Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.

SPECTRUM SHARING IN ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES FOR COGNITIVE RADIOS

We study a spectrum sharing problem where multiple systems coexist and interfere with each other. First, an analysis is proposed for distributed spectrum sharing based on Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) in Cognitive Radios (CRs). In one-shot game, selfish and rational CRs greedily full spread their own spectrum space in order to maximize their own rates, which leads to Nash Equilibrium (N.E.). But with long term interaction, i.e., Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), CRs can come to cooperate and acquire the social optimal point by using different evolutionary strategies such as Tit For Tat (TFT), Generous TFT (GTFT), etc. Also we compare the performances of the different evolutionary strategies in noise-free and noisy environments for two-player games. Finally, N-player IPD (N-IPD) is simulated to verify our conclusions that TFT is a good strategy for spectrum sharing in CRs.

The Importance of Hunting and Hunting Areas for Big and Small Game （Food） for the Tourism Development in the Crna River Basin in the Republic of Macedonia

The Crna River is a river in the Republic of Macedonia, right tributary to Vardar. Its source is in the mountains of Western Macedonia, west of Krusevo. It flows through the village of Sopotnica, and southwards through the plains east of Bitola. The name means ＂black river＂ in Macedonian, which is translation for its former Thracian name. The purpose of this paper is to show the hunting and hunting areas for big and small Game （food）, the structure of the areas of certain hunting, fishing, fishing water objects, fish species, fishponds up to 20 years shown by municipalities and individual farms with ponds in the basin of Black River. It had used statistical data for the hunting grounds by areas, fishing ponds. Fish is very diverse in this river. Hunting in the Black River basin is of great importance for the economy of Republic of Macedonia. It is also a necessary factor for development of other economic activities.

Coexistence and Extinction Pattern of Asymmetric Cyclic Game Species in a Square Lattice

The co-evolutionary dynamics of a cyclic game system is investigated in a two-dimensional square lattice with the asymmetrical rates for three species. Different with the well-mixed system, coexistence and extinction emerge alternately in the system, where a ＂zero-one＂ behavior is robust for a small population size, whereas, the system is predominated by coexistence for a big population one. We study in detail the influence about the fluctuation to the change of the state, and find that the difference between the maximal amplitude about the fluctuation and the average intensity determines which state the system is ultimately. In addition, we introduce Ports energy to explain the reason of the ＂zero-one＂ behavior. It is shown that the average Ports energy per site is the distance to the ＂zero-one＂ behavior in the model.

Game Modeling and Strategic Behavior Analysis in Public Goods Provision： Evidence From Water Resources Management

The utility of public goods vary with the behaviors of stakeholders （players）, and it is appropriate to study effective supply and management of public goods with game modeling and analysis. The comparison effect is the key issue of public good provision both in theoretical analysis and in practice. One major contribution of the paper is the extension of Clarke-Groves mechanism, to achieve which strategic behavior analysis is applied through the analysis and the comparison effect among various stakeholders in different stages is created and highly emphasized. In the first section of this paper, the definition of integrated water resources management （IWRM）, the importance of stakeholder participation as well as some models and methods that have been applied are illustrated. Following this, the framework of analysis is elaborated, in which the scenario and aims are shown, and it is claimed that game theory is the main approach, which includes both cooperative games and non-cooperative games. To achieve the aims of the public project, five approaches from game theory are able to cover the entire process of the project, and the fourth approach on interest compensation mechanism is the highlight of the research. After this, the interest compensation mechanism is demonstrated in the model section, and is proved to be an incentive compatible mechanism that makes each stakeholder choose to behave in accordance with the interest of the entire project. The Clarke-Groves mechanism is applied and extended in establishing the model, and the utility change by the comparison among stakeholders （defined as the comparison effect） is involved. In the application section, a water project is analyzed in consideration of various stakeholders, and other possible applications are also indicated.

后唐庄宗宠伶人

帝幼善音律~①,故伶人多有宠~④,常侍左右;帝或时自傅粉墨,与优人共戏于庭,以悦刘夫人~④,优名谓之“李天下”.尝因为优~④,自呼曰“李天下,李天下”,优人敬新磨遽前批其颊~⑤。帝失色,群优亦骇愕,新磨徐曰:“理天下者只有一人,尚谁呼邪.”帝悦,厚赐之。帝尝畋于中牟~⑥,践民稼,中牟令当马前谏曰:“陛下为民父母.