Auditor Switching by Corporate Governance： Empirical Analysis From the Listed Company in China

As the most important institutional arrangement in modem corporate, corporate governance is playing an increasingly important role in Chinese market economy, and its effect to auditor change is also being increasingly tapped in recent years. This paper summarizes the reason of auditor switching, especially the elements of corporate governance. Then by selecting the A-share listed companies in China as a sample, the authors use statistical test and logistic regression analysis to explore how the 15 factors of corporate governance which are based on the indicators of Nankai University evaluation system affect auditor switching. The results show that the largest proportion of shareholding, the proportion of independent directors, and board meetings which on behalf of the level of corporate governance, have a significant and negative correlation with auditor switching. The results also show that full disclosure, litigation, and arbitration which on behave of the level of corporate governance have a significant positive correlation with auditor switching.

Auditing the Auditors： The Audit Oversight Board and Regulating Audit Quality in Malaysia

The setting-up of the Malaysian Audit Oversight Board （AOB） in 2010 under the Securities Commission Amendment Act 2010 has extended the role of regulators into the statutory audit domain for public listed companies. Although the auditing profession in Malaysia has International Auditing Standards as prescribed minimum level of quality in the delivery of audit assurance services, self-regulation by the profession alone appears inadequate to ensure the delivery of quality audit services. With co-regulation, auditors now are monitored not just by the profession but also by a new statutory body with considerable regulatory powers to sanction auditors where quality of the audit process has been found wanting. This study solicits the opinions of auditors on their expectations of what the new regulator can achieve. Based on interviews with a sample of 30 auditors, the study finds that the majority believe that audit quality will be taken to a new level following AOB＇s remit of registration of auditors, compliance inspection with International Standard on Quality Control （ISQC）, monitoring of financial statement quality, and its power of sanctions. A review of AOB＇s early years＇ inspection confirms these expectations.

Does Big 4 Affect the Earnings Response Coefficient （ERC）？ Evidence From Malaysia

This study examines the effect of audit quality （AQ） on the earnings response coefficient （ERC） based on a sample of 1,884 firm-year observations comprising 471 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia from 2007 to 2010. This study tests whether AQ affects ERC after controlling the established determinants of ERC： beta, growth, earnings persistence, and size. Using reverse regression, the study confirms that Big 4 is significant and positive to ERC. Auditor switching from non-Big 4 to Big 4 indicates the same results; however, the switching of auditors among Big 4 is not significant. The study thus provides systematic and comprehensive additional evidence on the effect of AQ via the measurement of Big 4; and auditor switching from non-Big 4 to Big 4 and switching among Big 4 on ERC. This is an important contribution to the literature but especially so given that the evidence comes from Malaysia, an emerging economy, whereas the existing empirical literature relates mainly to the developed countries.

Audit Quality in Kazakhstan： Does Big 4 Provide High-Quality Audits？

This paper provides empirical evidence on audit quality in Kazakhstan as measured by audit tenure and the frequency of issuing modified opinions. In addition, an overview of audit institutions of Kazakhstan and an analysis of the current audit market for public companies are offered. This paper also sheds light upon the potential independence problems resulting in low audit quality and current barriers to audit researches in Kazakhstan. Consistent with the findings of extant researches on audit quality and the general perceptions of investors, two hypotheses were developed, i.e., the audits performed by Big 4 audit firms in Kazakhstan also have higher quality than non-Big 4 audit firms in terms of audit tenure and the frequency of issuing modified opinions. The result confirms the hypothesis that Big 4 audit firms provide higher audit quality than smaller local firms in association with audit tenure instead of in relation to the frequency of issuing modified opinions. The result indicates that Big 4 audit firms may not be as independent as they will be in a highly litigious market. Therefore, an independent inspection should be regularly implemented according to the audit law, and the inspection report should be publicized by Chamber of Auditors （COA）1. If this is not practical due to the lack of qualified inspectors, a peer review may be an altemative to implement the quality control policy immediately. To the author＇s best knowledge, this is the first audit quality research in countries of the Commonwealth of Independence States （CIS）.

