With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted mor...With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted more and more attention. This paper points out that scholars have studied the allocation of corporate control from the angles of the agency cost theory, property rights theory, corporate finance theory, and the theory of corporate governance, which has great value. However, the existing theories also have some flaws on the allocation of corporate control. First, people still have different understandings and views over the meaning of corporate control. Secondly, the existing research theoretically only observes and studies an arrangement of sheer level control, the allocation between final control and real control. This paper argues to build the two-tier allocation of corporate control： The first tier relation is between ultimate control rights and actual control rights, the second tier relation is between indirect control rights and direct control rights which are in actual control rights. This study can explain the resource allocation effects of corporate control, promote the development and improvement of the theory of the firm.展开更多
The application of behavioural theory to corporate finance is now attracting the attention of theoretical work. However, very little rigorous empirical work has been carried out to analyse the desirability of behaviou...The application of behavioural theory to corporate finance is now attracting the attention of theoretical work. However, very little rigorous empirical work has been carried out to analyse the desirability of behavioural biases in relation to financing decisions. The main results argue that managerial overconfidence provides an alternative determinant of capital structure. However, many questions remain to be explored, related to overconfidence measures and positive/negative effects of managerial overconfidence. Our paper assumes that the combination of financial theory and behavioural theory leads to better explanatory power. We follow two complementary goals. Firstly, we examine the dynamic trade-off model introducing a behavioural perspective. Secondly, we propose extending the pecking order analysis to incorporate overconfidence in Shyam-Sunder and Myers＇s model. We use a sample of Tunisian firms and employ panel-data estimation procedures to account for endogeneity and spurious correlation issues. Our results confirm the assumption that manager confidence is positively related to debt level. Overconfident managers underestimate the probability of financial distress and will choose higher levels of debt than they would if they were ＂rational＂.展开更多
文摘With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted more and more attention. This paper points out that scholars have studied the allocation of corporate control from the angles of the agency cost theory, property rights theory, corporate finance theory, and the theory of corporate governance, which has great value. However, the existing theories also have some flaws on the allocation of corporate control. First, people still have different understandings and views over the meaning of corporate control. Secondly, the existing research theoretically only observes and studies an arrangement of sheer level control, the allocation between final control and real control. This paper argues to build the two-tier allocation of corporate control： The first tier relation is between ultimate control rights and actual control rights, the second tier relation is between indirect control rights and direct control rights which are in actual control rights. This study can explain the resource allocation effects of corporate control, promote the development and improvement of the theory of the firm.
文摘The application of behavioural theory to corporate finance is now attracting the attention of theoretical work. However, very little rigorous empirical work has been carried out to analyse the desirability of behavioural biases in relation to financing decisions. The main results argue that managerial overconfidence provides an alternative determinant of capital structure. However, many questions remain to be explored, related to overconfidence measures and positive/negative effects of managerial overconfidence. Our paper assumes that the combination of financial theory and behavioural theory leads to better explanatory power. We follow two complementary goals. Firstly, we examine the dynamic trade-off model introducing a behavioural perspective. Secondly, we propose extending the pecking order analysis to incorporate overconfidence in Shyam-Sunder and Myers＇s model. We use a sample of Tunisian firms and employ panel-data estimation procedures to account for endogeneity and spurious correlation issues. Our results confirm the assumption that manager confidence is positively related to debt level. Overconfident managers underestimate the probability of financial distress and will choose higher levels of debt than they would if they were ＂rational＂.
