Based on the panel data, we analyze the US commercial banks' CRT. According to the study, we find that the introduction of CRT will increase the level of banks' liquid risk. The performance of bank mainly is that it...Based on the panel data, we analyze the US commercial banks' CRT. According to the study, we find that the introduction of CRT will increase the level of banks' liquid risk. The performance of bank mainly is that its supervision and review of risk will drop, based on the impact of asymmetric information, commercial Banks transfer the bad loans to investors. Through the analysis we can see that after the transfer of credit risk in commercial bank did not increase income and reduce risk. Because commercial Banks can extend more bad loans to expand its lending scale, and bad loans will increase the bank overall risk.展开更多
Joint loan guarantee contracts and mutual guarantee contracts among SMEs form the basis of SME guarantee networks. The expansion of these networks increases the fragility of a financial system as a result of the regio...Joint loan guarantee contracts and mutual guarantee contracts among SMEs form the basis of SME guarantee networks. The expansion of these networks increases the fragility of a financial system as a result of the regional and industrial risk contagion embedded within them. By providing a theoretical framework of a loan guarantee network, a method is proposed for calculating the amount of risk spillover caused by loan guarantees taking the perspective of the entire network. In addition,the route of risk contagion in guarantee networks is analyzed, revealing that when default risk shocks occur, risk contagion travels along the nodes not once but for several rounds and that the risk control of one firm cannot prevent these systemic risks. Therefore, a risk control scheme is designed based on the location and importance of firms in the network. Using data from a real guarantee network,we demonstrate that identifying the node locations of firms' in the guarantee network(including the coritivity and closeness of the firm) can help in understanding risk contagion mechanisms and preventing systemic credit risk before a crisis occurs.展开更多
文摘Based on the panel data, we analyze the US commercial banks' CRT. According to the study, we find that the introduction of CRT will increase the level of banks' liquid risk. The performance of bank mainly is that its supervision and review of risk will drop, based on the impact of asymmetric information, commercial Banks transfer the bad loans to investors. Through the analysis we can see that after the transfer of credit risk in commercial bank did not increase income and reduce risk. Because commercial Banks can extend more bad loans to expand its lending scale, and bad loans will increase the bank overall risk.
基金supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71172186,71472148,71572144 and 71502138
文摘Joint loan guarantee contracts and mutual guarantee contracts among SMEs form the basis of SME guarantee networks. The expansion of these networks increases the fragility of a financial system as a result of the regional and industrial risk contagion embedded within them. By providing a theoretical framework of a loan guarantee network, a method is proposed for calculating the amount of risk spillover caused by loan guarantees taking the perspective of the entire network. In addition,the route of risk contagion in guarantee networks is analyzed, revealing that when default risk shocks occur, risk contagion travels along the nodes not once but for several rounds and that the risk control of one firm cannot prevent these systemic risks. Therefore, a risk control scheme is designed based on the location and importance of firms in the network. Using data from a real guarantee network,we demonstrate that identifying the node locations of firms' in the guarantee network(including the coritivity and closeness of the firm) can help in understanding risk contagion mechanisms and preventing systemic credit risk before a crisis occurs.