A large magnitude-9.0 earthquake struck northeast Japan on March 11, 2011. Thirty minutes later, a tsunami reached Tokyo Electric Power Corporation （TEPCO）＇s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, and the emergen...A large magnitude-9.0 earthquake struck northeast Japan on March 11, 2011. Thirty minutes later, a tsunami reached Tokyo Electric Power Corporation （TEPCO）＇s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, and the emergency diesel generators submerged under water. Three units of the reactor experienced meltdown, and hydrogen explosions occurred at reactor houses. The RIKEN Nishina Center （RNC） contributed to the radiation screening effort by providing human resources, instruments, and transportation. The RNC also carried out extraction work and sample tests for soil contamination. Last summer, RIKEN was legally required to save 15% （equivalent to 3.3 MW） of its allocated electricity in its contract, making it extremely difficult to conduct experiments using accelerators. Accelerator operation was thus reduced to a minimum during the first half of the year. The RNC has a gas-turbine-based co-generation system （CGS） with an electrical capacity of 6.5 MW. The CGS was operated non-stop until the end of the year. RIKEN is constructing two sets of CGSs, each with a capacity of 1.5 MW to be commissioned this autumn.展开更多
Joint loan guarantee contracts and mutual guarantee contracts among SMEs form the basis of SME guarantee networks. The expansion of these networks increases the fragility of a financial system as a result of the regio...Joint loan guarantee contracts and mutual guarantee contracts among SMEs form the basis of SME guarantee networks. The expansion of these networks increases the fragility of a financial system as a result of the regional and industrial risk contagion embedded within them. By providing a theoretical framework of a loan guarantee network, a method is proposed for calculating the amount of risk spillover caused by loan guarantees taking the perspective of the entire network. In addition,the route of risk contagion in guarantee networks is analyzed, revealing that when default risk shocks occur, risk contagion travels along the nodes not once but for several rounds and that the risk control of one firm cannot prevent these systemic risks. Therefore, a risk control scheme is designed based on the location and importance of firms in the network. Using data from a real guarantee network,we demonstrate that identifying the node locations of firms' in the guarantee network(including the coritivity and closeness of the firm) can help in understanding risk contagion mechanisms and preventing systemic credit risk before a crisis occurs.展开更多
文摘A large magnitude-9.0 earthquake struck northeast Japan on March 11, 2011. Thirty minutes later, a tsunami reached Tokyo Electric Power Corporation （TEPCO）＇s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, and the emergency diesel generators submerged under water. Three units of the reactor experienced meltdown, and hydrogen explosions occurred at reactor houses. The RIKEN Nishina Center （RNC） contributed to the radiation screening effort by providing human resources, instruments, and transportation. The RNC also carried out extraction work and sample tests for soil contamination. Last summer, RIKEN was legally required to save 15% （equivalent to 3.3 MW） of its allocated electricity in its contract, making it extremely difficult to conduct experiments using accelerators. Accelerator operation was thus reduced to a minimum during the first half of the year. The RNC has a gas-turbine-based co-generation system （CGS） with an electrical capacity of 6.5 MW. The CGS was operated non-stop until the end of the year. RIKEN is constructing two sets of CGSs, each with a capacity of 1.5 MW to be commissioned this autumn.
基金supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71172186,71472148,71572144 and 71502138
文摘Joint loan guarantee contracts and mutual guarantee contracts among SMEs form the basis of SME guarantee networks. The expansion of these networks increases the fragility of a financial system as a result of the regional and industrial risk contagion embedded within them. By providing a theoretical framework of a loan guarantee network, a method is proposed for calculating the amount of risk spillover caused by loan guarantees taking the perspective of the entire network. In addition,the route of risk contagion in guarantee networks is analyzed, revealing that when default risk shocks occur, risk contagion travels along the nodes not once but for several rounds and that the risk control of one firm cannot prevent these systemic risks. Therefore, a risk control scheme is designed based on the location and importance of firms in the network. Using data from a real guarantee network,we demonstrate that identifying the node locations of firms' in the guarantee network(including the coritivity and closeness of the firm) can help in understanding risk contagion mechanisms and preventing systemic credit risk before a crisis occurs.
