Operational mechanism of supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies is not ideal, the supervisory effect of the listed company rely on features of supervisors＇ board and member of the supervisors＇ board. Based on...Operational mechanism of supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies is not ideal, the supervisory effect of the listed company rely on features of supervisors＇ board and member of the supervisors＇ board. Based on the comparison of supervisory audit in Britain, Germany, France and Japan, and the empirical research on 100 listed companies in a share market, the paper analyses supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies, and proposes some perfection solutions to strengthen supervisory audit.展开更多
China＇s supervisory mechanism is peculiar in that it integrated the supervisory board （SB） of the German corporate governance （CG） model in 1993, and has simultaneously adopted the audit committee （AC） of the A...China＇s supervisory mechanism is peculiar in that it integrated the supervisory board （SB） of the German corporate governance （CG） model in 1993, and has simultaneously adopted the audit committee （AC） of the Anglo-American model since 2002. This paper aims to reveal the effectiveness of SBs in coordination with ACs in China. The regulations for Anglo-American and Chinese systems are compared and further evidence is provided through interviewing two governors of all listed companies in the SSE and of 79 investment corporations in Hangzhou. Both statements indicate that China still faces difficulties and problems in meeting the two indexes of independence and expertise of supervision to give effective supervisory functions. Both opinions differed in terms of the co-ordination of SBs and ACs in the future. The evidence presented forms a basis for proposals of how key characteristics of effectiveness and co-ordination can be improved to make supervisory functions in China more effective.展开更多
文摘Operational mechanism of supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies is not ideal, the supervisory effect of the listed company rely on features of supervisors＇ board and member of the supervisors＇ board. Based on the comparison of supervisory audit in Britain, Germany, France and Japan, and the empirical research on 100 listed companies in a share market, the paper analyses supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies, and proposes some perfection solutions to strengthen supervisory audit.
文摘China＇s supervisory mechanism is peculiar in that it integrated the supervisory board （SB） of the German corporate governance （CG） model in 1993, and has simultaneously adopted the audit committee （AC） of the Anglo-American model since 2002. This paper aims to reveal the effectiveness of SBs in coordination with ACs in China. The regulations for Anglo-American and Chinese systems are compared and further evidence is provided through interviewing two governors of all listed companies in the SSE and of 79 investment corporations in Hangzhou. Both statements indicate that China still faces difficulties and problems in meeting the two indexes of independence and expertise of supervision to give effective supervisory functions. Both opinions differed in terms of the co-ordination of SBs and ACs in the future. The evidence presented forms a basis for proposals of how key characteristics of effectiveness and co-ordination can be improved to make supervisory functions in China more effective.
