For the optimum price problem of charging for effluent, this paper analyzes the optimal Pigovian Tax and the serious information asymmetry problem existing in the application process of optimal Pigovian Tax, which is ...For the optimum price problem of charging for effluent, this paper analyzes the optimal Pigovian Tax and the serious information asymmetry problem existing in the application process of optimal Pigovian Tax, which is predominant in theory. Then the bilevel system optimizing decision-making theory is applied to give bilevel linear programming decision-making model of charging for effluent, in which the government (environmental protection agency) acts as the upper level decision-making unit and the polluting enterprises act as the lower level decision-making unit. To some extent, the model avoids the serious information asymmetry between the government and the polluting enterprises on charging for effluent.展开更多
By developing an analytical model, this paper examines the role of the ＂external appraiser＂ as a tool to face the informational asymmetry issue related to fair value measurements. A comparison between such a signali...By developing an analytical model, this paper examines the role of the ＂external appraiser＂ as a tool to face the informational asymmetry issue related to fair value measurements. A comparison between such a signaling mechanism and a ＂full fair value disclosure＂ is firstly carried out, highlighting variables affecting the efficiency and the effectiveness of both information strategies. Then, recovering the traditional distinction between ＂protective disclosure＂ （hard information） and ＂informative disclosure＂ （soft information）, this paper demonstrates how the former could significantly increase the positive effects associated to an employment of an independent valuer, reaching some conclusions useful to the standard setting process.展开更多
基金the National Social Science Foundation of China(Grant No.04BJY026).
文摘For the optimum price problem of charging for effluent, this paper analyzes the optimal Pigovian Tax and the serious information asymmetry problem existing in the application process of optimal Pigovian Tax, which is predominant in theory. Then the bilevel system optimizing decision-making theory is applied to give bilevel linear programming decision-making model of charging for effluent, in which the government (environmental protection agency) acts as the upper level decision-making unit and the polluting enterprises act as the lower level decision-making unit. To some extent, the model avoids the serious information asymmetry between the government and the polluting enterprises on charging for effluent.
文摘By developing an analytical model, this paper examines the role of the ＂external appraiser＂ as a tool to face the informational asymmetry issue related to fair value measurements. A comparison between such a signaling mechanism and a ＂full fair value disclosure＂ is firstly carried out, highlighting variables affecting the efficiency and the effectiveness of both information strategies. Then, recovering the traditional distinction between ＂protective disclosure＂ （hard information） and ＂informative disclosure＂ （soft information）, this paper demonstrates how the former could significantly increase the positive effects associated to an employment of an independent valuer, reaching some conclusions useful to the standard setting process.
