This paper presents a framework to study consumers＇ behaviors and the equilibrium in a durable market which includes secondary markets. The author puts forward a two-period model extending the Tirole＇s literature, a...This paper presents a framework to study consumers＇ behaviors and the equilibrium in a durable market which includes secondary markets. The author puts forward a two-period model extending the Tirole＇s literature, and analyzes the equilibrium in the used durable market under perfect and imperfect information. Moreover, the conclusion shows the important role of information to consumers＇ behaviors and the equilibrium in the entire market.展开更多
This paper studies one managerial decision problem of the auction sites： how to combine penalties with commissions？ It is shown that when there exists secondary auction market, the auction whose penalty is a linear ...This paper studies one managerial decision problem of the auction sites： how to combine penalties with commissions？ It is shown that when there exists secondary auction market, the auction whose penalty is a linear function of the seller＇s commission will be more efficient than the auction with only commissions but no penalties. It has also been proven that using this strategy can maximize the expected revenue for the seller, the auction site and their total expected revenues.展开更多
文摘This paper presents a framework to study consumers＇ behaviors and the equilibrium in a durable market which includes secondary markets. The author puts forward a two-period model extending the Tirole＇s literature, and analyzes the equilibrium in the used durable market under perfect and imperfect information. Moreover, the conclusion shows the important role of information to consumers＇ behaviors and the equilibrium in the entire market.
基金The research was supported by NNSF of China and RGC of Hong Kong Joint Research Scheme(Project No.N_CityU103/02)also supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Project No. 70401004)
文摘This paper studies one managerial decision problem of the auction sites： how to combine penalties with commissions？ It is shown that when there exists secondary auction market, the auction whose penalty is a linear function of the seller＇s commission will be more efficient than the auction with only commissions but no penalties. It has also been proven that using this strategy can maximize the expected revenue for the seller, the auction site and their total expected revenues.
