百年传承永续发展Inheriting One Hundred Developing Sustainably公司概况永发印务(东莞)有限公司是永发印务有限公司(香港)旗下全资企业,成立于2001年,注册资本2.5亿港元,占地面积3.3万平方米,建筑面积2.6万平方米。公司主要生产药包...百年传承永续发展Inheriting One Hundred Developing Sustainably公司概况永发印务(东莞)有限公司是永发印务有限公司(香港)旗下全资企业,成立于2001年,注册资本2.5亿港元,占地面积3.3万平方米,建筑面积2.6万平方米。公司主要生产药包、酒包、食品包装及高档日化品为主的精品包装。公司园区环境优美,生产车间宽敞明亮,办公环境严谨有序,员工生活设施舒适齐全,是当地经济发展的支柱企业之一,综合实力在国内同行业中居于前列。展开更多
Two complementary firms＇ information sharing and security investment are investigated. When two complementary firms with heterogeneous assets are both breached, it is assumed that they suffer different losses which a...Two complementary firms＇ information sharing and security investment are investigated. When two complementary firms with heterogeneous assets are both breached, it is assumed that they suffer different losses which are associated with their information assets. Some insights about optimal strategies for the firms and the attacker are obtained by the game theory, which forms a comparison with those derived from substitutable firms, and those derived from complementary firms with homogenous loss. In addition, both the unit transform cost of investment and the extent of firms＇loss affect the optimal strategies.Assuming that firms can control information sharing, security investments and both of them, respectively, the effect of the social planner is further analyzed on the information sharing, firms＇ aggregate defence, the aggregate attack and social total cost. Finally, some policy advice is provided through numerical simulation. Results show that firms are willing to choose security investment centrally rather than individually, but an intervention in information sharing by the social planner may not necessarily be preferable.展开更多
文摘百年传承永续发展Inheriting One Hundred Developing Sustainably公司概况永发印务(东莞)有限公司是永发印务有限公司(香港)旗下全资企业,成立于2001年,注册资本2.5亿港元,占地面积3.3万平方米,建筑面积2.6万平方米。公司主要生产药包、酒包、食品包装及高档日化品为主的精品包装。公司园区环境优美,生产车间宽敞明亮,办公环境严谨有序,员工生活设施舒适齐全,是当地经济发展的支柱企业之一,综合实力在国内同行业中居于前列。
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71371050)
文摘Two complementary firms＇ information sharing and security investment are investigated. When two complementary firms with heterogeneous assets are both breached, it is assumed that they suffer different losses which are associated with their information assets. Some insights about optimal strategies for the firms and the attacker are obtained by the game theory, which forms a comparison with those derived from substitutable firms, and those derived from complementary firms with homogenous loss. In addition, both the unit transform cost of investment and the extent of firms＇loss affect the optimal strategies.Assuming that firms can control information sharing, security investments and both of them, respectively, the effect of the social planner is further analyzed on the information sharing, firms＇ aggregate defence, the aggregate attack and social total cost. Finally, some policy advice is provided through numerical simulation. Results show that firms are willing to choose security investment centrally rather than individually, but an intervention in information sharing by the social planner may not necessarily be preferable.
