广义民主、人民民主、党治民主——当代中国本土民主的由来

当代中国存在一种本土民主的观念,这种观念经过了从理想到实践,从革命到建设的演变过程。在这个过程中,民主观念依次呈现为三种类型,即作为理想原初形态的广义民主,作为开国政治承诺的人民民主,以及作为现实变通选择的党治民主。广义民主其实就是"自由人的联合体",那是一种没有国家暴力的,完全自由、平等的联合体,这只能作为一种终极的理想而存在。人民民主是中国共产党人在革命年代创造的民主观念,意味着各阶层人民联合起来,通过人民代表大会制度来过一种更高级的民主生活。但这种民主存在操作上的困难,实践中的解决方式是强调先进分子的领导。在中国共产党的领导下,人民民主成为需要实现的目标,现实中运行的则是另一种民主,那就是党治民主。在党治民主中,有各种不同的民主内容,如确认民主、咨询民主、维权民主、问责民主等,它们都是执政党治理国家的辅助性工具。从党治民主到人民民主,是一种性质上的变化,意味着人民在民主生活中的主体性地位不断增强,在目前的阶段主要表现为激活人民代表大会制度的过程。

Is There Such Thing as ＇Populist Constitutionalism＇？ The Case of Hungary

The paper deals with recent deviations from the shared values of con- stitutionalism towards a kind of ＇populist, illiberal constitutionalism＇ introduced by Hungary＇s new constitution in 2011. The populism of FIDESZ was directed against all elites, including the ones that designed the 1989 constitutional system （in which FIDESZ also participated）, claiming that it was time for a new revolution. This is why PM Viktor Orban characterized the results of the 2010 elections as a ＇revo- lution of the ballot boxes＇. His intention with this revolution was to eliminate all checks and balances, and even the parliamentary rotation of governing parties. His vision for a new constitutional order----one in which his political party occupies the centre stage of Hungarian political life and puts an end to debates over values has now been entrenched in the new constitution. The paper argues that this current Hungarian constitutional system was made possible by FIDESZ＇ anti-pluralist nationalist populism, but is not necessarily based on a true commitment to expressing the will of the people via ＇illiberal constitutionalism＇. The populist government rather misuses the country＇s lack of constitutional culture. Adherence to constitutional patriotism would mean that FIDESZ would have to endorse what John Rawls once called ＇constitutional essentials＇. The core of this kind of con- stitutional patriotism is a constitutional culture centred on universalist liberal democratic norms and values. Instead, the current Hungarian constitutional system is confronted with unconstitutional patriotism, a kind of nationalism that violates constitutional essentials in the name of ＇national constitutional identity＇.

Upscaling Illiberalism： Class, Contradiction, and the Rise and Rise of the Populist Right in Post- socialist Central Europe

Recent liberal political science analysis has highlighted media, manipu- lation, and populist political trickery in the apparently sudden rise of the new Right in Europe and the USA. I suggest that a robust engagement with the actual social transformations over which liberalism has presided since 1989 is imperative. Anthropological work on class processes and the rise of neo-nationalist populism in Central and Eastern Europe has been strong in developing a more relational, pro- cessual, and embedded vision. In the current paper, I am looking at the phases and spaces of the rise of iUiberalism as a popular political sensibility in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, I am interested in its gradual upscaling to the level of the nation state and, through the ＂Visegrad bloc＂ to the EU. I argue that both the emergence and step-by-step upscaling of illiberal political sensibilities are explained by class relational processes and the regionally uneven Polanyi-type ＂counter- movements＂ against liberalizations that they brought forth.

Populism, Sovereigntism, and the Unlikely Re- Emergence of the Territorial Nation-State

In the last three decades, the rise of a populist challenge to the liberal political mainstream exposed how shallow the supposed victory of global liberalism was, even in its heartlands in Europe and North America. Exclusive nationalism and nativism, identity politics, critiques of globaiisation and internationalism, and calls for democratic re-empowerment of the demos have converged politically on a new locus of inflated territorial, indeed ＇border＇ sovereignty, aligning the caU of ＇taking back control＇ on behalf of a radically re-defined community （＇we＇） with a defensive re-territorialisation of power along existing fault lines of nation-statism. In this paper, I argue that the very same call has become the new common political denominator for all populist platforms and parties across Europe. I argue that populists across the conventional left-fight divide have deployed a rigidly territo- rialised concept of popular sovereignty in order to bestow intellectual coherence and communicative power to the otherwise disparate strands of their anti-utopian cri- tiques of globalisation. In spite of significant ideological differences between so- called fight- and left-wing populism, in the short-term the two populist projects have sought to stage their performances of sovereigntism on, behind or inside the borders of the existing nation-states.

Social Origins and Political Participation of Private Business Owners in Beijing

Over the past 30 years, Chinese society has undergone an enormous social transition. Along with the rise of a private economy, private business owners have emerged as a new social stratum, which attracts academic attention domestically and internationally. As for the social origins of the private business owners, some of the private business owners are former cadres and current members of the Chinese Communist Party（CCP）. A question rarely pursued is what effects these ties have on political participation of＂ private business owners. The paper explores this question on the basis of data gathered in a representative survey of private enterprises in 2006. The study shows that the Chinese private business owners have diverse social origins, and their behavior in terms of political participation is also distinct in some ways. When it comes to the patterns of political participation of the private business owners, CCP members and former officials among private business owners indeed have unique characteristics in their access to political resources, but the patterns of political participation vary between these two groups. Furthermore, there are also considerable differences between members of the CCP and democratic parties in China in these respects. These findings cast doubt on the common use of CCP membership and occupational experience as cadre as interchangeable indicators for the ＂political capital＂ of business owners. A more differentiated understanding of the nature of political capital and mechanisms by which it is put to use by private entrepreneurs in China is called for.

The Growth of Intra-party Democracy and Its Implications for China＇s Democratic Future

During the past decades, while the Chinese Communist Party （CCP） has continued to consolidate its political leadership and refused to tolerate any opposition parties, intra-party democracy has been emphasized repeatedly and expanded vigorously by Chinese Communist leaders as an alternative to electoral democracy or liberal democracy characterized by multiparty competition. Various democratic experiments have been conducted and many democratic elements introduced at all levels in the CCP. Although the growth of intra-party democracy is limited, these great efforts and achievements have profound implications for China＇s democratic future. The growth of intra-party democracy not only reflects the CCP＇s continuous efforts to institutionalize the rules of elite politics and fight against widespread corruption, but might also provide a good approach for political transition to democracy with Chinese characteristics in the future.