The study of bilateral markets, in an equilibrium perspective, began to catch labor economists＇ attention in recent decades since they allow the prediction of market anomalies or flaws. In the study there appears a m...The study of bilateral markets, in an equilibrium perspective, began to catch labor economists＇ attention in recent decades since they allow the prediction of market anomalies or flaws. In the study there appears a matching process whose theoretical analysis is known as bilateral assignment model. Among the different examples of bilateral markets and the assignment processes linked with them is the real-estate market. Its characteristics raise problems which affect low-income groups mainly, for which the state＇s mission is critical. These problems motivated the authors of the present work to provide a solution by using the results obtained in the assignment models with capacity restrictions. In this work the study is made of the real-estate market with the variant of the state intervention in housing assignment. The situation raised here is that the state has the task of facilitating low-income people access to housing so that they can participate in the real-estate market. In order to be able to fulfill its work, the state has a list of people willing to sell or rent homes thanks to tax cuts or some compensation offered by the state, for example. However, the state budget is limited and its participation will have a certain quota. Like the bilateral market, this new model solves the problem in which buyers and sellers are assigned to one another so that they can satisfy a property of stability. It is also shown that it is possible to find assignments for which there are no buyer-seller coalitions affecting such stability. A method is shown by means of which it is possible to solve the problem of truncating the benefits given to buyers and sellers under the emergency of budget cut.展开更多
文摘The study of bilateral markets, in an equilibrium perspective, began to catch labor economists＇ attention in recent decades since they allow the prediction of market anomalies or flaws. In the study there appears a matching process whose theoretical analysis is known as bilateral assignment model. Among the different examples of bilateral markets and the assignment processes linked with them is the real-estate market. Its characteristics raise problems which affect low-income groups mainly, for which the state＇s mission is critical. These problems motivated the authors of the present work to provide a solution by using the results obtained in the assignment models with capacity restrictions. In this work the study is made of the real-estate market with the variant of the state intervention in housing assignment. The situation raised here is that the state has the task of facilitating low-income people access to housing so that they can participate in the real-estate market. In order to be able to fulfill its work, the state has a list of people willing to sell or rent homes thanks to tax cuts or some compensation offered by the state, for example. However, the state budget is limited and its participation will have a certain quota. Like the bilateral market, this new model solves the problem in which buyers and sellers are assigned to one another so that they can satisfy a property of stability. It is also shown that it is possible to find assignments for which there are no buyer-seller coalitions affecting such stability. A method is shown by means of which it is possible to solve the problem of truncating the benefits given to buyers and sellers under the emergency of budget cut.
