This paper reviews the history and journey of employee transition since the era of industrial economy, and divides the journey of employee transition into four stages according to evolving employee status and roles: E...This paper reviews the history and journey of employee transition since the era of industrial economy, and divides the journey of employee transition into four stages according to evolving employee status and roles: Employee 1.0 refers to subordinates who have little initiative and simply obeys orders. Employee 2.0 refers to self-managers who become "strategic business unit(SBU)", "manager" and "CEO". Employee 3.0 refers to entrepreneurs whose role is maker or partner. Employee 4.0 is self-organizers who act as social man and pursues personal imperialism, online development and global sharing.展开更多
Realizing the importance of corporate governance, many governments have embarked upon various initiatives. In Malaysia, the recently introduced Green Book program aims to strengthen the corporate governance among the ...Realizing the importance of corporate governance, many governments have embarked upon various initiatives. In Malaysia, the recently introduced Green Book program aims to strengthen the corporate governance among the government-linked companies （GLCs）, in view of their significant contributions to the national socio-economic development. The Green Book initiative, launched in 2005, contains, among other things, a provision to create a high-performing board. Performance of GLCs, therefore, is likely to scale better heights with the modification of the constitution of the boards. The present paper aims to examine the association between the selected corporate governance attributes and performance of GLCs in 2010, approximately five years since the implementation of the transformation program. The regression analysis reveals that none of the selected corporate governance indicators has significantly impacted the performance of GLCs. The findings serve as a wake-up call to the authorities to appraise the effectiveness of the transformation program in enhancing the performance of GLCs.展开更多
Based on data for 2005 to 2012, an analysis of the compensation gap between top executives at different Chinese listed companies reveals the following conclusions. （1） The large compensation gap existing among execu...Based on data for 2005 to 2012, an analysis of the compensation gap between top executives at different Chinese listed companies reveals the following conclusions. （1） The large compensation gap existing among executives at listed Chinese companies--in some years even larger than that between rank-and-file employees--is mainly caused by the exorbitant executive compensation at a minority of companies. （2） Between 2005 and 2012, the compensation gap first widened dramatically and then diminished gradually. The leading factor in this fluctuation was the drastic rise and fall in the level of executive compensation at a handful of financial enterprises. The main reason for the narrowing of the compensation gap is central government regulation, which has helped to curb the excessive growth of executive compensation in society as a whole. （3） Even in the same round of fluctuation, state-owned listed companies differ markedly from non-state-owned listed companies in the way their executive compensation is decided. （4） State-owned listed companies＇ executive compensation strategies and their internal governance structure have not played their due role in moderating the overly rapid growth of their executives＇ compensation or in reducing the compensation gap.展开更多
文摘This paper reviews the history and journey of employee transition since the era of industrial economy, and divides the journey of employee transition into four stages according to evolving employee status and roles: Employee 1.0 refers to subordinates who have little initiative and simply obeys orders. Employee 2.0 refers to self-managers who become "strategic business unit(SBU)", "manager" and "CEO". Employee 3.0 refers to entrepreneurs whose role is maker or partner. Employee 4.0 is self-organizers who act as social man and pursues personal imperialism, online development and global sharing.
文摘Realizing the importance of corporate governance, many governments have embarked upon various initiatives. In Malaysia, the recently introduced Green Book program aims to strengthen the corporate governance among the government-linked companies （GLCs）, in view of their significant contributions to the national socio-economic development. The Green Book initiative, launched in 2005, contains, among other things, a provision to create a high-performing board. Performance of GLCs, therefore, is likely to scale better heights with the modification of the constitution of the boards. The present paper aims to examine the association between the selected corporate governance attributes and performance of GLCs in 2010, approximately five years since the implementation of the transformation program. The regression analysis reveals that none of the selected corporate governance indicators has significantly impacted the performance of GLCs. The findings serve as a wake-up call to the authorities to appraise the effectiveness of the transformation program in enhancing the performance of GLCs.
基金supported by Ministry of Education as a major project in philosophy and social sciences(11JZD015,12JZD030)the Special Fund for Basic Research at Central Universities(2012CXQT11,310400086)
文摘Based on data for 2005 to 2012, an analysis of the compensation gap between top executives at different Chinese listed companies reveals the following conclusions. （1） The large compensation gap existing among executives at listed Chinese companies--in some years even larger than that between rank-and-file employees--is mainly caused by the exorbitant executive compensation at a minority of companies. （2） Between 2005 and 2012, the compensation gap first widened dramatically and then diminished gradually. The leading factor in this fluctuation was the drastic rise and fall in the level of executive compensation at a handful of financial enterprises. The main reason for the narrowing of the compensation gap is central government regulation, which has helped to curb the excessive growth of executive compensation in society as a whole. （3） Even in the same round of fluctuation, state-owned listed companies differ markedly from non-state-owned listed companies in the way their executive compensation is decided. （4） State-owned listed companies＇ executive compensation strategies and their internal governance structure have not played their due role in moderating the overly rapid growth of their executives＇ compensation or in reducing the compensation gap.