Perfection solutions of supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies

Operational mechanism of supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies is not ideal, the supervisory effect of the listed company rely on features of supervisors＇ board and member of the supervisors＇ board. Based on the comparison of supervisory audit in Britain, Germany, France and Japan, and the empirical research on 100 listed companies in a share market, the paper analyses supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies, and proposes some perfection solutions to strengthen supervisory audit.

Audit Quality, Timely Disclosure, and the Cost of Debt： Tunisian Evidence

The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of auditor type and eamings reporting lag on the cost of debt for the Tunisian setting. Our sample consists of 32 Tunisian companies for the period of 2003-2012. Audit quality is measured by auditor size （Big 4 versus non-Big 4） and timely disclosure is proxied by earnings reporting lag. Results show that auditor type is negatively associated with the cost of debt. By contrast, the association between earnings announcement lag and the cost of debt is positive and significant. When testing for the moderating effects of industry and listing status, we document that these associations are more pronounced for industrial companies and listed firms. Finally, the period of investigation slightly moderates the examined associations, since financial institutions become more sensitive to the tardy communication of information and less concerned with auditor type following some economic and political troubles in Tunisia between 2010 and 2012. Our findings have policy implications for managers in the Tunisian setting and other developing economies similar to Tunisia given the crucial role played by debt as an important source of external finance for companies.

Audit Committees： How They Affect Financial Reporting in Nigerian Companies

This study examines whether audit committees are associated with improved financial reporting quality for a sample of Nigerian listed companies prior to and after a corporate governance code mandated new regulations for audit committees in 2003. Using a sample of 70 companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, this study uses archival data in the form of companies＇ annual reports to measure the association between audit committees and improved financial reporting quality. Dechew and Dichev （2002）＇s model was used to measure earnings as a proxy for financial reporting quality. The results indicate that formation of audit committees was positively associated with improved financial reporting quality. It was also found that audit committees having an independent chair and audit committee expertise were positively associated with financial reporting quality. Other audit committee characteristics examined were found to be insignificantly related to financial reporting quality.

Independent Auditors Report： Australian Trends From 1996 to 2010

Audit report is the primary means of communication for auditors. To reduce the phenomenon of agency conflict, auditors work as agents for shareholders and report to them after reviewing the financial statements. In last 15 years, Australia has witnessed some major changes in Australian economy which have affected Australian business and its auditors＇ opinions. This paper examines the trend of audit opinions issued to Australian listed companies during this period. In total, 20,473 audit opinions were sited over the 15-year period, i.e., from 1996 to 2010. This research found that over the period, unqualified report was the most common type of audit reports issued in Australia with an average of 96.4%. The average rate at which the Big 4 audit firms issue unqualified reports is 88% compared with 76% issued by the non-Big 4 firms. It is also evidenced that the rate at which modified reports were issued during and after global financial crisis （GFC） （2007-2009） has increased across all industries, while the most noticeable increase occurred in the financial services, materials, and industrial sectors.

Does Independent External Auditing Play a Role in Corporate Governance？ An Empirical Study on Chinese A-Share Listed Firms

In China, an emerging economy, where investor protection is relatively weak, it is worthwhile and interesting to investigate whether independent external auditing, a sort of external corporate governance mechanism, exerts its influence. Using a sample of all A-share listed firms in 2005, this paper investigates the effects of independent external auditing on corporate governance via three aspects： （1） choice of auditing institution; （2） auditing fee; and （3） auditing opinion for annual reports. Empirical results show that, with worse agency problems in firms, the possibility of employing the “Big 41” to audit its annual reports is bigger. When determining auditing fees, auditing institutions take both firms＇ agency problems and the firm size into account. When issuing qualified opinions for poor-performing firms, auditors do not consider agency problems embedded in concentrated ownership. Overall, external independent auditing plays a limited role in corporate governance.