期刊文献+
共找到2篇文章
< 1 >
每页显示 20 50 100
案外人异议之诉的程序适用——解读民诉法第204条中的“与原判决、裁定无关” 被引量:2
1
作者 蒋晓燕 杨恩乾 《法治研究》 2011年第10期95-98,共4页
我国新修改的《民事诉讼法》第204条保留了案外人异议制度,引进了案外人异议之诉,并与审判监督程序相结合,形成了独具特色的案外人执行救济制度。然而,实践中就如何选择适用审判监督程序和案外人异议之诉仍存在不少争议。本文认为应当... 我国新修改的《民事诉讼法》第204条保留了案外人异议制度,引进了案外人异议之诉,并与审判监督程序相结合,形成了独具特色的案外人执行救济制度。然而,实践中就如何选择适用审判监督程序和案外人异议之诉仍存在不少争议。本文认为应当根据既判力规则,以原判决的主文内容为判断标准,从执行效率和程序安定的价值角度,在执行救济制度中从严适用启动审判监督程序的条件。 展开更多
关键词 案外人异议之诉 审判监督程序 主文部分
下载PDF
Contemporary Analytic Philosophy and Bayesian Subjectivism: Why Both Are Incoherent 被引量:1
2
作者 Tom Vinci 《Journal of Philosophy Study》 2016年第10期578-585,共8页
My purpose in this paper is to argue for two separate, but related theses. The first is that contemporary analytic philosophy is incoherent. This is so, I argue, because its methods contain as an essential constituent... My purpose in this paper is to argue for two separate, but related theses. The first is that contemporary analytic philosophy is incoherent. This is so, I argue, because its methods contain as an essential constituent a non-classical conception of intuition that cannot be rendered consistent with a key tenet of analytic philosophy unless we allow a Bayesian-subjectivist epistemology. I argue for this within a discussion of two theories of intuition: a classical account as proposed by Descartes and a modem reliabilist account as proposed by Komblith, maintaining that reliabilist accounts require a commitment to Bayesian subjectivism about probability. However, and this is the second thesis, Bayesian subjecfivism is itself logically incoherent given three simple assumptions: (1) some empirical propositions are known, (2) any proposition that is known is assigned a degree of subjective credence of 1, and (3) every empirical proposition is evidentially relevant to at least one other proposition. I establish this using a formal reductio proof. I argue for the t-u-st thesis in section 1 and for the second in section 2. The final section contains a summary and conclusion. 展开更多
关键词 INTUITIONS BAYESIANISM probability SUBJECTIVISM RATIONALITY analytic philosophy evidence RELIABILISM
下载PDF
上一页 1 下一页 到第
使用帮助 返回顶部