在创造力的研究中,变革型与交易型领导的作用一直是学者们关注的热点,然而对于这两种领导风格与员工创造力之间的关系长久以来学者们并未达成一致。通过对西安一高校的MBA学员及其下属进行问卷调查,探讨了不同组织内部环境下领导风格与...在创造力的研究中,变革型与交易型领导的作用一直是学者们关注的热点,然而对于这两种领导风格与员工创造力之间的关系长久以来学者们并未达成一致。通过对西安一高校的MBA学员及其下属进行问卷调查,探讨了不同组织内部环境下领导风格与员工创造力的权变关系。采用层次线性模型(Hierarchy Linear Model,HLM)方法进行了验证,研究结果发现在不同的企业内部环境下,交易型领导表现出对员工创造力的不同影响,而变革型领导对员工创造力的作用无显著变化:(1)当企业CEO表现出变革型领导行为,上级交易型领导对员工创造力的消极作用能够显著降低;(2)组织的集权程度越高,上级交易型领导对员工创造力的消极作用越大,反之,柔性控制程度越高,上级交易型领导对员工创造力的消极作用越小;(3)企业文化价值观能够减弱上级交易型领导对员工创造力的消极作用。展开更多
Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other？ We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007-2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers （CEOs） simul...Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other？ We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007-2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers （CEOs） simultaneously incur self-interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push-and-pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short-term and long-term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm.展开更多
文摘在创造力的研究中,变革型与交易型领导的作用一直是学者们关注的热点,然而对于这两种领导风格与员工创造力之间的关系长久以来学者们并未达成一致。通过对西安一高校的MBA学员及其下属进行问卷调查,探讨了不同组织内部环境下领导风格与员工创造力的权变关系。采用层次线性模型(Hierarchy Linear Model,HLM)方法进行了验证,研究结果发现在不同的企业内部环境下,交易型领导表现出对员工创造力的不同影响,而变革型领导对员工创造力的作用无显著变化:(1)当企业CEO表现出变革型领导行为,上级交易型领导对员工创造力的消极作用能够显著降低;(2)组织的集权程度越高,上级交易型领导对员工创造力的消极作用越大,反之,柔性控制程度越高,上级交易型领导对员工创造力的消极作用越小;(3)企业文化价值观能够减弱上级交易型领导对员工创造力的消极作用。
基金The authors are grateful for the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant Nos. 71702084 and 71372179）, and through the research projects of the Humanity and Social Science Youth foundation of the Ministry of Education of China （No. 17YJC630112）.
文摘Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other？ We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007-2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers （CEOs） simultaneously incur self-interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push-and-pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short-term and long-term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm.
