Grossman和Helpman(1994)的"保护待售(Protection For Sale)"模型认为政治上能够组成利益集团的产业会受到贸易保护,否则会受到"惩罚性"的负保护。一些主要针对发达中国家的检验支持了模型的主要结论,但是该模型对...Grossman和Helpman(1994)的"保护待售(Protection For Sale)"模型认为政治上能够组成利益集团的产业会受到贸易保护,否则会受到"惩罚性"的负保护。一些主要针对发达中国家的检验支持了模型的主要结论,但是该模型对发展中国家贸易政策的解释能力不足,这主要是因为发展中国家的制度特征、发展路径和国际环境与发达国家不同。展开更多
本文以Grossman and Helpman(1994)的保护待售模型和Grossman and Helpman(1996)带有外国直接投资的扩展模型为基础,运用1993-2000年省际面板数据,使用最小二乘法和工具变量的估计方法,以及关键变量的多种计算口径估算了中国政府的目标...本文以Grossman and Helpman(1994)的保护待售模型和Grossman and Helpman(1996)带有外国直接投资的扩展模型为基础,运用1993-2000年省际面板数据,使用最小二乘法和工具变量的估计方法,以及关键变量的多种计算口径估算了中国政府的目标函数。本文认为,政府对国有企业保护政策的内生性过程,是对外国直接投资所带来的收益与国有企业因为竞争加剧所带来的损失所进行的权衡。经验估计结果表明,在政府目标函数中,国有企业产出所占的比重是消费者福利所占比重的6倍。显示在国有企业面临外资企业竞争时,政府对国有企业的保护,一定程度上消减了消费者福利。展开更多
Employing Grossman and Helpman＇s ＂protection for sale＂ model, this article uses data on anti-dumping actions from 1999 to 2009 to perform a quantitative analysis of factors influencing India＇s determinations of an...Employing Grossman and Helpman＇s ＂protection for sale＂ model, this article uses data on anti-dumping actions from 1999 to 2009 to perform a quantitative analysis of factors influencing India＇s determinations of anti-dumping duties against China, and reveals the micro-formation mechanism of economic conflicts between China and India. We find that the political power of India＇s anti-dumping plaintiffs markedly increases the tariff level of its final determinations and that the relationship between the import penetration ratio and duty rates depends upon whether the plaintiffs are politically organized. Further, there is a significant positive correlation between India＇s anti-dumping duty rates and its unfavorable trade balance with China. This indicates that in determining anti-dumping duties, Indian authorities are clearly influenced by the political clout of their domestic interest groups. They are also motivated by the desire to keep down China and gain the upper hand in the face-off between the ＂dragon and the elephant.＂展开更多
文摘Grossman和Helpman(1994)的"保护待售(Protection For Sale)"模型认为政治上能够组成利益集团的产业会受到贸易保护,否则会受到"惩罚性"的负保护。一些主要针对发达中国家的检验支持了模型的主要结论,但是该模型对发展中国家贸易政策的解释能力不足,这主要是因为发展中国家的制度特征、发展路径和国际环境与发达国家不同。
文摘本文以Grossman and Helpman(1994)的保护待售模型和Grossman and Helpman(1996)带有外国直接投资的扩展模型为基础,运用1993-2000年省际面板数据,使用最小二乘法和工具变量的估计方法,以及关键变量的多种计算口径估算了中国政府的目标函数。本文认为,政府对国有企业保护政策的内生性过程,是对外国直接投资所带来的收益与国有企业因为竞争加剧所带来的损失所进行的权衡。经验估计结果表明,在政府目标函数中,国有企业产出所占的比重是消费者福利所占比重的6倍。显示在国有企业面临外资企业竞争时,政府对国有企业的保护,一定程度上消减了消费者福利。
基金an interim product of"Research into a Strategic System to Enable Chinese Enterprises to Cope with Trade Barriers against the Background of Prevailing International Trade Protectionism,"a project funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China for Youth(71203228)
文摘Employing Grossman and Helpman＇s ＂protection for sale＂ model, this article uses data on anti-dumping actions from 1999 to 2009 to perform a quantitative analysis of factors influencing India＇s determinations of anti-dumping duties against China, and reveals the micro-formation mechanism of economic conflicts between China and India. We find that the political power of India＇s anti-dumping plaintiffs markedly increases the tariff level of its final determinations and that the relationship between the import penetration ratio and duty rates depends upon whether the plaintiffs are politically organized. Further, there is a significant positive correlation between India＇s anti-dumping duty rates and its unfavorable trade balance with China. This indicates that in determining anti-dumping duties, Indian authorities are clearly influenced by the political clout of their domestic interest groups. They are also motivated by the desire to keep down China and gain the upper hand in the face-off between the ＂dragon and the elephant.＂
