The research performed analysis on causes of asymmetric information of agricultural product supply chain and made conclusion on operation mechanism and characteristics of supply chain based on asymmetric information. ...The research performed analysis on causes of asymmetric information of agricultural product supply chain and made conclusion on operation mechanism and characteristics of supply chain based on asymmetric information. Finally, the research detailed profit sharing of agricultural product supply chain in the context of asymmetric information and proposed suggestions, providing references of pricing and profit sharing of supply chains of agricultural products.展开更多
Under green supply chain mode, how to Carry out the distribution of profits between subjects is an important problem. Through the comparison of the green supply chain benefit allocation of non-cooperative game and coo...Under green supply chain mode, how to Carry out the distribution of profits between subjects is an important problem. Through the comparison of the green supply chain benefit allocation of non-cooperative game and cooperative game the payoffmatrix, it is clearly that the necessity of interest distribution cooperative game. Put general manufacturing enterprises of green supply chain as the research object, using Shapley value method for theory analysis and example verification, vertifys that enterprise synergy gains more than their own separate management, and puts forward a feasible path of supply chain collaboration through the construction of the distribution of interests coordination model.展开更多
Considering a one-supplier and two-retailer supply chain setting in which the supplier makes contacts with retailers in sequence based on FCFS(first–come–first-service) principle, the authors investigate the margina...Considering a one-supplier and two-retailer supply chain setting in which the supplier makes contacts with retailers in sequence based on FCFS(first–come–first-service) principle, the authors investigate the marginal effect of extra-gain guilty fairness concerns of supply chain members on the contract design, supply chain's profit and profit distribution. When the supplier considers distributional fairness of loss aversion and extra-gain guilty, extra-gain guilty concern reduces the optimal wholesale and retail price, and improves supply chain performance. When the first or the second retailer considers distributional fairness and peer-induced fairness, extra-gain guilty concerns decrease the optimal wholesale and retail price but increase the profit of all supply chain members only when the level of loss aversion is large enough and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2. However, when the level of loss aversion is small and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2, extra-gain guilty has no influence on supply chain performance. The analysis reveals that the supply chain performance can be further improved by considering fairness of extra-gain guilty.展开更多
基金Supported by S&T Development Strategy Program of Tianjin(15ZLZLZF00210)S&T Development Strategy Program of Tianjin(15ZLZLZF00390)~~
文摘The research performed analysis on causes of asymmetric information of agricultural product supply chain and made conclusion on operation mechanism and characteristics of supply chain based on asymmetric information. Finally, the research detailed profit sharing of agricultural product supply chain in the context of asymmetric information and proposed suggestions, providing references of pricing and profit sharing of supply chains of agricultural products.
文摘Under green supply chain mode, how to Carry out the distribution of profits between subjects is an important problem. Through the comparison of the green supply chain benefit allocation of non-cooperative game and cooperative game the payoffmatrix, it is clearly that the necessity of interest distribution cooperative game. Put general manufacturing enterprises of green supply chain as the research object, using Shapley value method for theory analysis and example verification, vertifys that enterprise synergy gains more than their own separate management, and puts forward a feasible path of supply chain collaboration through the construction of the distribution of interests coordination model.
基金partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71571079,71301122,71671133,71131004Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University under Grant No.NCET-13-0228
文摘Considering a one-supplier and two-retailer supply chain setting in which the supplier makes contacts with retailers in sequence based on FCFS(first–come–first-service) principle, the authors investigate the marginal effect of extra-gain guilty fairness concerns of supply chain members on the contract design, supply chain's profit and profit distribution. When the supplier considers distributional fairness of loss aversion and extra-gain guilty, extra-gain guilty concern reduces the optimal wholesale and retail price, and improves supply chain performance. When the first or the second retailer considers distributional fairness and peer-induced fairness, extra-gain guilty concerns decrease the optimal wholesale and retail price but increase the profit of all supply chain members only when the level of loss aversion is large enough and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2. However, when the level of loss aversion is small and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2, extra-gain guilty has no influence on supply chain performance. The analysis reveals that the supply chain performance can be further improved by considering fairness of extra-gain guilty.
