant No.70731160635
文摘The data of warrants underlying stocks was selected for the sample period from August,2005 to December,2009.These data the authors collected did not include the announcement date of reform of non-tradable underlying shares,and was available from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.The event study method is employed to test the magnitude effect based on the Wild bootstrap,which is performed on the abnormal return,the cumulative abnormal return,and the standardized cumulative abnormal return.Empirical results show no evidence of magnitude effect but sign effect after warrants introduction.The authors argue that this phenomenon is caused by the migration of radical agents from stock market to warrant market.
文摘Leung Chun-ying（fifth right）,Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Chairman Chow Chung-kong（fourth left）jointly beat a gong to mark the inauguration of the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect in Hong Kong on December 5. Under the new scheme, mainland investors can trade shares on the stock exchange of Hong Kong through local brokers, and Hong Kong investors can buy and sell stocks on the tech-heavy Shenzhen bourse. The arrangement is the second link between mainland and Hong Kong capital markets, after the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect was launched in 2014.
