With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted mor...With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted more and more attention. This paper points out that scholars have studied the allocation of corporate control from the angles of the agency cost theory, property rights theory, corporate finance theory, and the theory of corporate governance, which has great value. However, the existing theories also have some flaws on the allocation of corporate control. First, people still have different understandings and views over the meaning of corporate control. Secondly, the existing research theoretically only observes and studies an arrangement of sheer level control, the allocation between final control and real control. This paper argues to build the two-tier allocation of corporate control： The first tier relation is between ultimate control rights and actual control rights, the second tier relation is between indirect control rights and direct control rights which are in actual control rights. This study can explain the resource allocation effects of corporate control, promote the development and improvement of the theory of the firm.展开更多
Citizens of liberal democracies hold that their theory of governance is the most just, the most consistent with freedom, and the most likely to promote human flourishing. Yet, Canada, one of the world＇s most liberal ...Citizens of liberal democracies hold that their theory of governance is the most just, the most consistent with freedom, and the most likely to promote human flourishing. Yet, Canada, one of the world＇s most liberal and progressive democracies, has consistently been unable to come to terms with the minority nations in its midst. Why would national minorities resist joining fully in a just liberal democratic state？ And in the face of this refusal, what sort of relationship should the majority establish with these national minorities？ I argue that their resistance stems from an axiom of mainstream liberalism, ＂the civic unity assumption,＂ which holds that, ideally, all citizens endorse a single, unified state. While seemingly innocuous, this assumption extinguishes First Nations and Qurbrcois＇ claims to sovereignty. I conclude that this assumption--that majority and minority nationals must all work within the boundaries of a single constitutional structure--is ultimately an assimilative one, demanding that minority nationals merge their political community into the civic project of the majority. Drawing from John Rawls＇ The Law of Peoples, I argue that minority nations are best characterized as ＂peoples＂--complete societies with their own unique moral, cultural, and political traditions. If we accept this claim, we will come to see the multinational state differently： not as a political project uniting all citizens, but as a pact between nations; equal sovereign peoples coming together in a spirit of reciprocity to work out fair terms of social and political cooperation.展开更多
Constitutionally protected rights remove political issues from the control of the democratically elected legislature. Since such rights therefore limit the power of the majority, recent work in rights theory argues th...Constitutionally protected rights remove political issues from the control of the democratically elected legislature. Since such rights therefore limit the power of the majority, recent work in rights theory argues that the constitutional protection of rights is inconsistent with the fundamental democratic idea of government by the people. According to this view, democracies should assign the power to resolve questions regarding the nature and extent of individual rights to the majority. Constitutional attempts to remove such questions from the public agenda, it is argued, are disrespectful to citizens who disagree with the views embodied in the constitutionalized rights. I argue that this critique： （1） is insufficiently attentive to the question of when legislation by the majority constitutes a legitimate exercise of political power; and （2） underestimates the importance of securing the constitutive conditions of democratic self-government.展开更多
文摘With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted more and more attention. This paper points out that scholars have studied the allocation of corporate control from the angles of the agency cost theory, property rights theory, corporate finance theory, and the theory of corporate governance, which has great value. However, the existing theories also have some flaws on the allocation of corporate control. First, people still have different understandings and views over the meaning of corporate control. Secondly, the existing research theoretically only observes and studies an arrangement of sheer level control, the allocation between final control and real control. This paper argues to build the two-tier allocation of corporate control： The first tier relation is between ultimate control rights and actual control rights, the second tier relation is between indirect control rights and direct control rights which are in actual control rights. This study can explain the resource allocation effects of corporate control, promote the development and improvement of the theory of the firm.
文摘Citizens of liberal democracies hold that their theory of governance is the most just, the most consistent with freedom, and the most likely to promote human flourishing. Yet, Canada, one of the world＇s most liberal and progressive democracies, has consistently been unable to come to terms with the minority nations in its midst. Why would national minorities resist joining fully in a just liberal democratic state？ And in the face of this refusal, what sort of relationship should the majority establish with these national minorities？ I argue that their resistance stems from an axiom of mainstream liberalism, ＂the civic unity assumption,＂ which holds that, ideally, all citizens endorse a single, unified state. While seemingly innocuous, this assumption extinguishes First Nations and Qurbrcois＇ claims to sovereignty. I conclude that this assumption--that majority and minority nationals must all work within the boundaries of a single constitutional structure--is ultimately an assimilative one, demanding that minority nationals merge their political community into the civic project of the majority. Drawing from John Rawls＇ The Law of Peoples, I argue that minority nations are best characterized as ＂peoples＂--complete societies with their own unique moral, cultural, and political traditions. If we accept this claim, we will come to see the multinational state differently： not as a political project uniting all citizens, but as a pact between nations; equal sovereign peoples coming together in a spirit of reciprocity to work out fair terms of social and political cooperation.
文摘Constitutionally protected rights remove political issues from the control of the democratically elected legislature. Since such rights therefore limit the power of the majority, recent work in rights theory argues that the constitutional protection of rights is inconsistent with the fundamental democratic idea of government by the people. According to this view, democracies should assign the power to resolve questions regarding the nature and extent of individual rights to the majority. Constitutional attempts to remove such questions from the public agenda, it is argued, are disrespectful to citizens who disagree with the views embodied in the constitutionalized rights. I argue that this critique： （1） is insufficiently attentive to the question of when legislation by the majority constitutes a legitimate exercise of political power; and （2） underestimates the importance of securing the constitutive conditions of democratic self-government.
