This paper applies stochastic evolutionary game theory to analyzing the stability of cooperation among members against external opportunism in a multi-firm alliance.The authors first review the pros and cons of pertin...This paper applies stochastic evolutionary game theory to analyzing the stability of cooperation among members against external opportunism in a multi-firm alliance.The authors first review the pros and cons of pertinent traditional models,and then a stochastic game model on decisions is proposed,where a coordination parameter,a time variable,a punishment effect and bounded rationality are considered.The Gauss white noise is introduced to reflect the random disturbance in the process.Several sufficient criteria on stability are developed,which enable us to investigate"if-then"type scenarios and project the impact of different strategies.展开更多
基金supported by the Scientific Research Foundation of Shandong Province in 2014the Outstanding Young Scientist Award under Grant No.BS2014SF009+1 种基金the National Natural Science Research of China under Grant Nos.71373194,71101059,71172086,71272122,61304175the Ministry of Education of Humanities and Social Science Youth Fund Project under Grant No.13YJC630013
文摘This paper applies stochastic evolutionary game theory to analyzing the stability of cooperation among members against external opportunism in a multi-firm alliance.The authors first review the pros and cons of pertinent traditional models,and then a stochastic game model on decisions is proposed,where a coordination parameter,a time variable,a punishment effect and bounded rationality are considered.The Gauss white noise is introduced to reflect the random disturbance in the process.Several sufficient criteria on stability are developed,which enable us to investigate"if-then"type scenarios and project the impact of different strategies.
