The paper estimates the returns to overeducation by the Over-Required and Undereducation(ORU)model.The estimated results indicate that the returns to overeducation are positive,but lower than the returns to required e...The paper estimates the returns to overeducation by the Over-Required and Undereducation(ORU)model.The estimated results indicate that the returns to overeducation are positive,but lower than the returns to required education,which suggests that while overeducated employees’earnings are diminished,they still can benefit from it.The paper also attempts to estimate the returns to overeducation by occupations,industries and regions.The result shows that in the field where educational level has much to do with the skills required by employers,education-job match has a greater effect on one’s earnings,such as professionals and skilled persons.On the contrary,education-job mismatch has little effect on one’s earnings,such as non-skilled employees,administrative and clerical employees.In addition,the returns to overeducation are lower or insignificant for those working in competitive but lower paid industries and areas.Conversely,the returns to overeducation are higher for those working in the highly monopolized and highly paid industry and area.It can be argued that regardless of the incidence of overeducation,those with higher level of education prefer to choose the lower level of job in these industries and areas.展开更多
We study strong stability of Nash equilibria in load balancing games of m(m 2)identical servers,in which every job chooses one of the m servers and each job wishes to minimize its cost,given by the workload of the ser...We study strong stability of Nash equilibria in load balancing games of m(m 2)identical servers,in which every job chooses one of the m servers and each job wishes to minimize its cost,given by the workload of the server it chooses.A Nash equilibrium(NE)is a strategy profile that is resilient to unilateral deviations.Finding an NE in such a game is simple.However,an NE assignment is not stable against coordinated deviations of several jobs,while a strong Nash equilibrium(SNE)is.We study how well an NE approximates an SNE.Given any job assignment in a load balancing game,the improvement ratio(IR)of a deviation of a job is defined as the ratio between the pre-and post-deviation costs.An NE is said to be aρ-approximate SNE(ρ1)if there is no coalition of jobs such that each job of the coalition will have an IR more thanρfrom coordinated deviations of the coalition.While it is already known that NEs are the same as SNEs in the 2-server load balancing game,we prove that,in the m-server load balancing game for any given m 3,any NE is a(5/4)-approximate SNE,which together with the lower bound already established in the literature yields a tight approximation bound.This closes the final gap in the literature on the study of approximation of general NEs to SNEs in load balancing games.To establish our upper bound,we make a novel use of a graph-theoretic tool.展开更多
文摘The paper estimates the returns to overeducation by the Over-Required and Undereducation(ORU)model.The estimated results indicate that the returns to overeducation are positive,but lower than the returns to required education,which suggests that while overeducated employees’earnings are diminished,they still can benefit from it.The paper also attempts to estimate the returns to overeducation by occupations,industries and regions.The result shows that in the field where educational level has much to do with the skills required by employers,education-job match has a greater effect on one’s earnings,such as professionals and skilled persons.On the contrary,education-job mismatch has little effect on one’s earnings,such as non-skilled employees,administrative and clerical employees.In addition,the returns to overeducation are lower or insignificant for those working in competitive but lower paid industries and areas.Conversely,the returns to overeducation are higher for those working in the highly monopolized and highly paid industry and area.It can be argued that regardless of the incidence of overeducation,those with higher level of education prefer to choose the lower level of job in these industries and areas.
基金supported by the Taishan Scholarship of the Government of Shandong Province of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.11071142)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China (Grant No.ZR2010AM034)
文摘We study strong stability of Nash equilibria in load balancing games of m(m 2)identical servers,in which every job chooses one of the m servers and each job wishes to minimize its cost,given by the workload of the server it chooses.A Nash equilibrium(NE)is a strategy profile that is resilient to unilateral deviations.Finding an NE in such a game is simple.However,an NE assignment is not stable against coordinated deviations of several jobs,while a strong Nash equilibrium(SNE)is.We study how well an NE approximates an SNE.Given any job assignment in a load balancing game,the improvement ratio(IR)of a deviation of a job is defined as the ratio between the pre-and post-deviation costs.An NE is said to be aρ-approximate SNE(ρ1)if there is no coalition of jobs such that each job of the coalition will have an IR more thanρfrom coordinated deviations of the coalition.While it is already known that NEs are the same as SNEs in the 2-server load balancing game,we prove that,in the m-server load balancing game for any given m 3,any NE is a(5/4)-approximate SNE,which together with the lower bound already established in the literature yields a tight approximation bound.This closes the final gap in the literature on the study of approximation of general NEs to SNEs in load balancing games.To establish our upper bound,we make a novel use of a graph-theoretic tool.
