The challenges of today＇s world require college students have different skills and know how to apply the knowledge acquired to solve new situations. The traditional mode of teaching with lectures, still present in ma...The challenges of today＇s world require college students have different skills and know how to apply the knowledge acquired to solve new situations. The traditional mode of teaching with lectures, still present in many subjects of the engineering, seems to favor the development of the necessary skills, as active use of knowledge required [ 1 ]. However, they are using simulation games as an educational method in many universities in the world for the advantages they present for learning and the development of various skills, to simulate specific situations of professional activity [2]. This paper presents some background and requirements that games must meet educational purposes and propose their use in subjects related to economics, management and organization of production engineering programs where you can teach and learn from building products with simple items like cardboard paper on the theory of constructionism to build a product where people are building theories and knowledge in the mind [3]. The use of games is not widespread in universities in Argentina, however you can generate more motivating learning situations as it leaves the board becoming less abstract and more concrete learning. Classroom climate changes as students take a more participatory role and the teacher intervenes as a guide or facilitator of learning. This work could motivate teachers and researchers to promote their use in teaching and in future research to evaluate the potential of its use as a learning tool.展开更多
With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted mor...With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted more and more attention. This paper points out that scholars have studied the allocation of corporate control from the angles of the agency cost theory, property rights theory, corporate finance theory, and the theory of corporate governance, which has great value. However, the existing theories also have some flaws on the allocation of corporate control. First, people still have different understandings and views over the meaning of corporate control. Secondly, the existing research theoretically only observes and studies an arrangement of sheer level control, the allocation between final control and real control. This paper argues to build the two-tier allocation of corporate control： The first tier relation is between ultimate control rights and actual control rights, the second tier relation is between indirect control rights and direct control rights which are in actual control rights. This study can explain the resource allocation effects of corporate control, promote the development and improvement of the theory of the firm.展开更多
Based on the 1997-2007 panel data of 676 listed companies and in-depth interviews with the senior executives, independent directors, fund managers and securities analysts of these companies, this paper tries to analyz...Based on the 1997-2007 panel data of 676 listed companies and in-depth interviews with the senior executives, independent directors, fund managers and securities analysts of these companies, this paper tries to analyze the relationship between corporate govemance and firm performance from a sociological perspective. The results show that the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the Chinese institutional environment is sharply different from the predictions of the agency theory. The empirical findings from China lend strong support to the new institutional argument that ＂besf＇ corporate governance practices are socially ＂constructed＂ by various social forces and interests groups in specific social, political and cultural contexts, and how ＂good＂ a corporate governance practice is depends to a large extent on whether it fits in with the institutional environment in which it is embedded. There exists no universally ＂best＂ model of corporate governance across the world. Our empirical sociological study based on Chinese experience offers new perspectives and evidence for deconstructing the global myth ofcoroorate ~ovemance.展开更多
文摘The challenges of today＇s world require college students have different skills and know how to apply the knowledge acquired to solve new situations. The traditional mode of teaching with lectures, still present in many subjects of the engineering, seems to favor the development of the necessary skills, as active use of knowledge required [ 1 ]. However, they are using simulation games as an educational method in many universities in the world for the advantages they present for learning and the development of various skills, to simulate specific situations of professional activity [2]. This paper presents some background and requirements that games must meet educational purposes and propose their use in subjects related to economics, management and organization of production engineering programs where you can teach and learn from building products with simple items like cardboard paper on the theory of constructionism to build a product where people are building theories and knowledge in the mind [3]. The use of games is not widespread in universities in Argentina, however you can generate more motivating learning situations as it leaves the board becoming less abstract and more concrete learning. Classroom climate changes as students take a more participatory role and the teacher intervenes as a guide or facilitator of learning. This work could motivate teachers and researchers to promote their use in teaching and in future research to evaluate the potential of its use as a learning tool.
文摘With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted more and more attention. This paper points out that scholars have studied the allocation of corporate control from the angles of the agency cost theory, property rights theory, corporate finance theory, and the theory of corporate governance, which has great value. However, the existing theories also have some flaws on the allocation of corporate control. First, people still have different understandings and views over the meaning of corporate control. Secondly, the existing research theoretically only observes and studies an arrangement of sheer level control, the allocation between final control and real control. This paper argues to build the two-tier allocation of corporate control： The first tier relation is between ultimate control rights and actual control rights, the second tier relation is between indirect control rights and direct control rights which are in actual control rights. This study can explain the resource allocation effects of corporate control, promote the development and improvement of the theory of the firm.
基金the Shum Fellowship of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard Universitythe Young Scholar Start-up Research Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences+1 种基金the MIT-Harvard Economic Sociology Seminarthe participants provided helpful comments and suggestions
文摘Based on the 1997-2007 panel data of 676 listed companies and in-depth interviews with the senior executives, independent directors, fund managers and securities analysts of these companies, this paper tries to analyze the relationship between corporate govemance and firm performance from a sociological perspective. The results show that the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the Chinese institutional environment is sharply different from the predictions of the agency theory. The empirical findings from China lend strong support to the new institutional argument that ＂besf＇ corporate governance practices are socially ＂constructed＂ by various social forces and interests groups in specific social, political and cultural contexts, and how ＂good＂ a corporate governance practice is depends to a large extent on whether it fits in with the institutional environment in which it is embedded. There exists no universally ＂best＂ model of corporate governance across the world. Our empirical sociological study based on Chinese experience offers new perspectives and evidence for deconstructing the global myth ofcoroorate ~ovemance.
