When nations are threatened with violence, the choices they make in order to cope with the challenges of war reflect different alternative possible reactions. They may choose to fight their battles fiercely or they ma...When nations are threatened with violence, the choices they make in order to cope with the challenges of war reflect different alternative possible reactions. They may choose to fight their battles fiercely or they may prefer to surrender and, sometimes, the options lay in-between. The question, therefore, is what makes nations fight and, more importantly, what causes them eventually to win or lose a war. In search of an answer to this riddle, this study examines secondary sources about three historical case studies taken from the first half of the twentieth century that deal with the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the Soviet Union. It concentrates on the part played by national ethos regarding the manner in which each of them handled their wars in moments of crisis and reveals how national ethos is intertwined with another phenomenon of social psychology that turns it into a crucial factor in the management of international campaigns： enthusiasm for war. A wide historical perspective, however, shows that even though the right kind of national ethos is essential for winning a war, it is far from being enough. Hence national ethos proves, at the end of the day, to be a necessary condition for military victory, but certainly not a sufficient one.展开更多
文摘When nations are threatened with violence, the choices they make in order to cope with the challenges of war reflect different alternative possible reactions. They may choose to fight their battles fiercely or they may prefer to surrender and, sometimes, the options lay in-between. The question, therefore, is what makes nations fight and, more importantly, what causes them eventually to win or lose a war. In search of an answer to this riddle, this study examines secondary sources about three historical case studies taken from the first half of the twentieth century that deal with the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the Soviet Union. It concentrates on the part played by national ethos regarding the manner in which each of them handled their wars in moments of crisis and reveals how national ethos is intertwined with another phenomenon of social psychology that turns it into a crucial factor in the management of international campaigns： enthusiasm for war. A wide historical perspective, however, shows that even though the right kind of national ethos is essential for winning a war, it is far from being enough. Hence national ethos proves, at the end of the day, to be a necessary condition for military victory, but certainly not a sufficient one.
