在电子商务的快速发展和消费者需求日益多变的背景下,研发与生产的复杂性不断增加,成本的不确定性也随之上升。这要求企业在设计和制造产品时,必须进行更紧密的合作创新。然而,在电子商务领域,企业之间的联合产品开发在成本分摊和利润...在电子商务的快速发展和消费者需求日益多变的背景下,研发与生产的复杂性不断增加,成本的不确定性也随之上升。这要求企业在设计和制造产品时,必须进行更紧密的合作创新。然而,在电子商务领域,企业之间的联合产品开发在成本分摊和利润分配方面面临着一系列新的挑战,特别是在如何有效激励各方以实现协同创新和优化资源配置方面。在本文中,我们对涉及两个具有不同开发能力的公司——研发所与生产商,联合开发产品进行了概念化与模型化,研究了研发所与生产商协同合作的最优成本分担激励策略,并在此模型下给出了最佳技术创新水平以及研发所的最佳成本分担比例。研究结果显示,当生产商的技术创新水平大于等于某一阈值时,研发所应该选择成本共担策略,且成本共担比例与研发所的技术创新弹性系数、研发所的单位技术创新收益系数成正比,在研发所与生产商的合作机制中,具有主从关系的Stackelberg博弈均衡收益要优于Nash博弈均衡下的收益。分析进一步表明,研发所通过分担生产商的部分成本可以提高双方的技术创新水平,实现研发所与生产商收益均增长的情况,从而达到帕累托改进。Against the backdrop of rapid development of e-commerce and increasingly changing consumer demands, the complexity of research and production continues to increase, and the uncertainty of costs also rises. This requires companies to engage in closer collaborative innovation when designing and manufacturing products. However, in the field of e-commerce, joint product development between enterprises faces a series of new challenges in cost sharing and profit distribution, especially in how to effectively motivate all parties to achieve collaborative innovation and optimize resource allocation. In this article, we conceptualized and modeled the joint development of products involving two companies with different development capabilities—R&D institutes and manufacturers. We studied the optimal cost sharing incentive strategy for collaborative cooperation between R&D institutes and manufacturers, and provided the optimal level of technological innovation and the optimal cost sharing ratio for R&D institutes under this model. The research results show that when the technological innovation level of the manufacturer is greater than or equal to a certain threshold, the R&D institute should choose a cost sharing strategy, and the cost sharing ratio is proportional to the R&D institute’s technological innovation elasticity coefficient and the R&D institute’s unit technological innovation return coefficient. In the cooperation mechanism between the R&D institute and the manufacturer, the equilibrium return of Stackelberg game with a master-slave relationship is better than that of Nash game equilibrium. The analysis further shows that by sharing part of the producer’s costs the R&D institute can increase the level of technological innovation on both sides and achieve a situation where both the R&D institute and the producer’s revenues increase, thus achieving a Pareto improvement.展开更多
文摘在电子商务的快速发展和消费者需求日益多变的背景下,研发与生产的复杂性不断增加,成本的不确定性也随之上升。这要求企业在设计和制造产品时,必须进行更紧密的合作创新。然而,在电子商务领域,企业之间的联合产品开发在成本分摊和利润分配方面面临着一系列新的挑战,特别是在如何有效激励各方以实现协同创新和优化资源配置方面。在本文中,我们对涉及两个具有不同开发能力的公司——研发所与生产商,联合开发产品进行了概念化与模型化,研究了研发所与生产商协同合作的最优成本分担激励策略,并在此模型下给出了最佳技术创新水平以及研发所的最佳成本分担比例。研究结果显示,当生产商的技术创新水平大于等于某一阈值时,研发所应该选择成本共担策略,且成本共担比例与研发所的技术创新弹性系数、研发所的单位技术创新收益系数成正比,在研发所与生产商的合作机制中,具有主从关系的Stackelberg博弈均衡收益要优于Nash博弈均衡下的收益。分析进一步表明,研发所通过分担生产商的部分成本可以提高双方的技术创新水平,实现研发所与生产商收益均增长的情况,从而达到帕累托改进。Against the backdrop of rapid development of e-commerce and increasingly changing consumer demands, the complexity of research and production continues to increase, and the uncertainty of costs also rises. This requires companies to engage in closer collaborative innovation when designing and manufacturing products. However, in the field of e-commerce, joint product development between enterprises faces a series of new challenges in cost sharing and profit distribution, especially in how to effectively motivate all parties to achieve collaborative innovation and optimize resource allocation. In this article, we conceptualized and modeled the joint development of products involving two companies with different development capabilities—R&D institutes and manufacturers. We studied the optimal cost sharing incentive strategy for collaborative cooperation between R&D institutes and manufacturers, and provided the optimal level of technological innovation and the optimal cost sharing ratio for R&D institutes under this model. The research results show that when the technological innovation level of the manufacturer is greater than or equal to a certain threshold, the R&D institute should choose a cost sharing strategy, and the cost sharing ratio is proportional to the R&D institute’s technological innovation elasticity coefficient and the R&D institute’s unit technological innovation return coefficient. In the cooperation mechanism between the R&D institute and the manufacturer, the equilibrium return of Stackelberg game with a master-slave relationship is better than that of Nash game equilibrium. The analysis further shows that by sharing part of the producer’s costs the R&D institute can increase the level of technological innovation on both sides and achieve a situation where both the R&D institute and the producer’s revenues increase, thus achieving a Pareto improvement.
