The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the increasing intervention of the state in the private sphere-as is evidenced in labor laws, consumer rights, bioethics, and Internet crimes-is compatible with the liberal ...The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the increasing intervention of the state in the private sphere-as is evidenced in labor laws, consumer rights, bioethics, and Internet crimes-is compatible with the liberal ideal of neutrality, or, on the contrary, whether it can be seen as a turning point towards the position of communitarian or republican authors, for whom the state must endorse a substantive good. Such a turning point could lead to a reformulation of the public and private spheres, and of course, raise questions over which values justify which kinds of intervention. This paper will cover these debates in three parts： First, by presenting briefly the history of the liberal conception of rights, I will try to show that, from a starting point based mostly on individual protection, the liberal tradition has become more interventionist, which can be seen through the notion of ＂claim rights.＂ Departing from John Rawls＇s work, I will argue that this notion allows for some level of intervention, without betraying liberal neutrality. Subsequently, I will discuss the difference between this kind of intervention and the ones proclaimed by communitarians and republicans authors： The former will be illustrated by Michael Sandel＇s criticism of Rawls in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and the later by Richard Dagger＇s position in Civic Virtues, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. Finally, in the third part, we＇ll discuss whether liberal principles can be harmonized with the republican and communitarian focus on civic virtues and good life.展开更多
The purpose of my paper is to show that the virtue which Aristotle calls philia, not in the strong sense of friendship, but in the weaker one of amiability （cf. NE 1126b 10-1 i 27a 12）, represents a particular kind ...The purpose of my paper is to show that the virtue which Aristotle calls philia, not in the strong sense of friendship, but in the weaker one of amiability （cf. NE 1126b 10-1 i 27a 12）, represents a particular kind of bond, related to the fact of being part of a community, and therefore has a very strong relationship, although the two do not coincide with that kind of friendship which Aristotle calls politike philia （civic friendship）. My thesis, then, is that there is a strong relationship, among Aristotelian ethical works, between philia/amiability, like-mindedness （homonoia）, and politike philia. The key to discovering this link is the Aristotelian account of social relations： in Aristotle＇s opinion, the polls is not a commercial alliance, as if it were a public limited company, in which the common good depends on the fact that everyone has a strong economic interest in the company, but is a common life in which citizens are concerned about each other＇s moral goodness. The link between them is therefore a kind of friendship, which is of course civic and therefore does not presuppose love. In the political context, the knowledge of the nature of the constitution, in fact, is a sufficient condition for there being benevolence towards other citizens. Since philia/amiability shows deep analogies with homonoia as well, for both represent, in different ways, peculiar features of the citizenship, the thesis I want to support is not that philia/amiability, homonoia, and politike philia coincide, but that philia/amiability and homonoia are two different expressions of the same disposition, namely politike philia： according to my view, the former is the expression ofpolitike philia on a relational and moral side, while the latter represents the attitude of the citizens towards each other when implicated in political decisions.展开更多
文摘The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the increasing intervention of the state in the private sphere-as is evidenced in labor laws, consumer rights, bioethics, and Internet crimes-is compatible with the liberal ideal of neutrality, or, on the contrary, whether it can be seen as a turning point towards the position of communitarian or republican authors, for whom the state must endorse a substantive good. Such a turning point could lead to a reformulation of the public and private spheres, and of course, raise questions over which values justify which kinds of intervention. This paper will cover these debates in three parts： First, by presenting briefly the history of the liberal conception of rights, I will try to show that, from a starting point based mostly on individual protection, the liberal tradition has become more interventionist, which can be seen through the notion of ＂claim rights.＂ Departing from John Rawls＇s work, I will argue that this notion allows for some level of intervention, without betraying liberal neutrality. Subsequently, I will discuss the difference between this kind of intervention and the ones proclaimed by communitarians and republicans authors： The former will be illustrated by Michael Sandel＇s criticism of Rawls in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and the later by Richard Dagger＇s position in Civic Virtues, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. Finally, in the third part, we＇ll discuss whether liberal principles can be harmonized with the republican and communitarian focus on civic virtues and good life.
文摘The purpose of my paper is to show that the virtue which Aristotle calls philia, not in the strong sense of friendship, but in the weaker one of amiability （cf. NE 1126b 10-1 i 27a 12）, represents a particular kind of bond, related to the fact of being part of a community, and therefore has a very strong relationship, although the two do not coincide with that kind of friendship which Aristotle calls politike philia （civic friendship）. My thesis, then, is that there is a strong relationship, among Aristotelian ethical works, between philia/amiability, like-mindedness （homonoia）, and politike philia. The key to discovering this link is the Aristotelian account of social relations： in Aristotle＇s opinion, the polls is not a commercial alliance, as if it were a public limited company, in which the common good depends on the fact that everyone has a strong economic interest in the company, but is a common life in which citizens are concerned about each other＇s moral goodness. The link between them is therefore a kind of friendship, which is of course civic and therefore does not presuppose love. In the political context, the knowledge of the nature of the constitution, in fact, is a sufficient condition for there being benevolence towards other citizens. Since philia/amiability shows deep analogies with homonoia as well, for both represent, in different ways, peculiar features of the citizenship, the thesis I want to support is not that philia/amiability, homonoia, and politike philia coincide, but that philia/amiability and homonoia are two different expressions of the same disposition, namely politike philia： according to my view, the former is the expression ofpolitike philia on a relational and moral side, while the latter represents the attitude of the citizens towards each other when implicated in political decisions.
