As the most important institutional arrangement in modem corporate, corporate governance is playing an increasingly important role in Chinese market economy, and its effect to auditor change is also being increasingly...As the most important institutional arrangement in modem corporate, corporate governance is playing an increasingly important role in Chinese market economy, and its effect to auditor change is also being increasingly tapped in recent years. This paper summarizes the reason of auditor switching, especially the elements of corporate governance. Then by selecting the A-share listed companies in China as a sample, the authors use statistical test and logistic regression analysis to explore how the 15 factors of corporate governance which are based on the indicators of Nankai University evaluation system affect auditor switching. The results show that the largest proportion of shareholding, the proportion of independent directors, and board meetings which on behalf of the level of corporate governance, have a significant and negative correlation with auditor switching. The results also show that full disclosure, litigation, and arbitration which on behave of the level of corporate governance have a significant positive correlation with auditor switching.展开更多
In China, an emerging economy, where investor protection is relatively weak, it is worthwhile and interesting to investigate whether independent external auditing, a sort of external corporate governance mechanism, ex...In China, an emerging economy, where investor protection is relatively weak, it is worthwhile and interesting to investigate whether independent external auditing, a sort of external corporate governance mechanism, exerts its influence. Using a sample of all A-share listed firms in 2005, this paper investigates the effects of independent external auditing on corporate governance via three aspects： （1） choice of auditing institution; （2） auditing fee; and （3） auditing opinion for annual reports. Empirical results show that, with worse agency problems in firms, the possibility of employing the “Big 41” to audit its annual reports is bigger. When determining auditing fees, auditing institutions take both firms＇ agency problems and the firm size into account. When issuing qualified opinions for poor-performing firms, auditors do not consider agency problems embedded in concentrated ownership. Overall, external independent auditing plays a limited role in corporate governance.展开更多
文摘As the most important institutional arrangement in modem corporate, corporate governance is playing an increasingly important role in Chinese market economy, and its effect to auditor change is also being increasingly tapped in recent years. This paper summarizes the reason of auditor switching, especially the elements of corporate governance. Then by selecting the A-share listed companies in China as a sample, the authors use statistical test and logistic regression analysis to explore how the 15 factors of corporate governance which are based on the indicators of Nankai University evaluation system affect auditor switching. The results show that the largest proportion of shareholding, the proportion of independent directors, and board meetings which on behalf of the level of corporate governance, have a significant and negative correlation with auditor switching. The results also show that full disclosure, litigation, and arbitration which on behave of the level of corporate governance have a significant positive correlation with auditor switching.
文摘In China, an emerging economy, where investor protection is relatively weak, it is worthwhile and interesting to investigate whether independent external auditing, a sort of external corporate governance mechanism, exerts its influence. Using a sample of all A-share listed firms in 2005, this paper investigates the effects of independent external auditing on corporate governance via three aspects： （1） choice of auditing institution; （2） auditing fee; and （3） auditing opinion for annual reports. Empirical results show that, with worse agency problems in firms, the possibility of employing the “Big 41” to audit its annual reports is bigger. When determining auditing fees, auditing institutions take both firms＇ agency problems and the firm size into account. When issuing qualified opinions for poor-performing firms, auditors do not consider agency problems embedded in concentrated ownership. Overall, external independent auditing plays a limited role in corporate governance.
