Based on the value sensitivity of options to underlying and corresponding treaty clauses, this paper poses a measuring method of path dependence intensity, which breaks the setup where the path dependence intensity is...Based on the value sensitivity of options to underlying and corresponding treaty clauses, this paper poses a measuring method of path dependence intensity, which breaks the setup where the path dependence intensity is only classified roughly and which becomes a deep study on path-dependent options. Then, its feasibility, instructions, and application to compare the path dependence intensity of sorts of options will be discussed.展开更多
This paper deals with the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell an item Of high-tech. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives that are not mu...This paper deals with the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell an item Of high-tech. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives that are not mutually consistent. However, if the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. In addition, if he wants to sell his high-tech to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.展开更多
In the field of sequencing of secret number,an important problem is how to establish an efficient and secure protocol for sorting the secret number.As a powerful tool in solving privacy sequencing problems,secure mult...In the field of sequencing of secret number,an important problem is how to establish an efficient and secure protocol for sorting the secret number.As a powerful tool in solving privacy sequencing problems,secure multipart computation is more and more popular in anonymous voting and online auction.In the present study,related secure computation protocol for sequencing problem is not many by far.In order to improve the efficiency and safety,we propose a security sequencing protocol based on homomorphic encryption.We also give analysis of correctness and security to highlight its feasibility.展开更多
This paper develops a sequential fair Stackelberg auction model in which each of the two risk-seeking insiders has an equal chance to be a leader or follower at each auction stage. The authors establish the existence,...This paper develops a sequential fair Stackelberg auction model in which each of the two risk-seeking insiders has an equal chance to be a leader or follower at each auction stage. The authors establish the existence, uniqueness of sequential fair Stackelberg equilibria （in short, FSE） when both insiders adopt linear strategies, and find that at the sequential equilibria such two insiders compete aggressively that cause the liquidity of market to drop, the information to be revealed and the profit to go down very rapidly while the trading intensity goes substantially high. Furthermore, the authors also give continuous versions of corresponding parameters in the sequential FSE in closed forms, as the time interval between auctions approaches to zero. It shows that such parameters go down or up approximately exponentially and all of the liquidity of market, information and profit become zero while the trading intensity goes to infinity. Some numerical simulations about the sequential FSE are also illustrated.展开更多
To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method ...To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method to present a new scoring function that converts each bid into a score.Twokinds of multi-attribute auction models are introduced in terms of scoring rules and bidding objectivefunctions.Equilibrium bidding strategies,procurer's revenue comparisons and optimal auction designare characterized in these two models.Finally,this article discusses some improvement of robustnessof our models,with respect to the assumptions.展开更多
In many auctions,buyers know beforehand little about objects to be sold in the future.Whether and how to reveal information about future objects is an important decision problem for sellers.In this paper,two objects a...In many auctions,buyers know beforehand little about objects to be sold in the future.Whether and how to reveal information about future objects is an important decision problem for sellers.In this paper,two objects are sold sequentially and each buyer's valuation for the second object is k times that for the first one,and the true value of k is sellers' private information.The authors identify three factors which affect sellers' revelation strategies: The market's competition intensity which is characterized by the number of buyers,buyers' prior information about the second object,and the difference degree between two objects which is characterized by k.The authors give not only conditions under which revealing information about the second object in advance benefits the seller,but also the optimal releasing amount of information in the market with two sellers and one seller,respectively.展开更多
文摘Based on the value sensitivity of options to underlying and corresponding treaty clauses, this paper poses a measuring method of path dependence intensity, which breaks the setup where the path dependence intensity is only classified roughly and which becomes a deep study on path-dependent options. Then, its feasibility, instructions, and application to compare the path dependence intensity of sorts of options will be discussed.
文摘This paper deals with the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell an item Of high-tech. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives that are not mutually consistent. However, if the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. In addition, if he wants to sell his high-tech to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.51307004
文摘In the field of sequencing of secret number,an important problem is how to establish an efficient and secure protocol for sorting the secret number.As a powerful tool in solving privacy sequencing problems,secure multipart computation is more and more popular in anonymous voting and online auction.In the present study,related secure computation protocol for sequencing problem is not many by far.In order to improve the efficiency and safety,we propose a security sequencing protocol based on homomorphic encryption.We also give analysis of correctness and security to highlight its feasibility.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.10721101China’s National 973 Project(2006CB805900)+1 种基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.11161011 and 11365005Guizhou EDKY[2016]027,Guizhou QKZYD[2016]4006,Guizhou ZDXK[2016]8
文摘This paper develops a sequential fair Stackelberg auction model in which each of the two risk-seeking insiders has an equal chance to be a leader or follower at each auction stage. The authors establish the existence, uniqueness of sequential fair Stackelberg equilibria （in short, FSE） when both insiders adopt linear strategies, and find that at the sequential equilibria such two insiders compete aggressively that cause the liquidity of market to drop, the information to be revealed and the profit to go down very rapidly while the trading intensity goes substantially high. Furthermore, the authors also give continuous versions of corresponding parameters in the sequential FSE in closed forms, as the time interval between auctions approaches to zero. It shows that such parameters go down or up approximately exponentially and all of the liquidity of market, information and profit become zero while the trading intensity goes to infinity. Some numerical simulations about the sequential FSE are also illustrated.
基金supported by the Foundation for the Author of National Excellent Doctoral Dissertation of China under Grant No. 200159National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 70571014
文摘To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method to present a new scoring function that converts each bid into a score.Twokinds of multi-attribute auction models are introduced in terms of scoring rules and bidding objectivefunctions.Equilibrium bidding strategies,procurer's revenue comparisons and optimal auction designare characterized in these two models.Finally,this article discusses some improvement of robustnessof our models,with respect to the assumptions.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.61273206 and 71471069
文摘In many auctions,buyers know beforehand little about objects to be sold in the future.Whether and how to reveal information about future objects is an important decision problem for sellers.In this paper,two objects are sold sequentially and each buyer's valuation for the second object is k times that for the first one,and the true value of k is sellers' private information.The authors identify three factors which affect sellers' revelation strategies: The market's competition intensity which is characterized by the number of buyers,buyers' prior information about the second object,and the difference degree between two objects which is characterized by k.The authors give not only conditions under which revealing information about the second object in advance benefits the seller,but also the optimal releasing amount of information in the market with two sellers and one seller,respectively.
